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### Neolib

#### Movements against neoliberalism are growing in Latin America and spill over -- the plans reifies neoliberalism --- ethics require we de-link to preserve the environment and indigenous culture.

Harris 8 (Richard L Harris: Professor of Global Studies at California State University, Monterey Bay; Managing Editor of the Journal of Developing Societies (SAGE India); and Coordi­ nating Editor of Latin American Perspectives (SAGE USA). “Latin America’s Response to Neoliberalism and Globalization,” http://www.nuso.org/upload/articulos/3506\_2.pdf)

The economic, political and social development of the Latin American and Caribbean countries is obstructed by the power relations and international structures that regulate the world capitalist system. The structures of this system provide a hierarchical political and economic exoskeleton that constrains all national efforts to pursue any significant degree of self-directed, inward-oriented, balanced and environmentally sustainable development. Indeed, the geopolitical power structures that preserve and support the world capitalist system have made it almost impossible for the governments of the core as well as the peripheral countries in this system to pursue a path of inward-oriented, equitable, democratically controlled and environmentally sustainable development (Amin 2001b:20). Since the 1980s, inter-American relations and the economic, political and social development of the Latin American and Caribbean states have been shaped by these geo­ political structures and the neoliberal strategic agenda put forward by the government of the United States of America (USA), the major transnational corporations and the three major international financial institutions (IFIs) that operate in the Latin American and Caribbean region (Harris and Nef, 2008). This later group of IFIs includes the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The policies of these IFIs based in Washington generally follow the dictates of the government of the USA due to the controlling influence that it exercises over these institutions. Their agenda for the Latin American and Caribbean region gives priority to promoting and protecting the interests of the major investors and transnational corporations that are largely based in the USA and operate in the region. It also serves to maintain and strengthen the geopolitical hegemony of the USA over the Western Hemisphere (Harris and Nef). But conditions are changing. Washington’s neoliberal agenda for controlling the capi­ talist development of the Western Hemisphere and maintaining US hegemony over the region is increasingly threatened by a progressive alternative agenda for the regio­ nal integration of the Latin American and Caribbean countries that has begun to gain widespread support in the region. This alternative agenda for the region calls for the autonomous economic development of the region free of the hegemonic control and influence of the USA and the IFIs based in Washington. Not only does this type of development pose a fundamental threat to the hegemony of the USA in the region, it threatens the dominance of transnational capital throughout the Americas. Moreover, it also poses a significant threat to the global expansion and integration of the world capitalist system in general and to the global hegemonic coalition led by the government and transnational corporations of the USA. Today, political and economic strategies are being developed for moving from the prevailing export-oriented neoliberal model of economic development to new in­ ward-oriented models of sustainable development, tailored to the diverse conditions, economic capacities, political structures, natural endowments and cultural values of the societies involved. Moreover, a growing number of international and regional civil society organizations have emerged in recent years to create such alternatives. What the forums, networks, programs, and activities of these various types of organizations reveal is that there is a growing international network of organizations and social movements committed to promoting new, more equitable forms of international cooperation and regulation that support inward-oriented and sustainable development as well as genuine democracy at the regional and national levels. At the same time, these organizations argue that the present global trading regime that has been erected under the WTO should and can be replaced by a new global trading system that replaces the present system of so-called free but in fact unfair trade, with a sys­ tem that ensures «fair trade» and promotes South-South economic exchange and coo­ peration. Most of the progressive alternatives advocated by these organizations and the new left-leaning governments that have been elected to office in the region give priority to aligning the external relations of the countries in the region to the internal needs of the majority of the population. That is to say, decisions about what to export and what to import should be aligned with the needs of the population rather than the interests of transnational capitalists and transnational corporations or the hegemonic interests of the USA. Some of these alternative strategies involve what Walden Bello (2002) has referred to as «deglobalization.» That is to say, they involve unlinking the economies of these peripheral capitalist societies from the advanced capitalist centers of the world economy, particularly in the USA. They also involve throwing off the constraints that have been imposed upon the economic policies and structures of the­ se countries by the IFIs (IMF, World Bank, and IDB), the WTO and the other agents and regulatory regimes that regulate the world capitalist system. In fact, there appears to be growing interest throughout Latin America in revivifying the Pan-American ideal of unification, currently perhaps best expressed in Hugo Chávez’ Bolivarian dream of turning South America into a regional economic hegemon (DeLong, 2005). The governments of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Uruguay have indicated they want to join the government of Venezuela in creating a regional union. It has been proposed that this coalescing continental confederation should shift the region’s extra-continental trade towards Europe, Asia and South Africa and away from North America. The prospect of this happening appears to have alarmed Washington more than the increasing number of electoral triumphs of leftist politicians in the region (Delong). There has also been considerable talk in the region about creating a single currency for the South American countries that would be modeled on and perhaps tied to the Euro rather than the US Dollar. This discussion is symptomatic of what appears to be an emerging desire to create an integrated economic and political community that is strikingly different from the type of hemispheric economic integration scheme being pursued by the Washington and its allies in the region (DeLong). Moreover, there is an increasing tendency in the region to find alternatives to trading with the USA. In particular, several Latin American nations (Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela and Chile) have been strengthening their economic relations with Asia, particularly with China. But the widespread popular opposition to neoliberalism and so-called globalization, and the shift to the Left in the region’s politics, represent much more than a serious challenge to US hegemony, they also represent a serious threat to the existing pattern of capitalist development in the region. Central to Washington’s strategy for the hemisphere has been the imposition of a neoliberal model of capitalist development on the region which involves the increasing integration of the region’s economies into a hemispheric ‘free trade’ area or rather a trade bloc that is dominated by the USA. This project is itself an essential part of the strategy of the USA for the domination of the global economy by its transnational corporations. The restructuring of the economies of the region under the mantra of neoliberalism and the banner of globalization has been aimed at giving the USA-based transnational corporations and investors free reign within the region and a strong hemispheric base from which to dominate the world economy In opposition to the neoliberal, polyarchical and globalizing model of development that has been imposed by the government of the USA and its allies in the region, the growing movement for an alternative form of development that is both genuinely democratic, equitable and environmentally sustainable appears to be gaining ground in various parts of Latin America and the Caribbean. This alternative model of development requires the reorganization and realignment of the existing economies in the region. It also requires the replacement of the existing political regimes, which serve the interests of the transnational bloc of social forces that are behind the integration of the region into the new global circuits of accumulation and production that the major trans­ national corporations and the IFIs have been constructing since the 1970s. In addition to fundamental economic changes, most of the existing pseudo-democratic political regimes in the region need to be thoroughly democratized so that they are responsive to and capable of serving the needs and interests of the majority of the people rather than the ruling polyarchies and the transnational corporations operating in the region. An essential requirement for realigning the region’s economies so that they produce people-centered and environmentally sustainable development is the integration of these economies into a regional economic and political union that has the resources, structures and the power to operate independently of the government of the USA and the transnational corporations based in the USA as well as in the European Union and Japan. If this type of regional integration takes place, it will enable the Latin American and Caribbean states to break free of the hegemonic influence of the USA, and reverse the denationalization (‘globalization’) of the Latin American and Caribbean economies. Instead of the corporate-driven hemispheric integration of the region under the hegemony of the USA, a new system of regional economic cooperation and both equitable as well as environmentally sustainable development is desperately needed to improve the lives of the vast majority of the people living in Latin America and the Caribbean. This type of regional, equitable and sustainable development can only be success­ fully carried out by truly democratically elected political leaders with broad-based popular support who are sincerely committed to achieving this alternative rather than the elitist neoliberal model. It probably will also require democratic socialist political institutions and structures of production and distribution. Regionalism has been the dream of the democratic left for some time. The European Union has its origins in the French socialist dream of ending Franco-German enmity through unifying Europe, and African regionalism was the vision of African socialists such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania who saw regional integration as the only means to progress beyond tribalism and colonialism and create a united and democratic Africa (Faux, 2001:4). Viewed from the perspective of those who want to create a people-cen­ tered, democratic, equitable and environmentally sustainable social order in the Ame­ ricas, the corporate-dominated process of capitalist pseudo-globalization taking place in the region and around the world urgently needs to be replaced by what Samir Amin has referred to as a new system of «pluricentric regulated globalization» (Amin, 2001a). This alternative form of globalization requires the development of regional economic and political unions in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East and elsewhere, which collaboratively promote people-centered, democratic and envi­ ronmentally sustainable forms of development on a regional basis. According to Amin, these regional unions of states are needed to collaborate as partners in collecti­ vely regulating the global restructuring of the world economy for the benefit of the vast majority of humanity rather than the transnational corporations and the northern centers of the world capitalist system in the USA, Europe and Japan. This type of regional-based regulative order is needed to regulate and redirect inter­ national economic, social, and political relations so that these relations serve the inte­ rests and needs of the vast majority of the world’s population. The present power structures and regulatory regime of the world capitalist system support the transna­ tional corporate-driven restructuring and denationalization of the economies of both the societies at the core and in the periphery of this system. The Latin American and Caribbean countries need to ‘de-link’ step-by-step from this exploitative and inequitable system. They need to redirect and restructure their eco­ nomies so that they serve the needs of the majority of their people while also protec­ ting their natural resources and ecosystems. The alternative policies of economic, poli­ tical and social development proposed and in some cases adopted by the new leftist leaders, the progressive civil society organizations and their supporters, combined with the project of regional integration associated with the new Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR), are significant indications of unprecedented and pro­ found transformation unfolding in the Americas. A growing number of civil society organizations and social movements throughout the Americas are pressuring the governments of the region to follow what the pro­ gressive civil society networks such as the Alianza Social Continental/ Hemispheric Social Alliance (ASC/HSA) describes as a regional model of integration that supports the environmentally sustainable and democratic development of all the societies in the region (see ASC-HSA, 2006). The ASC/HSA also contends that the UNASUR pro­ ject and the Bolivarian dream of unification is threatened by the so-called free trade agreements that Washington has negotiated with Chile, Colombia, Peru, the Central American countries and the Dominican Republic. As the ASC/HSA makes clear in its documents and public information campaigns, these agreements compromise the national sovereignty, obstruct the local production of medicines, threaten public health, facilitate the profit-driven privatization of water and vital services such as health and sanitation, and threaten the survival of indigenous cultures, biodiversity, food sovereignty, and local control over natural resources. The «Alternatives for the Americas» proposal developed by this inter-American network of progressive civil society organizations and social movements calls on all governments in the region to subordinate trade and investments to sustainability and environmental protection as well as social justice and local democratic control over economic and social development (ASC/HSA 2002:5). The growing number and political influence of these kinds of networks, organizations and movements provide unquestionable evidence of the emergence of the social for­ ces and political conditions that Panitch (1996:89) and others (Harris, 1995:301-302; Jo­ nas and McCaughan, 1994) predicted in the 1990s would arise in opposition to neoli­ beralism, corporate-dominated pseudo globalization and the extension and consolida­ tion of the hegemony of the USA. It now seems increasingly possible that these forces and the political mobilization that they have helped to create will transform the politi­ cal regimes in the region as well as the nature of inter-American relations, bring about the regional integration of the Latin American countries and free these countries from US hegemony and the form of ‘turbo-capitalism’ to which they have been subjected. At this point, we can only speak in general terms about the new model(s) of develop­ ment that will replace the neoliberal model of uneven and inequitable development that has pillaged most of the region.

#### Environment collapse causes extinction – tipping points are coming

**Foster et al., Oregon sociology professor, 2010**

(John, The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Earth, pg 14-8, ldg)

It is common today to see this ecological rift simply in terms of climate change, which given the dangers it poses and the intractable problems for capitalism it presents has grabbed all the headlines. But recently scientists—in a project led by Johan Rockstrom at the Stockholm Resilience Centre, and including Crutzen and the leading U.S. climatologist, James Hansen—have developed an analysis of nine "planetary boundaries" that are crucial to maintaining an earth-system environment in which humanity can exist safely. Climate change is only one of these, and the others are ocean acidification, stratospheric ozone depletion, the nitrogen and the phosphorus cycles, global freshwater use, change in land use, biodiversity loss, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution. For the last two, atmospheric aerosol loading and chemical pollution, there are not yet adequate physical measures, but for the other seven processes clear boundaries have been designated. Three of the boundaries—those for climate change, ocean acidification, and stratospheric ozone depletion—can be regarded as tipping points, which at a certain level lead to vast qualitative changes in the earth system that would threaten to destabilize the planet, causing it to depart from the "boundaries for a healthy planet." The boundaries for the other four processes—the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, freshwater use, change in land use, and biodiversity loss—are better viewed as signifying the onset of irreversible environmental degradation. Three processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries: climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss. Each of these can therefore be seen, in our terminology, as constituting an extreme "rift" in the planetary system. Stratospheric ozone depletion was an emerging rift in the 1990s, but is now stabilizing, even subsiding. Ocean acidification, the phosphorus cycle, global freshwater use, and land system change are all rapidly emerging global rifts, though not yet extreme. Our knowledge of these rifts can be refined, and more plan-etary rifts may perhaps be discovered in the future. Nevertheless, the analysis of planetary boundaries and rifts, as they present themselves today, helps us understand the full scale of the ecological crisis now confronting humanity. The simple point is that the planet is being assaulted on many fronts as the result of human-generated changes in the global environment.4 In the planetary boundaries model developed by Rockstrom and his associates, each ecological process has a preindustrial value (that is, the level reached before the advent of industrial capitalism), a pro-posed boundary, and a current status. In the case of climate change the preindustrial value was 280 parts per million (ppm) of carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere; its proposed boundary is 350 ppm (necessary if tipping points such as a catastrophic rise in sea level are to be avoided); and its current status is 390 ppm. Biodiversity loss is measured by the rate of extinction (number of species lost per million species per year). The preindustrial annual rate, referred to as the "natural" or "background" rate of species loss, was 0.1-1 per million; the proposed boundary is 10 per million; whereas the current rate is greater than 100 per million (100-1,000 times the preindustrial back-ground rate). With respect to the nitrogen cycle, the boundary is con-cerned with the amount of nitrogen removed from the atmosphere for human use in millions of tons per year. Before the rise of industrial capitalism (more specifically before the discovery of the Haber-Bosch process early in the twentieth century), the amount of nitrogen removed from the atmosphere was 0 tons. The proposed boundary, to avoid irreversible degradation of the earth system, is 35 million tons per year. The current status is 121 million tons per year. In each of these extreme rifts, the stability of the earth system as we know it is being endangered. We are at red alert status. If business as usual continues, the world is headed within the next few decades for major tipping points along with irreversible environmental degradation, threatening much of humanity. Biodiversity loss at current and projected rates could result in the loss of upward of a third of all living species this century. The pumping of more and more nitrogen into the biosphere is resulting in the creation of dead zones in lakes and ocean regions (a phenomenon also affected by phosphorus). Each one of these rifts by itself constitutes a global ecological crisis. These ruptures reveal that the limits of the earth system are not determined by the sheer physical scale of the economy but by the particular rifts in natural processes that are generated.5 The emerging rifts in the other ecological processes, which have not yet overshot their boundaries, are scarcely less threatening. For the phosphorus cycle (categorized as part of a single planetary boundary together with the nitrogen cycle), the preindustrial quantity flowing into the oceans per year was approximately 1 million tons; the proposed boundary is 11 million tons (based on the assumption that ocean anoxic events begin at ten times the background rate); and its current status is already 8.5 to 9.5 million tons. In regard to ocean acidification, the value refers to a global mean saturation state of arag-onite (a form of calcium carbonate) in surface seawater. A decline in the number indicates an increase in the acidity of the ocean. The preindustrial value was 3.44 (surface ocean aragonite saturation state); the proposed boundary—after which there would be a massive die-down of shell-forming organisms—is 2.75; and the current status is 2.90. In the case of freshwater use, the preindustrial annual consumption of freshwater in km3 (cubic kilometers) was 415; the estimated boundary is 4,000 km3 (marking a threshold beyond which the irreversible degradation and collapse of terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems is likely); and the current rate of consumption is 2,600 km3. For change in land use, the parameters are set by the percentage of global ice-free land surface converted to cropland. In preindustrial times, this percentage was very low. The proposed boundary is 15 percent (after which there is the danger of triggering catastrophic effects on ecosystems), and the current status is 11.7 percent. In each of these emerging rifts, we are faced with an orange alert status, in which we are rapidly moving toward extreme conditions, whereby we will pass the planetary boundaries, undermining the earth system that supports the conditions of life. No measure for chemical pollution has yet been determined, but proposals include measuring the effects of persistent organic pollu-tants (otherwise known as POPs), plastics, endocrine disrupters, heavy metals, and nuclear waste on ecosystems and the earth system in general. Likewise, no measure has yet been determined for atmospheric aerosol loading (the overall particulate concentration in the atmosphere on a regional basis), which can disrupt monsoon systems, lead to health problems, and interact with climate change and freshwater boundaries. Stratospheric ozone depletion is the one previously emerging rift that was brought under control (as far as anthropogenic drivers were concerned) in the 1990s, reducing what was a rapidly growing threat to life on the planet due to an increase in ultraviolet radiation from the sun. The preindustrial value of ozone concentration was 290 (Dobson Units—the measurement of atmospheric ozone columnar density, where 1 Dobson Unit is defined as 0.01 millimeters thick under standard pressure and temperature); the proposed planetary boundary is a concentration of 276 (after which life on the planet would experience devastating losses); and the current status is 283. Between 60°S and 60°N latitude, the decline in stratospheric ozone concentrations has been halted. Nevertheless, it will take decades for the Antarctic ozone hole to disappear, and Arctic ozone loss will likely persist for decades. Life on the planet had a close call.6 The mapping out of planetary boundaries in this way gives us a better sense of the real threat to the earth system. Although in recent years the environmental threat has come to be seen by many as simply a question of climate change, protecting the planet requires that we attend to all of these planetary boundaries, and others not yet determined. The essential problem is the unavoidable fact that an expanding economic system is placing additional burdens on a fixed earth system to the point of planetary overload. It has been estimated that in the early 1960s humanity used half of the planet's biocapacity in a year. Today this has risen to an overshoot of 30 percent beyond the earth's regenerative capacity. Business-as-usual projections point to a state in which the ecological footprint of humanity will be equivalent to the regenerative capacity of two planets by the mid-2030s.7 Rockstrom and his associates concluded their article in Nature by stating: "The evidence so far suggests that, as along as the [planetary boundary] thresholds are not crossed, humanity has the freedom to pursue long-term social and economic development." Although this is undoubtedly true, what is obviously not addressed in this conclu-sion—but is clearly the point of their whole analysis—is that these thresholds have in some cases already been crossed and in other cases will soon be crossed with the continuation of business as usual. Moreover, this can be attributed in each and every case to a primary cause: the current pattern of global socioeconomic development, that is, the capitalist mode of production and its expansionary tendencies. The whole problem can be called "the global ecological rift," referring to the overall break in the human relation to nature arising from an alienated system of capital accumulation without end.'

#### Vote Neg to reject the Aff’s neoliberal economic engagement in favor of a commons-based approach. That solves and creates space to challenge neoliberalism

**De Angelis, East London political economy professor, 2003**

(Massimo, “Reflections on alternatives, commons and communities”, Winter, <http://www.commoner.org.uk/deangelis06.pdf>, DOA: 7-2-12, ldg)

This movement has posed the question of a plurality of “alternatives” to the social processes and arrangements that produce the horrors of modern global capital. In order to take the many calls for and practices of alternatives seriously, we have to make them relevant to the real people at the fringe or outside the movement. In other words, we want to move from movement to society not so much by persuading people to “join” our movement, but through a language and a political practice that by tracing the connections between diverse practices attempts to dissolve the distinctions between inside and outside the movement, i.e., actually moves ‘from movement to society’. To make the possibility of a new world that contains many worlds an actuality, we have to be able to shape our own discourse in such a way as to echo the needs and aspirations coming from below. We have to give coherence to their plurality, without imposing a model or reiterating dead ideologies. We need a discourse that helps to articulate the many alternatives that spring out of the points of crises of neoliberal capital, which seriously threaten to dispossess people of their livelihood and impose on them new or more intensified commodified patterns of life. We need a discourse that builds on the plurality of the many concrete struggles and their methods and help us to articulate a vision – not a plan – of the whole. Then we can better evaluate what are the global implications of our local struggles, as well as the local implications of global struggles for the building of a world that contains many worlds. But most of all, we need a discourse that recognizes the power we have to shape alternatives, at every level in society, that sets out from the simple fact that, contrarily to common belief, alternatives do exist, are everywhere and plural. To clarify, I think that every social node, that is every individual or network of individuals is a bearer of alternatives. This is evident not only when struggles erupt in any of the waged or unwaged local and trans-local nodes of social production. We just need to look around in the relative normality of daily routines to see that every social node “knows” of different ways to do things within its life-world and sphere of action longs for a different space in which things can be done in different ways. Each social node expresses needs and aspirations that are the basis of alternatives. For example: the alternative to working 10 hours a day is working 6; the alternative to poverty is access to the means of existence; the alternative to indignity is dignity; the alternative to building that dam and uprooting communities is not building that dam and leaving communities where they are; the alternative to tomatoes going rotten while transported on the back of an old woman for 20 miles is not GM tomatoes that do not rot, but access to land near home, or a home, or a road and a truck. Since every social node is aware of a spectrum of alternatives, the problem is simply how to make these alternatives actual? What resources are needed? How to coordinate alternatives in such a way that they are not pitted against each other as is the case of the competitive markets’ understanding of alternatives? How to solve the many existing problems without relying on the alienating coordinating mechanism of the market and creating instead social relations of mutual enrichment, dignity, and respect? These are I believe the bottom line questions on which a new political discourse must be based. Once we acknowledge the existence of the galaxy of alternatives as they emerge from concrete needs and aspirations, we can ground today’s new political discourse in the thinking and practice of the actualization and the coordination of alternatives, so as each social node and each individual within it has the power to decide and take control over their lives. It is this actualization and this coordination that rescues existing alternatives from the cloud of their invisibility, because alternatives, as with any human product, are social products, and they need to be recognized and validated socially. Our political projects must push their way through beyond the existing forms of coordination, beyond the visible fist of the state, beyond the invisible hand of competitive markets, and beyond the hard realities of their interconnections that express themselves in today forms of neoliberal governance, promoting cooperation through competition and community through disempowerment. As I will argue, this new political discourse is based on the project of defending and extending the space of commons, at the same time building and strengthening communities through the social fields.

### Politics

#### Raising the debt ceiling is likely but uncertain – time is running out

Stuart 9-26 (Jim Stewart, political blogger, Princeton graduate, “Shutdown and/or Default,” 9-26-2013, http://jimstuartnewblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/shutdown-andor-default.html)

After today, four days to go before a possible shutdown. After that, seventeen days to possible default. What's the forecast? Here's what I see, albeit with little clarity:¶ Friday or Saturday the Senate will return a clean CR at sequester spending levels back to the House. Right now, don't think Boehner can pass a clean CR without relying on Democrats. He was hoping to pass an omnibus conditional debt ceiling resolution on Saturday, before the budget vote, to get his caucus to shift focus to the debt ceiling. This afternoon, he found he doesn't have the votes. People want to see what happens on the Budget CR. So Boehner must put a conditional CR back to the Senate, ensuring a Tuesday shutdown, or ask Democrats for help. If Democrats say yes without conditions, there will be no shutdown. If they ask for something, most likely moving the budget target off the sequester levels, we will have shutdown, since the Senate won't have time to respond before the midnight Monday deadline. Best Guess: Boehner will ask for Democratic help and pass a clean CR - so no Shutdown.¶ The debt ceiling could follow a similar trajectory: the House will pass a contingent debt ceiling resolution containing a long list of demands - one year Obamacare delay, the Keystone pipeline, drilling on federal lands and offshore, reverse new EPA carbon capture rules, cut back the wings of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, etc. The Senate will strip all this out and send back a clean 14 month debt ceiling increase resolution. Meanwhile a very high stakes game of chicken will be going on: Obama says he will not negotiate the debt ceiling; Boehner says he has to and ultimately will. Boehner has raised the expectations of the GOP caucus very high - saying the debt ceiling is the maximum point of leverage with the Democrats, and that is where the GOP can make the most progress. I am very clear that Obama will not budge on this, and that the Democratic leadership team in the House and Senate will back him up. Will Boehner realize this in time? In their last big negotiation in 2011, Obama caved to save the country from default. I think Republicans expect him to cave. Will they all realize their mistake in time? And if they do, will they turn back and pass a clean resolution? Best Guess: Boehner will figure it out and decide to move with a clean resolution just in time to get it signed before October 17.¶ This is a highly hopeful forecast and I am basing it mostly on my assessment of Boehner as a person who will do the right thing - not for himself, but for his Party and his country, once he sees there are no good alternatives. Do not think he will take the lead in causing a shutdown; nor will he refuse to take a path that prevents default just to please the base. I am not at all confident, though. I assign just a 50-60% probability to the above scenario - in other words, not very high.¶ And here's another low probability forecast: If the game plays out as above, we will land on October 18 with a very angry and frustrated GOP base, an ecstatic Democratic Party, a deeply wounded Speaker Boehner, and the next budget deadline coming up on November 15, less than 30 days away. I think there's a chance that Boehner, possibly realizing his time is up as Speaker, will lead a Grand Bargain negotiation with Obama (cancel the sequester, replace it with a mix of targeted cuts, new tax revenues from tax reform, and chained CPI for Medicare and Social Security) that will pass the House with Democratic votes and be signed into law.¶ Pretty far out, I admit. I give it a 30% chance. But that's not zero. And wouldn't that be a great day for the country!

#### PC is key

Lillis & Wasson 9-7 (Mike Lillis, and Erik Wasson, The Hill, “Fears of wounding Obama weigh heavily on Democrats ahead of vote,” 9-7-2013, http://thehill.com/homenews/house/320829-fears-of-wounding-obama-weigh-heavily-on-democrats#ixzz2fOPUfPNr)

The prospect of wounding President Obama is weighing heavily on Democratic lawmakers as they decide their votes on Syria. Obama needs all the political capital he can muster heading into bruising battles with the GOP over fiscal spending and the debt ceiling. Democrats want Obama to use his popularity to reverse automatic spending cuts already in effect and pay for new economic stimulus measures through higher taxes on the wealthy and on multinational companies. But if the request for authorization for Syria military strikes is rebuffed, some fear it could limit Obama's power in those high-stakes fights. That has left Democrats with an agonizing decision: vote "no" on Syria and possibly encourage more chemical attacks while weakening their president, or vote "yes" and risk another war in the Middle East. “I’m sure a lot of people are focused on the political ramifications,” a House Democratic aide said. Rep. Jim Moran (D-Va.), a veteran appropriator, said the failure of the Syria resolution would diminish Obama's leverage in the fiscal battles. "It doesn't help him," Moran said Friday by phone. "We need a maximally strong president to get us through this fiscal thicket. These are going to be very difficult votes."

#### Plan drains capital – Backlash and hostage taking on unrelated priority legislation is empirically proven

LeoGrande, 12

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### Failure collapses global trade, investment and growth

Davidson 9-10 (Adam Davidson, co-founder of NPR’s Planet Money (Adam, “Our Debt to Society” New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all>)

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history. Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency. Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years.

#### Trigger nuclear wars – and turns multilat and global democracy

Merlini 11 (Cesare, nonresident senior fellow, Center on the United States and Europe, chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs, “A Post-Secular World?” Survival, 53(2), 2011, ebsco, ldg)

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional **conflict** between states, perhaps even **involving the use of nuclear weapons.** The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism**.**

### T G2G

#### 1. Interpretation – economic engagement is only *direct aid* and *trade agreements* – the embargo is a restriction on private action

Daga 13 (Sergio Daga, director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, Bolivia, visiting senior policy analyst, Heritage Foundation, M.A. Economics, University of Chile, B.A. Economics, Catholic University of Bolivia, also trained at Libertad y Desarrollo, Chile, and the Atlas Economic Research Foundation, United States, “Economics of the 2013-2014 Debate Topic: U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela,” National Center for Policy Analysis, Debate Backgrounder No. 7, 5-15-2013, http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message\_to\_Debaters\_6-7-13.pdf)

Economics is the branch of human knowledge concerned with the ¶ satisfaction of human wants through the production of goods and ¶ services, and the exchange of those goods and services between two ¶ or more individuals. Thus, economics encompasses human activities ¶ from simple barter between two individuals to international trade ¶ between firms or governments. Many of these economic activities ¶ are regulated by government, and some are outlawed. Trade and ¶ other economic activities that cross national borders — such as ¶ sales of goods and services, travel, migration or transfers of money ¶ — are regulated by both the government of the originating country ¶ and the government of the destination country. The government ¶ itself could be an economic actor, buying and selling from other ¶ governments or firms in other countries; or the government could ¶ regulate the private economic activities of individuals and firms.¶ Economic engagement between or among countries can take ¶ many forms, but this document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1) international trade agreements ¶ designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2) government foreign ¶ aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government economic ¶ engagement with private economic engagement through 3) ¶ international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) ¶ remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are ¶ important with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate ¶ resolution; however, when discussing economic engagement by ¶ the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with ¶ respect to some countries than to others.

#### *Prefer it* –

#### First, *limits* – any regulation, product, or private action is justified – infinite unpredictable AFFs

#### Second, *ground* – means-focus is key to stable disad and counterplan prep – they create a race to shallow, unpredictable single-sector strategies

### Alan Gross CP

Alan Gross

#### The United States federal government should substantially normalize trade relations with Cuba if, and only if, Cuba agrees to release Alan Gross.

#### Solves the AFF, avoids politics

Herrero 12/27/12 – (Ricardo, “Getting Serious about Alan Gross” The Huffington Post, Ricardo Herrero is Deputy Executive Director of the Cuba Study Group, Available online @ <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ricardo-herrero/getting-serious-about-ala_b_2370767.html>)

Earlier this month, USAID subcontractor Alan Gross began his fourth year in a Cuban prison. Ever since his incarceration, a debate has raged over whether the United States should halt further efforts to engage with the Cuban people until the Cuban government releases Gross. Both Alan and his wife Judy have repeatedly called on the U.S. and Cuba to engage in a dialogue without preconditions. Sadly, like all things Cuba-related, the debate over Gross' incarceration has since devolved into an ideological three-ring circus where finding a solution has become a secondary objective behind not appearing to be making concessions to the enemy.¶ The Washington Post perfectly captured the tone deafness of the current debate in a recent editorial: "better relations between Cuba and the United States must be conditioned on real steps toward democratization by Havana. But until Mr.Gross is released, they ought to get worse." This position reflects exactly the sort of stale, inside-the-box thinking that has long plagued the discourse over U.S.-Cuba policy.¶ For years we've known that the Cuban government is incredibly adept at manipulating U.S. policy choices. Time and again, any attempt by the U.S. to increase its engagement with the Cuban people has been met with confrontation and repression by Cuban officials, which in turn emboldens hardliners in the U.S. to call for the tightening economic sanctions. This pattern has become all too predictable, and the Gross case is its latest example: arrested in Havana for bringing communication devices to the island less than three months after President Obama relaxed family travel and remittance restrictions in 2009 and only two weeks after the U.S. House held hearings on lifting the Cuba travel ban for all Americans. In response to Gross' arrest, U.S. hardliners blocked any further normalization efforts in Congress, though they weren't able to stop the Obama Administration from further loosening restrictions on people-to-people travel and remittances in January, 2011. Shortly thereafter, Gross was sentenced to 15 years in prison.¶ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once said "It is my personal belief that the Castros do not want to see an end to the embargo and do not want to see normalization with the United States, because they would lose all of their excuses for what hasn't happened in Cuba in the last 50 years." If we believe this to be the case, then why don't we use this insight to steer our efforts in securing the release of Alan Gross?¶ The Cubans have often stated that they are willing to swap Gross for five Cuban spies who were arrested in Florida in 1998 for infiltrating a U.S. Navy base and several anti-Castro groups in Miami. The U.S. has refused to accept the swap, and the negotiations have remained stalled for almost three years.¶ So what can be done? There are three opportunities for securing Gross' release that could also help improve relations between the U.S. and Cuba:¶ 1. Introduce alternative terms to the negotiation. The Cubans have dictated the terms of the negotiation from day one, and hardliners in the U.S. government have seemingly been too happy to play along. However, just because the U.S. won't agree to the spy swap doesn't mean negotiations should stop there. U.S. sanctions on Cuba remain a decades-old morass of congressional actions, presidential directives and executive orders, resulting in an entrenched and inflexible foreign policy that is as incoherent as it is ineffective. There are plenty of outdated sanctions on the books that the United States could repeal or amend in exchange for Gross' release.¶ 2. Pursue Gross' release and economic engagement concurrently. In 2011, the Obama Administration announced a shift in the focus of U.S.-Cuba policy toward empowering civil society and supporting independent economic activity. If Cuba's burgeoning private sector is to grow into a viable alternative to the Island's top-down economic system, it will need a deeper economic relationship with the American private sector. By conditioning all further efforts to engage with the Cuban people on Gross' release, we are playing by the rules of those who benefit from the prolonged confrontation and mutual isolation between the two countries. Denying these private individuals an economic relationship with the United States only serves to further delay the kind of changes that policies like Helms-Burton were ill-designed to accelerate.¶ 3. Look to the Angel Carromero case as a model. We don't know what deal the Spanish government struck with the Cubans to secure the release of Angel Carromero, the Popular Party's pro-democracy activist who was charged with the negligent homicide of Oswaldo Payá and Harold Cepero and will now serve his sentence in Spain. What is clear is that through direct diplomacy, the Spanish have been far more successful at liberating political prisoners, democracy advocates, and businessmen from Cuban jails than any other country, all while promoting democracy inside the island through direct support to pro-democracy groups. On the other hand, our confrontational approach has only perpetuated the conflict without any progress to show for it.¶ The United Nations recently condemned Cuba's arbitrary detention of Alan Gross for the first time and the U.S. Embargo on Cuba for the 21st year in a row. By pivoting negotiations for Gross's release away from a spy-swap and toward win-win alternatives, both the United States and Cuba stand to gain credibility within the international community. The United States could finally pave the road to a future where it can lead an effective multilateral policy toward Cuba focused on the advancement of human rights and helping the Cuban people. Just as importantly, Alan would finally come home.

#### The plan kills credibility

Weissberg 10 - Professor of Political Science-Emeritus, University of Illinois-Urbana (Robert, “President Obama's Compulsive Appeasement Disorder”, August 27 of 2010, American Thinker, <http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/08/president_obamas_compulsive_ap.html>)

There's a simple explanation: we are no longer feared. Superpowers of yesteryear, going back to the Greeks and Romans, were feared for a reason -- they leveled a city to make an example. Today, by contrast, Uncle Sam relies on cajoling, bribery (think North Korea), entreating puny leaders of inchoate states (special envoys to the PLO's Mahmoud Abbas) and otherwise playing weak hands. We have gone from resolve to U.N. resolution. We've forgotten Machiavelli's sage advice: since love and fear can hardly exist together, if we must choose between them, it is far safer to be feared than loved.¶ Being feared does not require bombing Iran into the Stone Age, though that would certainly terrify North Korea and even slow down the Somali pirates. Being feared is when your enemy believes that you are willing to use overwhelming, deadly force, and this need not require nuking anybody. The trick is creating a credible, threatening persona -- convincing your enemy that while you may speak softly, you also carry a big stick and are willing to use it. Israel long ago learned this lesson, regardless of world outrage.

#### Obama’s credibility is solves Indo-Pak war – causes extinction

Ben Coes 11, a former speechwriter in the George H.W. Bush administration, managed Mitt Romney’s successful campaign for Massachusetts Governor in 2002 & author, “The disease of a weak president”, The Daily Caller, http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/

The disease of a weak president usually begins with the Achilles’ heel all politicians are born with — the desire to be popular. It leads to pandering to different audiences, people and countries and creates a sloppy, incoherent set of policies. Ironically, it ultimately results in that very politician losing the trust and respect of friends and foes alike.¶ In the case of Israel, those of us who are strong supporters can at least take comfort in the knowledge that Tel Aviv will do whatever is necessary to protect itself from potential threats from its unfriendly neighbors. While it would be preferable for the Israelis to be able to count on the United States, in both word and deed, the fact is right now they stand alone. Obama and his foreign policy team have undercut the Israelis in a multitude of ways. Despite this, I wouldn’t bet against the soldiers of Shin Bet, Shayetet 13 and the Israeli Defense Forces.¶ But Obama’s weakness could — in other places — have implications far, far worse than anything that might ultimately occur in Israel. The triangular plot of land that connects Pakistan, India and China is held together with much more fragility and is built upon a truly foreboding foundation of religious hatreds, radicalism, resource envy and nuclear weapons.¶ If you can only worry about preventing one foreign policy disaster, worry about this one.**¶** Here are a few unsettling facts to think about:¶ First, Pakistan and India have fought three wars since the British de-colonized and left the region in 1947. All three wars occurred before the two countries had nuclear weapons. Both countries now possess hundreds of nuclear weapons, enough to wipe each other off the map many times over.¶ Second, Pakistan is 97% Muslim. It is a question of when — not if — Pakistan elects a radical Islamist in the mold of Ayatollah Khomeini as its president. Make no mistake, it will happen, and when it does the world will have a far greater concern than Ali Khamenei or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a single nuclear device.¶ Third, China sits at the northern border of both India and Pakistan. China is strategically aligned with Pakistan. Most concerning, China covets India’s natural resources. Over the years, it has slowly inched its way into the northern tier of India-controlled Kashmir Territory, appropriating land and resources and drawing little notice from the outside world.¶ In my book, Coup D’Etat, I consider this tinderbox of colliding forces in Pakistan, India and China as a thriller writer. But thriller writers have the luxury of solving problems by imagining solutions on the page. In my book, when Pakistan elects a radical Islamist who then starts a war with India and introduces nuclear weapons to the theater, America steps in and removes the Pakistani leader through a coup d’état.¶ I wish it was that simple.¶ The more complicated and difficult truth is that we, as Americans, must take sides. We must be willing to be unpopular in certain places. Most important, we must be ready and willing to threaten our military might on behalf of our allies. And our allies are Israel and India.¶ There are many threats out there — Islamic radicalism, Chinese technology espionage, global debt and half a dozen other things that smarter people than me are no doubt worrying about. But the single greatest threat to America is none of these. The single greatest threat facing America and our allies is a weak U.S. president. It doesn’t have to be this way. President Obama could — if he chose — develop a backbone and lead. Alternatively, America could elect a new president. It has to be one or the other. The status quo is simply not an option.

### Shunning

#### Cuba is a flagrant, willful, and persistent violator of human rights — repression is worsening.

Miami Herald 13 — Miami Herald, 2013 (“Human rights under abuse in Cuba,” Editorial, April 22nd, Available Online at http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/04/22/3358813/human-rights-under-abuse-in-cuba.html#storylink=cpy, Accessed 07-03-2013)

The State Department’s latest report on human-rights practices effectively puts the lie to the idea that the piecemeal and illusory changes in Cuba under Gen. Raúl Castro represent a genuine political opening toward greater freedom.

If anything, things are getting worse. The report, which covers 2012, says the independent Cuban Commission on Human Rights and Reconciliation counted 6,602 short-term detentions during the year, compared with 4,123 in 2011. In March 2012, the same commission recorded a 30-year record high of 1,158 short-term detentions in a single month just before the visit of Pope Benedict XVI.

Among the many abuses cited by the 2012 report are the prison sentences handed out to members of the Unión Patriotica de Cuba, the estimated 3,000 citizens held under the charge of “potential dangerousness,” state-orchestrated assaults against the Damas de Blanco (Ladies in White), the suspicious death of dissident Oswaldo Payá and so on.

As in any dictatorship, telling the truth is a crime: Independent journalist Calixto Ramón Martínez Arias, the first to report on the cholera outbreak in Cuba, was jailed in September for the crime of desacato (insulting speech) and remained there until last week.

The regime is willing to undertake some meek economic reforms to keep people employed. It has even dared to relax its travel requirements to allow more Cubans to leave the country if they can get a passport.

Both of these are short-term survival measures, designed as escape valves for growing internal pressure. But when it comes to free speech, political activity and freedom of association — the building blocks of a free society — the report is a depressing chronicle of human-rights abuses and a valuable reminder that repression is the Castro regime’s only response to those who demand a genuinely free Cuba. Fundamental reform? Not a chance.

#### Reject engagement with human rights abusers — moral duty to shun

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict. But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions? We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order. Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in. Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order. An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order. How does shunning do this? First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.) Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force." Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it. Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful, persistent, and flagrant immorality.

### Leadership

**Multilateralism fails – organizations fail and exclusion of countries is inevitable – the US is not key**

**Gallagher 10 –** leading Australian consultant on trade and public policy (Peter, “Plurilateralism… get used to it,” 12/20/10, [http://www.petergallagher.com.au/index.php/site/article/plurilateralism...-get-used-to-it)//AY](http://www.petergallagher.com.au/index.php/site/article/plurilateralism...-get-used-to-it%29//AY)

Those Orga­ni­za­tions will go on. So will mul­ti­lat­er­al­ism. This week is only another reminder that col­lab­o­ra­tive man­age­ment of the global com­mons (peace, trade… pos­si­bly emis­sions) is, and always has been, very dif­fi­cult to achieve. The ‘one-world, one vision’ approach endorsed by the U.N. in its cur­rent form and backed for sixty years by the U.S. and Europe (chiefly) may be too hard to sus­tain for the next lit­tle while. Dur­ing the past decade, the veil of mul­ti­lat­eral col­lab­o­ra­tion thrown over the inner-workings of the U.N./Bretton-Woods man­age­ment frame­work has grown thin­ner and thin­ner. **There has always been a cer­tain amount of stiff-arming** behind the veil. But, with appro­pri­ate restraint—including by Japan—it worked for a long time to deliver effec­tive global col­lab­o­ra­tion. After this week, it will never be quite the same. But there’s no need for panic. It’s a shame but no emer­gency that a U.N. meet­ing turns out to be another expen­sive dud. Just relax and try to enjoy the ride. Enjoy the rich­ness of greater global diver­sity, for one thing. The extra­or­di­nary thing about this week in Copen­hagen is not what we didn’t see (an agree­ment on emis­sions) but what we *did* see, clearly for the first time. The veil of mul­ti­lat­er­al­ism has fallen long enough to show the world the present real­i­ties behind it. First, of course, the expen­sive, chaotic sham of 192 nations in at least as many lim­ou­sines, from Tuvalu to the United States, try­ing to agree on 1 text with at least 2 tar­gets lubri­cated by a $100billion bribe (that turned out to be only a $10billion i.o.u.) Sec­ond, and more impor­tant, The Pres­i­dent of the United States being intro­duced to a meet­ing to which he not been invited—*at which he did not even have a seat*—to nego­ti­ate a nar­row deal, sav­ing the appear­ance of col­lab­o­ra­tion, with Brazil, China, India and South Africa. To enter the room, Obama had to leave Europe and Japan out in the cold. He had to work out a deal with four giant economies that col­lec­tively hold quite a few mark­ers on the future of the global com­mons, but most of whom are by any mea­sure still poor coun­tries. The [account](http://bit.ly/8172r2) of this meet­ing is a vision of the global frame­work for col­lab­o­ra­tion now and in the next few decades. What we now have as a frame­work for global orga­ni­za­tion is a roil­ing, argu­men­ta­tive, pluri­lat­er­al­ism where alliances and coali­tions slip and slide along a dozen dif­fer­ent planes of inter­na­tional endeav­our. Farewell to the old two-handed back-room brawls and staged con­sen­sus of the *pax atlantica*. In the new frame­work broad, top-down ‘solu­tions’ like Kyoto’s tar­gets and the WTO’s ‘Sin­gle Under­tak­ing’ cannnot be made to work by a fly­ing visit from the U.S. Pres­i­dent or alter­nate hand-wringing and blus­ter from Brussels. The bad news—if you’d like the world to be a set­tled place ruled by, say, a benef­i­cent dic­ta­tor (oxy­moron) from Wash­ing­ton or even Beijing—is that ‘global gov­er­nance’ now becomes a tricky mat­ter of rec­on­cil­ing and align­ing many dif­fer­ent, prob­a­bly autonomous, or at best regional attempts to deal with the man­age­ment of global com­mons. **Guar­an­teed to be messy.**

#### No Middle East impact

Cook 7**—**CFR senior fellow for Mid East Studies. BA in international studies from Vassar College, an MA in international relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and both an MA and PhD in political science from the University of Pennsylvania(Steven, Ray Takeyh, CFR fellow, and Suzanne Maloney, Brookings fellow, 6 /28, Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast, http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=6383265)u

Underlying this anxiety was a scenario in which Iraq's sectarian and ethnic violence spills over into neighboring countries, producing conflicts between the major Arab states and Iran as well as Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government. These wars then destabilize the entire region well beyond the current conflict zone, involving heavyweights like Egypt. This is scary stuff indeed, but with the exception of the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds, the scenario is far from an accurate reflection of the way Middle Eastern leaders view the situation in Iraq and calculate their interests there. It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country. Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, **the region has** also **developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.**

**No Water Wars**

**Victor, 07** (David G., Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, professor at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego, November/December 2007, “What Resource Wars?,” The National Interest, Issue 92; pg. 48, Hensel)

While there are many reasons to fear global warming, the risk that such dangers could cause violent conflict ranks extremely low on the list because it is highly unlikely to materialize. Despite decades of warnings about water wars, what is striking is that water wars don't happen-usually because countries that share water resources have a lot more at stake and armed conflict rarely fixes the problem. Some analysts have pointed to conflicts over resources, including water and valuable land, as a cause in the Rwandan genocide, for example. Recently, the UN secretary-general suggested that climate change was already exacerbating the conflicts in Sudan. But none of these supposed causal chains stay linked under close scrutiny-the conflicts over resources are usually symptomatic of deeper failures in governance and other primal forces for conflicts, such as ethnic tensions, income inequalities and other unsettled grievances. Climate is just one of many factors that contribute to tension. The same is true for scenarios of climate refugees, where the moniker "climate" conveniently obscures the deeper causal forces.

#### U.S. primacy isn’t key to peace---their data is flawed

Christopher Preble 10, director of Foreign Policy Studies at the CATO Institute, August 3, 2010, “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?,” online: <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/>

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions.¶ But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.

#### US unilateral action is inevitable – ideology – committing to multilateralism in one instance doesn’t solve

**Bass 9** (James E Bass, Major, US Air Force, “Unilateral vs. Multilateral Engagement: A Scenario-Based Approach to Guiding America’s Future Foreign Policy,” Air Command and Staff College, Air University, p. 3-6, April 2009, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA539615)

According to Stewart Patrick of the Center on International Cooperation, **America’s preference for unilateral engagement is explained by three inherent characteristics.** **First, a sense of “exceptionalism” that evolved from America’s founding principles has had major influence on US policy goals and engagement.**5 As a champion for liberal principles the US is motivated to cooperate with others to promote universal prosperity and security. Nevertheless, **American exceptionalism also motivates the US to protect its values, and avoid any engagement that might infringe upon its sovereignty**.6 In fact, America’s preoccupation with safeguarding sovereignty yielded a predilection for unilateralism throughout the 1900’s.7 Not until it attained great power status, did the US consent to multilateralism. Specifically, after World War II, the US employed multilateralism to rebuild a favorable international framework that would counter the strategic threat posed by the Soviet Union. The Cold War dominated foreign policy until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. During the Cold War period foreign policy was dictated by the executive branch and focused primarily on the threat of nuclear war. The President committed to multilateral agreements where it served national security.8 **Second, the system of checks and balances built into the US Constitution produced a separation of powers that limits the government’s ability to endorse multilateral commitments**. Specifically, two-thirds of the Senate must support a treaty for ratification to occur. **This construct makes it possible for political minorities to hinder multilateral engagement.**9 For example, during World War I the Republican-controlled Senate rejected US membership in the League of Nations despite President Wilson’s support.10 **Third, America’s current hegemonic status provides incentive to act unilaterally because multilateral engagement is based on rules and norms rather than power.** As a consequence, the weaker power is strengthened from the benefits of multilateral cooperation, while the stronger power endures the costs of restraint.11 For example, a given UN convention limiting freedom of action with regard to national instruments of power could severely hamper achievement of US strategic objectives putting vital interests at risk. On the same note, such a convention could embolden a weaker adversary to hold US interests at risk without fear of retribution assuming that the US will limit its response within the restraints of the convention. Here **it is helpful to note specific instances in which the three inherent characteristics aforementioned have guided US action on foreign policy issues**. To begin with, **the US has used military force without United Nations (UN) approval**. While the US did attain UN approval for coalition intervention to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, America’s frustrations with the impediments of multilateralism lead it to act without UN approval in the 1998 bombing of Iraq and the 1999 ousting of Serbian forces from Kosovo. **These interventions set a precedent for the future unilateral use of force**.12 Indeed, **the US demonstrated its most dramatic disregard for international institutions in March of 2003** when President Bush unilaterally issued Saddam Hussein an ultimatum despite a lack of UN support. While the US made an effort to gain UN authorization for the war in Iraq, there is little doubt that the administration had already determined its intended course of action prior to submitting the UN proposal for use of force in February of 2003. America’s praiseworthy efforts to gain UN support was a multilateral endeavor that initially suppressed anti-American sentiments.13 However, the “Bush Doctrine” and America’s failed efforts to restore stability in post-war Iraq proved US policy to be shortsighted resulting in international opposition to US policy and calling into question traditional east-west alliances.14 At the same time, the US has increasingly restricted support for UN peacekeeping operations since its failures in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.15 In addition to declining peacekeeping assistance, the US is also to blame, in part, for the shortcomings in UN effectiveness due to its neglectful financial provisions. In fact, the UN case is only one of several instances in which the US demonstrated a disregard for international institutions through its waning financial support during the 1990s.16 **The US has also shown disregard for multilateral cooperation on global security issues.** Regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats, the US Senate approved the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997 only after insisting on exemptions that diluted its impact, and in 1999 the Senate weakened nonproliferation efforts and snubbed allies when it rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.17 Also in 1999, the US upset international order by espousing support for a national missile defense (NMD) system that violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Risking global strategic stability, in 2001 the Bush administration pushed Moscow for modification of the ABM Treaty, and subsequently withdrew unilaterally in 2002 after failing to secure Russia’s cooperation.18 Yet another example of US indifference to multilateral cooperation with regard to WMD threats involves the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Ineffective due to the absence of a compliance scheme, international efforts to implement verification procedures were rejected by the Bush administration in 2001on the grounds that they did not coincide with US national interests.19 **US lack of interest in multilateral cooperation on global security issues extends beyond WMD threats**. For example, in 1997 the Clinton administration refused to sign the Ottawa Convention banning antipersonnel land mines. Despite the fact that the convention has been signed by 156 countries, the US still declines accession arguing that land mines are a critical component of its Korea strategy.20 Also in 2001, a draft UN convention to limit small arms trafficking was singularly opposed by the Bush administration’s insistence on curtailment of the conventions terms. The US was uncompromising on limits to civilian small arms ownership and advocated several other changes that weakened the draft convention.21 The US has held many countries to high standards on international issues such as human rights, technology transfers, antiterrorism, and narcotics interdiction, imposing punishment on those that fail to meet US standards.22 Nevertheless, the US has frequently been wary of taking on international commitments. For example, the US has declined to ratify the International Criminal Court and the UN conventions on the Rights of the Child and Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. While the US was a major contributor to the growth of multilateral free trade initiatives in the 1990s, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization, it engaged in unilateralism to gain market concessions.23 **The US has also been reluctant to embrace conventions that address world-wide issues such as global warming**, evidenced by the Bush administration’s refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on climate change in 2001.

#### human rights violations is an alt cause

**Burgsdorff, 9–** Ph. D in Political Science from Freiburg University, EU Fellow at the University of Miami (Sven Kühn von, “Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration”, March 2009 [http://aei.pitt.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/11047/1/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf)DF](http://aei.pitt.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/11047/1/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf%29DF)

In addition, the US needs to improve its international human rights reputation which was ¶ severely damaged by US engagements in Iraq and the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo. The ¶ perception that the US does not do its utmost to fully respect international law is an issue that ¶ renders difficult joint efforts to make the UN a meaningful instrument for acting decisively against ¶ human rights violations.2¶ If the US wants to act more effectively in multilateral fora in general on ¶ human rights matters, Washington, as a matter of priority, needs to restore US credibility, thus ¶ making human rights a more defendable key priority in international relations. Together, the EU and ¶ US stand a far better chance of furthering democratic change and sustainable improvement of the ¶ living conditions in Cuba. It is also then that other foreign partners, notably from Latin America, ¶ could be more easily approached to engage on Cuba along commonly agreed upon agendas. A ¶ realistic scenario, however, has to consider that political change in Cuba will probably take longer¶ and most likely be preceded by economic reform measures coming from the regime itself. Foreign ¶ actors wishing to assist in this process in a meaningful manner, are well advised to pursue a long ¶ term, incentives-based approach to both the Cuban authorities and Cuba’s emerging civil society,¶ including the human rights defenders.

#### Status quo solves Kashmir conflict

Tony Karon, Wednesday, Oct. 06, 2010, Why a Terrorist Strike on Europe Risks Geopolitical Meltdown, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2023847,00.html

Drone attacks have reportedly been stepped up in the hope of disrupting that plot, allegedly revealed by a captured German of Afghan descent. **Following the Mumbai massacre**, carried out by the Pakistan-based jihadist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, **the U.S. had to work hard to restrain India from retaliating by bombing facilities in Pakistan used by the** various Kashmir jihadist groups **long cultivated by Pakistani intelligence — mindful of the danger that such an action could provoke a war between the nuclear-armed neighbors**. **But if Western cities were the target of a successful strike, it would be NATO that would be under pressure to respond**. Indeed, according to Bob Woodward's book Obama's Wars, Obama's National Security Adviser General Jim Jones told Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari that if Faisal Shahzad (the Pakistani-American sentenced to life imprisonment in New York City on Tuesday) had succeeded in his attempt to bomb Times Square last year, the U.S. "would [have] been forced to do things Pakistan would not like." Woodward wrote that retribution would entail the bombing of "up to 150 known terrorist safe havens inside Pakistan." If Jones' warning, as reported by Woodward, is to be taken seriously, it's not hard to deduce that a series of attacks in Europe that emanate from Pakistan would force a similar response.

#### The OAS fails – credibility is inherently ineffective

**AP 6/4** (Associated Press, “John Kerry seeks changes to OAS,” 6/4/13, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/john-kerry-latin-america-oas-changes-92245.html)//SJF

Secretary of State John Kerry is demanding reforms in the 35-nation Organization of American States as he visits Latin America for the first time since taking office. Leading the U.S. delegation in Guatemala to the annual general assembly of the OAS — an organization he has disparaged as ineffective, inefficient and nearly irrelevant — Kerry will try to convince fellow members of the need for major changes in its bureaucracy and a return to its core mission of promoting human rights, democracy and development. Gutierrez dares GOP to vote down bill Bill reduces benefits for lobbyists Rhee's group tripled its budget Balz book: Christie considered 2012 Udall brother 'hiked everywhere' SEIU pushes House on immigration Officials traveling with Kerry said he also would be making the case against legalization of marijuana at the national level, lobbying for the election of the U.S. candidate for a hemispheric human rights panel and trying to improve badly damaged relations with Venezuela. Kerry arrived Tuesday at the Guatemalan mountain resort of Antigua and began his two-day program with a meeting with Guatemala’s president. Drugs, U.S. immigration reform and good governance were to top the agenda in those talks, the two men told reporters. The OAS often is criticized in the United States and Kerry wrote a scathing editorial about its failures and need to reform three years ago while he was the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He then introduced legislation in Congress aimed at requiring significant budget reforms in the organization. Just last year, shortly before he was nominated to be secretary of state, Kerry penned a letter to **the OAS** permanent council with three other senators bemoaning that the group “**has been forfeiting its effectiveness” with a lack of strategic focus and fiscal recklessness.** The State Department said Monday that Kerry believed the bloc was an organization of critical importance to the Americas and that his participation in the general assembly was aimed at helping to strengthen it. “The fact that he is going to the OAS and he is spending two days there participating sends a clear signal that he thinks this remains the premier multilateral organization in the hemisphere,” department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said. “**In order to assure that the OAS retains** that **status, it must refocus on its core principles**,” she said, stressing democracy, human rights, development and regional security. “Strengthening it is of course part of (Kerry’s) agenda and part of what he’ll be focused on in the next couple of days.” As a senator in 2010, Kerry made similar, though not as subtle, points in an opinion piece he co-wrote with Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), his successor as head of the Foreign Relations Committee. “**Sadly, its culture of consensus has often been the breeding ground of the ideas that reflect the lowest common denominator, rather than the highest ambitions of diplomacy and cooperation**,” they wrote in The Miami Herald. **The pair excoriated the OAS for becoming “a pliable tool of inconsistent political agendas” and suggested that they agreed with critics who called the organization “a grazing pasture for third-string diplomats.”** Psaki played down the last comment, saying she “would hardly call the secretary of state a third-string diplomat.” Kerry’s mere presence at the meeting demonstrates his and the Obama administration’s commitment to improving the OAS, she said. In November 2012, Kerry and Menendez, along with Republican Sens. Richard Lugar of Indiana and Marco Rubio of Florida, wrote that OAS finances had become dangerously precarious and that it must reform, pare back superfluous projects or risk losing support from its prime contributor, the United States. The United States has over the past decades found itself at growing odds with numerous Latin and South American members of the OAS. Many of them, like Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador, are led by leftist or populist leaders who have balked at accepting the dominance of the U.S. in the Americas and pursued policies that often run counter to Washington’s wishes. Apart from Cuba, which has been suspended from the OAS for decades, the U.S. has most differences with Venezuela, whose president, Hugo Chavez, reveled in tweaking Washington until his death last year.

#### Normalized US-Cuban ties coming – solves the AFF

Gott ‘13

Richard Gott is a writer and historian. He worked for many years at the Guardian as a leader-writer, foreign correspondent and as the features editor. He is the author of Cuba: A New History, published by Yale University Press – Guardian – Feb 25th – http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/feb/25/cuba-us-ties-castro-raul

The mills of God grind slowly, yet they grind exceeding small. So it is with the history of Cuba, which has long moved forward at a barely observable speed. The announcement by Raúl Castro, aged 81, that he will retire in 2018 (after two terms in office), and that his likely successor as eventual president will be Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermúdez (now appointed vice-president), aged 52, suddenly catapults the half-century-old revolutionary process into new and unfamiliar waters.

By 2018, Fidel Castro, aged 86, long described as an ageing revolutionary, will likely be dead; so too will most likely be Cuba's revolutionary ally in Venezuela, Hugo Chávez. Barack Obama will also have left the scene, the last of nearly a dozen US presidents that the Cuban revolution has outlived. Cuba will then move forward at its customary glacial pace without any Castros at the helm and without any members of the revolutionary generation of 1959 that will by then have guided the country for nearly 60 years (the retiring vice-president, the revolutionary veteran José Ramón Ventura Machado, was born in 1930 and is 30 years older than his replacement). Four questions immediately pose themselves. What is the nature and character of the new leader? What will be his impact on the internal Cuban scene? What will be the future of the all-important economic relationship with Venezuela, which provides cheap oil in exchange for Cuban developmental aid (in terms of doctors, security advisers and sports instructors)? And how will a new Cuban leadership affect relations with the United States which has maintained an economic blockade of the island for the past half century? For supporters of the Cuban revolution, there are reasons to give optimistic answers to all four questions. Diaz-Canel may have an unfortunate physical resemblance to a Soviet-style Bulgarian apparatchik of yesteryear but he has proved to be a competent administrator and a genial party chief in two provinces, Villa Clara and Holguín. Plucked from relative obscurity to be the youngest ever member of the politburo, he has been minister of higher education and has recently taken on important foreign roles. With a background as a university professor and an enthusiastic cyclist, he has also served in the armed forces, a significant and necessary detail in the biography of a future leader. As a protégé of Raúl Castro, Diaz-Canel has been a supporter of the current programme to introduce market forces into some aspects of the economy and there is no reason to suppose that this would not continue. The list of reforms is impressive: the introduction of co-operatives outside the agricultural area; the creation of private farms and businesses; the sale of private houses and cars; and the availability of visas for foreign travel. For many people these reforms have not gone far enough, but the new mood of optimism in Cuba is palpable. Diaz-Canel has also been a strong advocate of the existing close relationship with Venezuela which will continue for the next six years under the likely Venezuelan presidency of Nicolas Maduro, the chosen successor of Chávez. So no change there either. An important feature of this relationship, aside from its economic benefits, is that Cuba is now respected and welcomed throughout the continent, not just with Venezuela's close ideological allies like Bolivia and Ecuador, but also with Brazil and Argentina. In this context it is now the US that is the odd man out. Indeed the most intriguing question now concerns Cuba's future relationship with the US. Many people have expressed the hope that Obama, with no re-election problem to worry about, might feel emboldened to make conciliatory noises towards the existing Castro government. Most people both in Cuba and in the US have begun to forget what the quarrel was all about. The road to a new friendship remains a possibility, yet one of the stumbling blocks has been the continued existence of a Castro in power. Under the terms of the Helms-Burton Act, imposed by the US Congress in 1996, the US cannot contemplate recognising a Cuban government in which one of the Castro brothers has a continuing role. By 2018, this will no longer be relevant. There seems little doubt that under a future President Diaz-Canel, Cuba would be able to forge a new and beneficial relationship with the US.

### Transition

**Doesn’t solve econ – current Cuban economic model prohibits FDI**

Feinberg 11 - professor of international political economy at UC San Dieg, nonresident senior fellow with the Latin America Initiative at Brookings (Richard E., “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the International Response”, November, Brookings, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118_cuba_feinberg.pdf>)//ID

Despite these advances, the Cuban economy remains in the doldrums (as described in Section 1) . The main constraint slowing the Cuban economy is not U.S. sanctions (even as they have hit hard). Rather, it is Cuba’s own outdated economic model, inherited from the Soviet Union, of central planning . Cuba’s many commercial partners would like to invest more in Cuba and would prefer to purchase more Cuban exports to correct the imbalances in their bilateral trade accounts, but are frustrated by Cuba’s scant economic offerings.

Dahl ev says SQ solves –

“governments agreed at a meeting on nuclear security in Vienna…measures such as minimizing the use of highly-enriched uranium

**No civil war risk**

**Wong-Diaz, 6** – professor of law, political science and international relations at the City College of San Francisco(Francisco, “CASTRO’S CUBA: QUO VADIS?” December, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub744.pdf

This monograph examines alternative scenarios in the twilight of Fidel Castro and in a post-Castro Cuba. They constitute a triad of outcomes; namely, a violent regime change, a peaceful transition to democracy, or a dynastic succession. Regime change is a possibility since Cuba is one of Freedom House’s two not-free countries in the Americas and a state sponsor of terrorism. However, after 47 years of oneman rule, a violent overthrow of the Communist dictatorship is highly unlikely. There is no organized armed opposition within Cuba, and the repressive state machinery operates effectively against real or potential enemies. The Cuban armed forces (FAR) remain loyal after having been purged, and are tightly controlled by Raul. In addition, on August 6, Secretary of State Condolezza Rice publicly stated that the Bush administration had no intention to invade Cuba.

**Any Cuban economic decline will be mitigated – remittances, tourism, oil, and diversification**

Messa-Lago, 13 – Professor Emeritus of Economics and Latin American Studies at the University of Pittsburgh (Carmelo, “The possible impact of the death of Chavez in the Cuban economy”, 12/03/2013, http://www.cubaencuentro.com/cuba/articulos/el-posible-impacto-de-la-muerte-de-chavez-en-la-economia-cubana-283444, translated from Spanish by Google Translate)//eek

If substantially reduce or end Venezuelan aid (equivalent to more than a fifth of the Cuban GDP), the economic crisis in Cuba would be very strong but somewhat lower than the crisis of the 90s for several reasons: an income of $ 2,800 million for the foreign tourists was meager in 1990 foreign remittances which amount is not true but it is estimated between $ 2,000 and $ 3,000, which were much lower in 1990; 350,000 Cuban-Americans visiting the island each year and spend substantial resources; Cuba also produces more oil than in 1990 but still relies on 62% of imports, and finally there is now a more diversified trade partners in 1990 (42% versus 65% Venezuela with the USSR). Even with these palliatives, the blow would be powerful and Cubans would suffer another crisis similar to the Special Period. Raul Castro has sought alternative sources of trade and investment with other countries but not yet achieved substantial results.

**Reforms won’t be large enough to solve**

Ravsberg, 13– BBC correspondent for Cuba (Fernando, “Cuba’s Economic System: Reform or Change?”, June 20, 2013, http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=95012#sthash.Ev4eCAh6.dpuf)//eek

HAVANA TIMES — Marino Murillo, Vice-Chairman of Cuba’s Council of Ministers and architect of the island’s recent economic reforms, has urged the country to aim for growth by eliminating “all of the obstacles that the current economic model places in the way of the development of the productive forces.”

The problem is that the greatest obstacle could be the model itself, which is based on relations of production that hinder the country’s economic development, slow down changes, interfere with reforms and bring about discontent among the population.

By implementing this socialist model, which dates back to Stalin’s time, Cuba obtained the same results seen in all other countries which copied it: agricultural production crises, industrial stagnation, shortages and a disaffected citizenry.

Murillo invoked socialism’s theoretical forefathers, who said that the new, socialist society would need to nationalize only the “fundamental means of production”, a prescription that wasn’t exactly followed by a model which placed even junk food stands in State hands.

To be at all effective, every economic change essayed in the country today, no matter how small, invariably demands a whole series of subsequent reforms. And it is precisely there where the model, and its defenders, prevent the reform from becoming effective or yielding its best results.

Though the Cuban government’s official discourse itself is calling for a “rejuvenation” of the country’s model, the fact of the matter is that it will be next to impossible to fit a new piece into this jigsaw puzzle without altering the pieces around it, without producing a domino-effect that will ultimately change the entire pattern.

Though the Cuban government’s official discourse itself is calling for a “rejuvenation” of the country’s model, the fact of the matter is that it will be next to impossible to fit a new piece into this jigsaw puzzle without altering the pieces around it, without producing a domino-effect that will ultimately change the entire pattern.

The government runs into these obstacles every time it attempts to move one of the pieces of the puzzle. When it decided to hand over State-controlled lands to the peasants, officials invoked Cuba’s “current legislation” to forbid farmers to set up their homes in farm areas.

Such absurd restrictions discouraged many and pushed others to quit the food production sector altogether and devote themselves to securing construction materials illegally, so as to be able to build a home elsewhere, far from prying looks.

Massive and hugely inefficient, the agricultural sector may well be the very paradigm of bureaucratic mismanagement, but it is far from being its only expression in the country. Cuba’s import system is a true bureaucratic gem, in which producers are those with the least say in official decisions.

A Cuban factory wishing to import a piece of equipment from abroad is required to approach the importing company assigned to it by the State. Technically speaking, this “importer” does not actually import anything – it merely puts out a bid among foreign companies with offices in Cuba.

Employees from these companies are the ones who travel to the manufacturing country, purchase the equipment and bring it back to Cuba. Under the country’s current model, the manager of a Cuban factory is expressly forbidden from contacting the foreign export company directly.

Thus, the person who makes the order is an office clerk who knows little or nothing about what the company needs and who, in the best of scenarios, will opt for the cheapest piece of equipment available, something which often leads to serious production problems later.

The status quo relations of production continue to find support in Cuba, from the defenders of “Real Socialism.” Ironically, or not surprisingly, most of them are isolated from the reality of this socialist system, enjoying government perks that compensate for the “small inconveniences” of everyday life.

In the worst cases, these “intermediating State importers” are bribed by foreign companies so that they will purchase obsolete or poor-quality equipment. In recent weeks, Cuban courts tried hundreds of State employees implicated in these types of “deals”.

These are the “relations of production” which keep equipment in Cuban factories paralyzed for months, waiting for the needed spare parts, while State importers take all the time in the world to decide what to purchase.

#### Terrorists aren’t pursuing nuclear attacks

Wolfe 12 – Alan Wolfe is Professor of Political Science at Boston College. He is also a Senior Fellow with the World Policy Institute at the New School University in New York. A contributing editor of The New Republic, The Wilson Quarterly, Commonwealth Magazine, and In Character, Professor Wolfe writes often for those publications as well as for Commonweal, The New York Times, Harper's, The Atlantic Monthly, The Washington Post, and other magazines and newspapers. March 27, 2012, "Fixated by “Nuclear Terror” or Just Paranoia?" [http://www.hlswatch.com/2012/03/27/fixated-by-“nuclear-terror”-or-just-paranoia-2/](http://www.hlswatch.com/2012/03/27/fixated-by-)

If one were to read the most recent unclassified report to Congress on the acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions, it does have a section on CBRN terrorism (note, not WMD terrorism). The intelligence community has a very toned down statement that says “several terrorist groups … probably remain interested in [CBRN] capabilities, but not necessarily in all four of those capabilities. … mostly focusing on low-level chemicals and toxins.” They’re talking about terrorists getting industrial chemicals and making ricin toxin, not nuclear weapons. And yes, Ms. Squassoni, it is primarily al Qaeda that the U.S. government worries about, no one else. The trend of worldwide terrorism continues to remain in the realm of conventional attacks. In 2010, there were more than 11,500 terrorist attacks, affecting about 50,000 victims including almost 13,200 deaths. None of them were caused by CBRN hazards. Of the 11,000 terrorist attacks in 2009, none were caused by CBRN hazards. Of the 11,800 terrorist attacks in 2008, none were caused by CBRN hazards.

**No nuclear terrorism – tech barriers.**

Chapman ‘12

(Stephen, editorial writer for Chicago Tribune, “CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely,” May 22, http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html)

A layperson may figure it’s only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard’s Graham Allison, in his book “Nuclear Terrorism,” concludes, “On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable.” But remember: **After Sept. 11**, 2001, **we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida** and its ideological kin **have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious**. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “**the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small**.” **The events required** to make that happen **comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist** group **has to get a bomb or fissile material**, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. **If that were easy, one would have already gone missing**. Besides, **those devices are probably no longer a danger,** since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal**.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards** designed to prevent unauthorized use. **As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp**. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. **Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause**. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas**, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil.** Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. **This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on**, **multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up**. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. **Given the formidable odds, it probably won’t bother**. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, **the worst eventuality is one that will never happen.**

**( ) No nuclear terror – counter to the goals of terror groups.**

Kapur ‘8

(S. Paul; Associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. pg. 32)

Before a terrorist group can attempt to use nuclear weapons, it must meet two basic requirements. First, the group must decide that it wishes to engage in nuclear terrorism. Analysts and policy makers often assume that terrorist groups necessarily want to do so (Carter 2004; U.S. Government 2002). However, **it is not clear that terrorist organizations would necessarily covet nuclear devices**. **Although analysts often characterize terrorism as an irrational activity** (Laqeuer I999: 4-5), **extensive empirical evidence indicates that terrorist groups in fact be­have rationally**, adopting strategies designed to achieve particular ends (Crenshaw I995: 4; Pape 2003: 344). Thus whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons is contingent on whether doing so is likely to further their goals. Under what circumstances could nuclear weapons fail to promote terrorists' goals? **For certain types of terrorist objectives, nuclear weapons could be too de­structive.** **Large-scale devastation could negatively influence audiences important to the terrorist groups.** **Terrorists often rely on populations sympathetic to their cause for political, financial, and military support.** **The horrific destruction of a nuclear explosion could alienate segments of this audience**. **People who otherwise would sympathize with the terrorists may conclude that in using a nuclear device terrorists had gone too far and were no longer deserving of support**. The catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons could also damage or destroy the very thing that the terrorist group most values. For example, **if a terrorist orga­nization were struggling with another group for control of their common home­land, the use of nuclear weapons against the enemy group would devastate the terrorists' own home territory.** Using nuclear weapons would be extremely counter­productive for the terrorists in this scenario.

**US won’t use nuclear retaliation against non-state nuclear terror.**

Washington Post ‘7

(Thursday, August 2, 2007 – “Obama says no nuclear weapons to fight terror” – http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/02/AR2007080201375\_pf.html)

Presidential hopeful Barack Obama said Thursday he would not use nuclear weapons "in any circumstance" to fight terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawing criticism from Hillary Rodham Clinton and other Democratic rivals."I think it would be a profound mistake for us to use nuclear weapons in any circumstance," Obama said, with a pause, "involving civilians." Then he quickly added, "Let me scratch that. There's been no discussion of nuclear weapons. That's not on the table."

#### Turn – plan strengthens the regime, kills the economy, and undermines US influence in the region

Suchlicki ‘13 (Jaime, Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, What If…the U.S. Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo? 2/26/13, http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/what-if-the-u-s-ended-the-cuba-travel-ban-and-the-embargo/)

Lifting the ban for U.S. tourists to travel to Cuba would be a major concession totally out of proportion to recent changes in the island. If the U.S. were to lift the travel ban without major reforms in Cuba, there would be significant implications:

Money from American tourists would flow into businesses owned by the Castro government thus strengthening state enterprises. The tourist industry is controlled by the military and General Raul Castro, Fidel’s brother. American tourists will have limited contact with Cubans. Most Cuban resorts are built in isolated areas, are off limits to the average Cuban, and are controlled by Cuba’s efficient security apparatus. Most Americans don’t speak Spanish, have but limited contact with ordinary Cubans, and are not interested in visiting the island to subvert its regime. Law 88 enacted in 1999 prohibits Cubans from receiving publications from tourists. Penalties include jail terms. While providing the Castro government with much needed dollars, the economic impact of tourism on the Cuban population would be limited. Dollars will trickle down to the Cuban poor in only small quantities, while state and foreign enterprises will benefit most. Tourist dollars would be spent on products, i.e., rum, tobacco, etc., produced by state enterprises, and tourists would stay in hotels owned partially or wholly by the Cuban government. The principal airline shuffling tourists around the island, Gaviota, is owned and operated by the Cuban military. The assumption that the Cuban leadership would allow U.S. tourists or businesses to subvert the revolution and influence internal developments is at best naïve. As we have seen in other circumstances, U.S. travelers to Cuba could be subject to harassment and imprisonment. Over the past decades hundred of thousands of Canadian, European and Latin American tourists have visited the island. Cuba is not more democratic today. If anything, Cuba is more totalitarian, with the state and its control apparatus having been strengthened as a result of the influx of tourist dollars. As occurred in the mid-1990s, an infusion of American tourist dollars will provide the regime with a further disincentive to adopt deeper economic reforms. Cuba’s limited economic reforms were enacted in the early 1990s, when the island’s economic contraction was at its worst. Once the economy began to stabilize by 1996 as a result of foreign tourism and investments, and exile remittances, the earlier reforms were halted or rescinded by Castro. Lifting the travel ban without major concessions from Cuba would send the wrong message “to the enemies of the United States”: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the United States; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually the United States will “forget and forgive,” and reward him with tourism, investments and economic aid. Since the Ford/Carter era, U.S. policy toward Latin America has emphasized democracy, human rights and constitutional government. Under President Reagan the U.S. intervened in Grenada, under President Bush, Sr. the U.S. intervened in Panama and under President Clinton the U.S. landed marines in Haiti, all to restore democracy to those countries. The U.S. has prevented military coups in the region and supported the will of the people in free elections. U.S. policy has not been uniformly applied throughout the world, yet it is U.S. policy in the region. Cuba is part of Latin America. While no one is advocating military intervention, normalization of relations with a military dictatorship in Cuba will send the wrong message to the rest of the continent. Once American tourists begin to visit Cuba, Castro would probably restrict travel by Cuban-Americans. For the Castro regime, Cuban-Americans represent a far more subversive group because of their ability to speak to friends and relatives on the island, and to influence their views on the Castro regime and on the United States. Indeed, the return of Cuban exiles in 1979-80 precipitated the mass exodus of Cubans from Mariel in 1980. A large influx of American tourists into Cuba would have a dislocating effect on the economies of smaller Caribbean islands such as Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and even Florida, highly dependent on tourism for their well-being. Careful planning must take place, lest we create significant hardships and social problems in these countries. If the embargo is lifted, limited trade with, and investments in Cuba would develop. Yet there are significant implications.

#### China’s expanding into Latin America---US influence is key to crowd them out

Dowd 12 (Alan, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, “Crisis in the America's,” http://www.ascfusa.org/content\_pages/view/crisisinamericas)

Focused on military operations in the Middle East, nuclear threats in Iran and North Korea, and the global threat of terrorism, U.S. policymakers have neglected a growing challenge right here in the Western Hemisphere: the expanding influence and reach of China.¶ Eyeing energy resources to keep its economy humming, China is engaged in a flurry of investing and spending in Latin America.¶ In Costa Rica, China is funding a $1.24-billion upgrade of the country’s oil refinery; bankrolling an $83-million soccer stadium; backing infrastructure and telecommunications improvements; and pouring millions into a new police academy.¶ In Colombia, China is planning a massive “dry canal” to link the country’s Pacific and Atlantic coasts by rail. At either terminus, there will be Chinese ports; in between, there will be Chinese assembly facilities, logistics operations and distribution plants; and on the Pacific side, there will be dedicated berths to ship Colombian coal outbound to China.¶ In mid-January, a Chinese-built oil rig arrived in Cuba to begin drilling in Cuba’s swath of the Gulf of Mexico. Reuters reports that Spanish, Russian, Malaysian and Norwegian firms will use the rig to extract Cuban oil. For now, China is focusing on onshore oil extraction in Cuba.¶ New offshore discoveries will soon catapult Brazil into a top-five global oil producer. With some 38 billion barrels of recoverable oil off its coast, Brazil expects to pump 4.9 million barrels per day by 2020, as the Washington Times reports, and China has used generous loans to position itself as the prime beneficiary of Brazilian oil. China’s state-run oil and banking giants have inked technology-transfer, chemical, energy and real-estate deals with Brazil. Plus, as the Times details, China came to the rescue of Brazil’s main oil company when it sought financing for its massive drilling plans, pouring $10 billion into the project. A study in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) adds that Beijing plunked down $3.1 billion for a slice of Brazil’s vast offshore oil fields.¶ The JFQ study reveals just how deep and wide Beijing is spreading its financial influence in Latin America: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; a $16.3-billion commitment to develop Venezuelan oil reserves; $1 billion for Ecuadoran oil; $4.4 billion to develop Peruvian mines; $10 billion to help Argentina modernize its rail system; $3.1 billion to purchase Argentina’s petroleum company outright. The New York Times adds that Beijing has lent Ecuador $1 billion to build a hydroelectric plant.¶ There is good and bad to Beijing’s increased interest and investment in the Western Hemisphere. Investment fuels development, and much of Latin America is happily accelerating development in the economic, trade, technology and infrastructure spheres. But China’s riches come with strings.¶ For instance, in exchange for Chinese development funds and loans, Venezuela agreed to increase oil shipments to China from 380,000 barrels per day to one million barrels per day. It’s worth noting that the Congressional Research Service has reported concerns in Washington that Hugo Chavez might try to supplant his U.S. market with China. Given that Venezuela pumps an average of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day for the U.S.—or about 11 percent of net oil imports—the results would be devastating for the U.S.¶ That brings us to the security dimension of China’s checkbook diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere.¶ Officials with the U.S. Southern Command conceded as early as 2006 that Beijing had “approached every country in our area of responsibility” and provided military exchanges, aid or training to Ecuador, Jamaica, Bolivia, Cuba, Chile and Venezuela.¶ The JFQ study adds that China has “an important and growing presence in the region’s military institutions.” Most Latin American nations, including Mexico, “send officers to professional military education courses in the PRC.” In Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, Beijing has begun to sell “sophisticated hardware…such as radars and K-8 and MA-60 aircraft.” The JFQ report concludes, ominously, that Chinese defense firms “are likely to leverage their experience and a growing track record for their goods to expand their market share in the region, with the secondary consequence being that those purchasers will become more reliant on the associated Chinese logistics, maintenance, and training infrastructures that support those products.”¶ Put it all together, and the southern flank of the United States is exposed to a range of new security challenges.¶ To be sure, much of this is a function of China’s desire to secure oil markets. But there’s more at work here than China’s thirst for oil. Like a global chess match, China is probing Latin America and sending a message that just as Washington has trade and military ties in China’s neighborhood, China is developing trade and military ties in America’s neighborhood.¶ This is a direct challenge to U.S. primacy in the region—a challenge that must be answered.¶ First, Washington needs to relearn an obvious truth—that China’s rulers do not share America’s values—and needs to shape and conduct its China policy in that context.¶ Beijing has no respect for human rights. Recall that in China, an estimated 3-5 million people are rotting away in laogai slave-labor camps, many of them “guilty” of political dissent or religious activity; democracy activists are rounded up and imprisoned; freedom of speech and religion and assembly do not exist; and internal security forces are given shoot-to-kill orders in dealing with unarmed citizens. Indeed, Beijing viewed the Arab Spring uprisings not as an impetus for political reform, but as reason “to launch its harshest crackdown on dissent in at least a decade,” according to Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.¶ In short, the ends always justify the means in Beijing. And that makes all the difference when it comes to foreign and defense policy. As Reagan counseled during the Cold War, “There is no true international security without respect for human rights.”¶ Second, the U.S. must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must reengage in its own neighborhood economically, politically and militarily.¶ That means no more allowing trade deals—and the partners counting on them—to languish. Plans for a hemispheric free trade zone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo for years, before President Obama finally signed them into law in 2011.¶ Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy. The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political wrangling in Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a year, while six Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty.¶ Reengagement means reversing plans to slash defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has “a deep respect for U.S. military power.” We cannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the midst of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last.¶ Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be what’s happening in China’s backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps it’s time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countries—from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chile—border the Pacific. Given Beijing’s actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.¶ Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine.¶ Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas, this “Monroe Doctrine 2.0” would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes China’s efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages any claims of control—implied or explicit—by China over territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere.¶ In short, what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

#### Cuba engagement reverses Chinese dominance

Luko 11 (James – Served in Washington DC with the National Council For Soviet East European Research, the Smithsonian Institute and two years as an analyst with the Canadian Department of National Defence, “China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped”, 6/29, http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.html)

The Red Dragon takes another wide step of not only flexing its muscles in Asia, but now wishes to supplant Russias and (former USSRs) forward base presence 90 miles from the United States- CUBA. Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, bilateral trade increased from $440 million in 2001 to $1.83 billion in 2010. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan. Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by China. A client state in the making ! [3] The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba. The Chinese threat in Cuba should be the catalyst for the US to establish open and normalized relations, with economic incentives to re-Americanize Cuba, return of American investments and security agreements. Checking the Chinese move in Cuba early on is vital to preventing a strategic Chinese foothold 90 miles from Florida. Allowing China to replace Russia in Cuba would be a strategic disaster. China is dangling financial assistance and investments in order to establish a beachhead close to the shores of America. This is a counter-response to Americas continued military presence in Asia, continued support of Taiwan and recent increased American aid to the Philippines in its spat with China over sovereignty of the Spratly Islands. The Cuban people wish to return to the American fold and re-establish the traditional relationship with the Cuban anchor in Florida- namely the almost 900,000 Cubans living in Florida alone! [4]

#### China’s influence in Latin America is key to their soft power

Malik, 06 – PhD in International Relations (Mohan, "China's Growing Involvement in Latin America," 6/12, [http://uyghuramerican.org/old/articles/300/1/info@uyghuramerican.org](http://uyghuramerican.org/old/articles/300/1/info%40uyghuramerican.org))

China's forays into Latin America are part of its grand strategy to acquire "comprehensive national power" to become a "global great power that is second to none." Aiming to secure access to the continent's vast natural resources and markets, China is forging deep economic, political and military ties with most of the Latin American and Caribbean countries. There is more to China's Latin American activism than just fuel for an economic juggernaut. China now provides a major source of leverage against the United States for some Latin American and Caribbean countries. As in many other parts of the developing world, China is redrawing geopolitical alliances in ways that help propel China's rise as a global superpower. Beijing's courtship of Latin American countries to support its plan to subdue Taiwan and enlist them to join a countervailing coalition against U.S. global power under the rubric of strengthening economic interdependence and globalization has begun to attract attention in Washington. Nonetheless, Beijing's relations with the region are neither too cozy nor frictionless. For Latin America and the Caribbean countries, China is an enviable competitor and rival, potential investor, customer, economic partner, a great power friend and counterweight to the United States, and, above all, a global power, much like the United States, that needs to be handled with care. As in Asia and Africa, China is rapidly expanding its economic and diplomatic presence in Latin America -- a region the United States has long considered inside its sphere of influence. China's interest in Latin America is driven by its desire to secure reliable sources of energy and raw materials for its continued economic expansion, compete with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition, pursue defense and intelligence opportunities to define limits to U.S. power in its own backyard, and to showcase China's emergence as a truly global great power at par with the United States. In Latin America, China is viewed differently in different countries. Some Latin American countries see China's staggering economic development as a panacea or bonanza (Argentina, Peru, and Chile view China as an insatiable buyer of commodities and an engine of their economic growth); others see it as a threat (Mexico, Brazil, and the Central American republics fear losing jobs and investment); and a third group of countries consider China their ideological ally (Bolivia, Cuba, and Venezuela). While China's growing presence and interests have changed the regional dynamics, it still cannot replace the United States as a primary benefactor of Latin America. Chinese investment in the region is US$8 billion, compared with $300 billion by U.S. companies, and U.S.-Latin America trade is ten times greater than China-Latin America trade. Nonetheless, China is the new kid on the block that everyone wants to be friendly with, and Beijing cannot resist the temptation to exploit resentment of Washington's domineering presence in the region to its own advantage. For Washington, China's forays into the region have significant political, security and economic implications because Beijing's grand strategy has made Latin America and Africa a frontline in its pursuit of global influence. China's Grand Strategy: Placing Latin America in the Proper Context China's activities in Latin America are part and parcel of its long-term grand strategy. The key elements of Beijing's grand strategy can be identified as follows: Focus on "comprehensive national power" essential to achieving the status of a "global great power that is second to none" by 2049; Seek energy security and gain access to natural resources, raw materials and overseas markets to sustain China's economic expansion; Pursue the "three Ms": military build-up (including military presence along the vital sea lanes of communication and maritime chokepoints), multilateralism, and multipolarity so as to counter the containment of China's regional and global aspirations by the United States and its friends and allies; Build a network of Beijing's friends and allies through China's "soft power" and diplomatic charm offensive, trade and economic dependencies via closer economic integration (free trade agreements), and mutual security pacts, intelligence cooperation and arms sales.

#### Chinese international influence is an existential impact – it controls every scenario for extinction

--can address terrosim – bc not the west

--environemnt

Zhang 2012 (Prof of Diplomacy and IR at the Geneva School of Diplomacy. “The Rise of China’s Political Softpower” 9/4/12 http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content\_26421330.htm)

As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty, international conflict, the clash of civilizations and environmental protection. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security. In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. The clash of civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?". China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China model The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger. China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is the rise of China's political soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues. As the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.

# 2NC

## K

### 2nc framework

#### we must analyze both ideology AND policy to affect political practice

Larner 2K (Wendy Larner, Professor of Human Geography and Sociology, Research Director and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Law, University of Bristol, Ph.D., M.A., B.S., “Neo-liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality,” Studies in Political Economy, 63, Autumn 2000, [http://spe.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/spe/article/download/6724/3723‎](http://spe.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/spe/article/download/6724/3723%E2%80%8E))

Introduction¶ The term ''neo-liberalism'' denotes new forms of¶ political-economic governance premised on the extension of¶ market relationships. In critical social science literatures, the¶ term has usurped labels referring to specific political projects¶ (Thatcherism, Regeanomics, Rogemomics), and is more widely¶ used than its counterparts including, for example, economic rationalism,¶ monetarism, neo-conservatism, managerialism and contractualism.'¶ Indeed, Jane Jenson recently used "neo-liberal" as a¶ general descriptor for post-welfare state citizenship regimes.2It is¶ in this context that I re-assess existing analyses of neo-liberalism.¶ The imperative for this examination arises from my growing conviction¶ that many critical commentators have underestimated the¶ significance of neo-liberalism for contemporary forms of governance¶ and, as such, have been largely unable to engage in the¶ formulation of an effective "post-social politics."3¶ At first glance the object of my enquiry appears self-evident.¶ Internationally, conservative and social democratic governments¶ alike are involved in debates over welfare state processes.¶ Whereas under Keynesian welfarism the state provision of goods¶ and services to a national population was understood as a means¶ of ensuring social well-being, neo-liberalism is associated with the¶ preference for a minimalist state. Markets are understood to be a¶ better way of organizing economic activity because they are associated¶ with competition, economic efficiency and choice. In conjunction¶ with this general shift towards the neo-liberal tenet of¶ "more market," deregulation and privatization have become central¶ themes in debates over welfare state restructuring.¶ This paper claims that neo-liberalism is a more complex phenomenon¶ than may have been recognized by many participants in¶ these debates. In order to address this claim, the first part of the¶ paper identifies three different interpretations of neo-liberalism. I¶ distinguish between analyses that understand neo-liberalism as a¶ policy framework, those that portray neo-liberalism as an ideology¶ and those who conceptualize neo-liberalism through the lens of¶ governmentality. I show that each of these interpretations of neoliberalism¶ has different implications for understandings of the¶ restructuring of welfare state processes and for the envisaging of¶ political strategies that might further aspirations for social justice¶ and collective forms of well-being. In this context, it should be¶ immediately apparent that this delineation of the different interpretations¶ of neo-liberalism is not simply an academic exercise;¶ our understandings of this phenomenon shape our readings of the¶ scope and content of possible political interventions.¶ I argue that analyses that characterize neo-liberalism as either a¶ policy response to the exigencies of the global economy, or the¶ capturing of the policy agenda by the "New Right," run the risk of¶ under-estimating the significance of contemporary transformations¶ in governance. Neo-liberalism is both a political discourse¶ about the nature of rule and a set of practices that facilitate the¶ governing of individuals from a distance. In this regard, understanding¶ neo-liberalism as governmentality opens useful avenues¶ for the investigation of the restructuring of welfare state processes.¶ At the same time, however, I suggest that the insights of the¶ governmentality literature should be enhanced by those from feminist¶ and other critical theorizing in which contested nature of discursive¶ practices is centred. In this regard:¶ Those whose aim it is to create knowledge that will assist social contestation¶ should take on the difficult work of understanding actual and¶ possible contests and struggles around rule, and our theories should¶ enable rather than prevent such projects.t¶ Neo-Iiberalism as Policy The most common conceptualization¶ of neo-liberalism is as a policy framework-marked by a shift¶ from Keynesian welfarism towards a political agenda favouring¶ the relatively unfettered operation of markets. Often this renewed¶ emphasis on markets is understood to be directly associated with¶ the so-called globalization of capital. The argument is a familiar¶ one. New forms of globalized production relations and financial¶ systems are forcing governments to abandon their commitment to¶ the welfare state.>Rather than formulating policies to ensure full¶ employment and an inclusive social welfare system, governments¶ are now focused on enhancing economic efficiency and international¶ competitiveness. One consequence is the "rolling back" of¶ welfare state activities, and a new emphasis on market provisioning¶ of formerly "public" goods and services.¶ Analysts tend to attribute this shift in policy agendas to the capture¶ of key institutions and political actors by a particular political¶ Ideology (with a capital "I"), a body of ideas or a worldview.e This¶ body of ideas is understood to rest on five values: the individual;¶ freedom of choice; market security; laissez faire, and minimal¶ government." These values underpin the new institutional economics¶ (built on public choice theory, transactions cost theory and¶ principal-agency theory) which, together with a new emphasis on¶ managerialism, comprise the intellectual basis of the neo-liberal¶ challenge to Keynesian welfarism, and provide the theoretical¶ impetus for deregulation and privatization. In tum, this new intellectual¶ agenda has been popularized by think tanks and corporate¶ decision makers, backed by powerful international organizers¶ such as the IMF and the World Bank.s¶ The widespread adoption of this system of ideas, which has¶ resulted in a free market version of restructuring, is attributed to¶ the influence of key politicians and/or political organizations.¶ Politicians such as Thatcher and Reagan are most often mentioned,¶ together with their counterparts elsewhere, such as¶ Mulroney and Douglas.? Other analyses focus on the importance¶ of Finance Departments and Treasury advisers.tv Finally, a wide¶ set of both public and private interests, particularly those representing¶ multi-national capital, are identified as supportive of market¶ liberalism. I I In each analytical case, however, it is assumed¶ that neo-liberalism is a policy reform programme initiated and¶ rationalized through a relatively coherent theoretical and¶ Ideological framework.¶ Of course there is a healthy internal debate amongst those who¶ understand neo-liberalism as a policy agenda. Public choice theory,¶ to give just one example, has been challenged on numerous¶ grounds.u It is also clear that neo-liberal policies are differentially¶ applied. In their discussion of New Zealand's model of public¶ management, for example, Jonathon Boston and his colleagues¶ stress that, "As is often the case, broad overarching terms, such as¶ the NPM, can shelter within them a wealth of policy diversity."13¶ My point is, however, that despite debate and diversity within this¶ literature, the key actors are understood to be politicians and policy¶ makers, and component parts of the neo-liberal policy agenda¶ are seen as mutually reinforcing. Indeed, the very use of the word¶ agenda "denotes a coherent program of things to be done."14¶ Such analyses constitute the vast majority of popular interpretations,¶ as well as many academic commentaries on neo-liberalism.¶ Understandably, for many such observers the extension of¶ market relations is highly problematic. More specifically, deregulation¶ and privatization are identified as transferring power away¶ from democratically elected governments with a mandate to¶ ensure universal service provision, towards private capital concerned¶ primarily with furthering opportunities for accumulation.¶ In turn, this shift from public to private sector is understood to¶ erode the foundations of both national economies and traditional¶ social solidarities. As Susan Strange has observed, "that these¶ changes have to a large extent emasculated state control over¶ national economies and societies has almost become a journalistic¶ platitude."15¶ In these analyses the response to neo-liberalism tends to take¶ the form of arguments over the success, or otherwise, of policy¶ programmes. Consequently the outcomes of neo-liberal policy¶ reforms predominate in these debates. In New Zealand, for example,¶ quantitative research based on macro-economic indicators is¶ used to dispute the efficacy of the shift towards "more market."16¶ Social policy analysts have demonstrated that increased social and¶ spatial polarization is amongst the consequences of neo-liberal¶ reform.I?¶ It is also argued that neo-liberalism has exaggerated¶ swings in the business cycle. The most common response to the¶ shift to a minimalist non-interventionist state is an argument for¶ the reintroduction of forms of state control that will attenuate the¶ power of the market and prioritize the re-establishment of national¶ control. Thus a change in the policy agenda, involving a return¶ to the more protectionist stance associated with Keynesian welfarism,¶ is seen as the primary solution to the problems generated¶ by neo-liberalism.¶ My argument is that while accounts of neo-liberalism as policy¶ serve a useful purpose in terms of elaborating the consequences of¶ welfare state restructuring, as an explanation of the phenomenon¶ itself they may raise more questions than they answer. It is notable¶ that, for example, that while very few political parties explicitly¶ identify themselves as neo-liberal, adherence to market-based pol-¶ icy options characterize the current policy programmes of social¶ democratic and conservative governments alike. Assuming a critical¶ distance from the tenets of neo-liberalism, in particular the¶ preference for market mechanisms as a means of ensuring social¶ well-being, how is it that such a massive transformation in the policy-¶ making agenda has been achieved?¶ Moreover, given the tenuous empirical claims and lack of intellectual¶ rigour on which this policy agenda appears to be based,¶ how is it possible to explain the tenacity of ideas associated with¶ neo-liberalism? For as political scientist Janine Brodie has¶ observed, "changing public expectations about citizenship entitlements,¶ the collective provision of social needs, and the efficacy of¶ the welfare state has been a critical victory for neo-liberalism."18¶ It is noticeable in New Zealand, for example, that despite the¶ apparent unpopularity of the so-called "free market revolution,"¶ many political claims are now framed in the language of choice,¶ flexibility and the market.i? In short, how do we account for the¶ apparent success of neo-liberalism in shaping both political programmes¶ and individual subjectivities?¶ Neo-Iiberalism as Ideology Neo-Marxist and socialist-feminist¶ theorizations of neo-liberalism provide useful means of addressing¶ these questions, and thus constitute the second interpretation of¶ neo-liberalism to be discussed in this paper. This might be seen as¶ a more "sociological" approach to neo-liberalism in which a wider¶ range of institutions, organizations and processes are considered.¶ Best known of these are the analyses of Thatcherism associated¶ with British theorist Stuart Hall. Rejecting the "classic variant" of¶ the Marxist theory of ideology, namely the idea that the ruling ideas¶ are the ideas of the ruling class, Hall argues that the power of¶ Thatcherism was its ability to constitute subject positions from¶ which its discourses about the world made sense to people in a¶ range of different social positions.s? In doing so Thatcherism¶ "changed the currency of political thought and argument" and¶ marked the consolidation of a new ideological hegemony based on¶ the tenets of neo-Iiberalism.u¶ In arguing that Thatcherism was an ideological transformation,¶ Hall makes explicit three points: first, that neo-liberalism is not¶ simply a system of ideas, nor a lurch to the Right in the formulation¶ of policy agendas; second, that power is not constituted and¶ exercised exclusively on the terrain of the state; third, that hege-¶ mony is only achieved through an ongoing process of contestation¶ and struggle. Strongly influenced by Gramsci, his claim is that¶ Thatcherism is best understood as a "struggle to gain ascendancy¶ over the entire social formation, to achieve positions of leadership¶ in a number of different sites of social life at once, to achieve the¶ commanding position on a broad strategic front."22¶ Most immediately, the strength of this work is that it does not¶ underestimate the contradictions and complexities of Thatcherism¶ as a concrete political phenomenon. In particular, Hall was concerned¶ with the fact that Thatcherism had managed to articulate¶ the interests of a wide range of groups in Britain, thereby clearing¶ the way for the reassertion of market forces. Moreover, rather than¶ understanding the ideology of the "New Right" as a coherent¶ corpus, he emphasized the different threads of this ideological¶ formation; in this case, the tensions between a "pure" neo-liberal¶ ideology premised on the individual and free market, and a more¶ traditional conservative ideology based on family and nation.¶ Finally, his work opens the crucial question of identity. Rather¶ than dismissing the attraction of the English working class to¶ Thatcherism as "false consciousness," he explored the ways in¶ which individual and group understandings were reconstructed¶ through and against these ideological processes.¶ Hall's analysis of Thatcherism was, in part, an intellectual¶ response to apparent political acquiescence of the British working¶ class to neo-liberal tenets. As the articles in Morley and Chen suggest,¶ however, it was also a response to the rise of the so-called¶ social movements (including feminism, gay and lesbian politics,¶ and ethnic struggles) and the subsequent extension of politics into¶ "lifestyle" issues such as health, food, sexuality and the body.23¶ More generally, as social heterogeneity and cross-cutting axes¶ become increasingly visible, social theorists have been forced to¶ take questions of identity and subjectivity more seriously. Indeed,¶ it is noticeable that identity has become a "keyword" for the social¶ sciences, and that a more capacious Gramscian conception of ideology¶ is now commonplace.e'¶ There have, of course, been influential critiques of Hall's work.¶ Perhaps best known is the debate that took place in New Left¶ Review during the 1980s. In this debate Hall was accused of overstating¶ support for the New Right and, in doing so, indulging in a¶ "apparent ideological celebration of Thatcherism." The alternative¶ account emphasized the political-economic under-pinnings of¶ Thatcherism, arguing that it was primarily a state strategy to reestablish¶ the conditions for sustained capitalist accumulation.c¶ More recently, this argument has been further developed using¶ concepts from the neo-Marxist Regulation school. In this later formulation,¶ neo-liberalism is understood as a mode of social regulation--¶ one possible form of a "Schumpterian workfare state."26¶ Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, in contrast, argue that rather than¶ representing a new mode of social regulation, neo-liberalism¶ should be seen as a regulatory vacuum and the outbreak of "jungle¶ law."27¶ The work of Jane Jenson is also influenced by Regulation¶ theory.28However, unlike her counterparts discussed above, the¶ question of identity formation is central to her analysis. Jenson is¶ concerned to explore the ''universe of political discourse" within¶ which identities are socially constructed. Her emphasis is on political¶ agency: how it is that groups of people mobilize around particular¶ collective identities in order to represent their interests and¶ intervene in the process of restructuring. Her primary emphasis is¶ on oppositional identities, in particular those of social movements,¶ rather than those constituted through official institutions and narratives.¶ In the context of the argument made in this paper, the¶ strength of Jenson's work is that she alerts us to the idea that the¶ universe of political discourse is not monopolized by hegemonic¶ groups.¶ Innovative accounts of neo-liberalism and welfare state restructuring¶ emerge out of these neo-Gramscian literatures, most notably¶ in the work of socialist-feminist analysts. Janine Brodie, for example,¶ argues that the contemporary shift in governing practices is "a¶ historic alteration in state form which enacts simultaneous changes¶ in cultural assumptions, political identities and the very terrain of¶ political struggle."29 Her work interrogates new discourses of¶ social welfare, marks shifts in understandings of citizenship, and¶ explores how these articulate with new understandings of gender¶ relations. Moreover, she stresses that social movements are part of¶ this complex matrix of discursive construction and reconstruction.¶ w Likewise, in an analysis of the "politics of post-welfare state¶ arrangements" in the Ministry of Health and Social Services in¶ Quebec, Dominique Masson explicates the role of women's organizations¶ in shaping new state forms, emphasizing that restructuring¶ is a contested process and "a complex, messy and contingent¶ historical phenomena."31¶ These analyses show that new political configurations are more¶ multi-vocal than we might previously have understood. Most¶ immediately, we are alerted to the possibility that there are different¶ configurations of neo-liberalism, and that close inspection of¶ particular neo-liberal political projects is more likely to reveal a¶ complex and hybrid political imaginary, rather than the straightforward¶ implementation of a unified and coherent philosophy.¶ Moreover, in making visible the claims of those all too often portrayed¶ as the ''victims'' of welfare state restructuring, these studies¶ emphasize that new welfare state arrangements emerge out of¶ political struggle, rather than being imposed in a top down manner.¶ Finally, and not unrelatedly, we are forced to explore the¶ notion that power is productive, and that the articulations between¶ hegemonic and oppositional claims give rise to new political subjectivities¶ and social identities which then enter into the "discourse¶ of restructuring."32¶ Neo-Iiberalism as Govemmentality As will be apparent from¶ the discussion above, it is a short step from ideology to discourse,¶ and thus to the third reading of neo-liberalism to feature in this¶ paper. However, this step requires us to move from Gramsci to¶ Foucault, and from neo-Marxism to post-structuralism. In poststructuralist¶ literatures, discourse is understood not simply as a¶ form of rhetoric disseminated by hegemonic economic and political¶ groups, nor as the framework within which people represent¶ their lived experience, but rather as a system of meaning that constitutes¶ institutions, practices and identities in contradictory and¶ disjunctive ways.v Indeed, Hall himself has taken this step with a¶ self-identified shift from a "base-superstructure ideology model"¶ to a "discursive model."34¶ The most influential post-structuralist theorization of neo-liberalism¶ is that associated with the neo-Foucauldian literature on¶ governmentality.a> This literature makes a useful distinction¶ between government and governance, and argues that while neoliberalism¶ may mean less government, it does not follow that there¶ is less governance. While on one hand neo-liberalism problematizes¶ the state and is concerned to specify its limits through the¶ invocation of individual choice, on the other hand it involves¶ forms of governance that encourage both institutions and individuals¶ to conform to the norms of the market. Elsewhere I have used¶ the term "market governance" to capture this point.36¶ The governmentality literature has inspired innovative analyses¶ of welfare state restructuring which show that social policy reform¶ is linked to a new specification of the object of governance. The¶ conception of a national community of citizens, made up of male¶ breadwinners and female domestic workers, has been usurped by¶ a new understanding in which not only are firms to be¶ entrepreneurial, enterprising and innovative, but so too are political¶ subjects. Neo-liberal strategies of rule, found in diverse realms¶ including workplaces, educational institutions and health and welfare¶ agencies, encourage people to see themselves as individualized¶ and active subjects responsible for enhancing their own well¶ being. This conception of the "active society" can also be linked¶ to a particular politics of self in which we are all encouraged to¶ ''work on ourselves" in a range of domains, including the "counter¶ cultural movements" outside the purview of traditional conceptions¶ of the political.I?¶ Nikolas Rose elucidates the process by which this new formula¶ of rule has usurped that of the welfare state.38He argues that it¶ was the linking of the critiques of the welfare state (from both¶ sides of the political spectrum) to the political technologies associated¶ with marketization, that provided the basis for "advanced¶ liberal" rule. Welfare agencies are now to be governed, not directly¶ from above, but through technologies such as budget disciplines,¶ accountancy and audit. In association with this "degovernmentalization"¶ of the welfare state, competition and consumer¶ demand have supplanted the norms of "public service."¶ Correspondingly, the citizen is re-specified as an active agent both¶ able and obliged to exercise autonomous choices. In his research¶ on unemployment, William Walters has looked at how this new¶ understanding forms the basis for active labour market policies,¶ and is associated with the "desocialization" of unemployment and¶ poverty.s?¶ The political implications of these analyses are perhaps more¶ subtle than those discussed previously. As O'Malley, Weir and¶ Shearing explain, ''the broad aim of the approach is to generate a¶ 'post-social politics' that provides a successor to socialism, but¶ which nonetheless is more than a simple condemnation of neo-liberal¶ and neo-conservative thinking."40¶ At the same time, those¶ working within this tradition are clear that they wish to avoid generating¶ a specific political programme. Rather they aspire to "fragment¶ the present;" "the received fixedness and inevitability of the¶ present is destabilized, shown as just sufficiently fragile as to let in¶ a little glimpse of freedom-as a practice of difference-through¶ its fractures."41 This politics stresses the complexity, ambiguity and¶ the contingency of contemporary political formations to maximize¶ possibilities for critical responses and interventions.¶ As yet, however, the governmentality literature has not paid a¶ great deal of attention to the politics surrounding specific programmes¶ and policies.P This is particularly the case vis-a-vis theorizations¶ of neo-liberalism in that the emphasis has been on broad¶ governmental themes rather than specific neo-liberal projects. This¶ programmatic orientation is reflected in the distinction made by¶ Nikolas Rose between "advanced liberalism" as a governmentality¶ and "neo-liberalism" as a political ideology.v Yet it is obvious that¶ without analyses of the "messy actualities" of particular neo-liberal¶ projects, those working within this analytic run the risk of precisely¶ the problem they wish to avoid-that of producing generalized¶ accounts of historical epochs. Indeed, this is precisely the criticism¶ made of this literature by Boris Frankel, who argues that advanced¶ liberalism is a totalizing concept, despite attempts to distance the¶ governmentality literature from other grand theories.s-¶ Moreover, in the few instances where the emphasis has been on¶ neo-liberal projects, the analysis has tended to focus on official¶ discourses, as read through government policy documents. As Pat¶ O'Malley explains, this means that this body of work privileges¶ official discourses, with the result that it is difficult to recognize¶ the imbrication of resistance and rule.45 My point is that despite its¶ origins in Foucauldian formulations, remarkably few of these¶ analyses draw from the discourses of oppositional groups as well¶ as those of hegemonic groups.s« It is in this context that I argue for¶ a formulation that draws on the insights of both the neo-Marxist¶ and socialist-feminist analyses discussed in the second section of¶ the paper, and the governmentality literature examined herein.¶ Theorizing the "New Zealand Experiment" The ''New Zealand¶ experiment" is a particularly challenging case through which to¶ work my argument. International attention has focused on this¶ country not only because of the depth and rapidity of the reforms¶ instituted by successive governments since 1984, but also because¶ this case appears to involve the direct application of a clearly¶ delineated theoretical model. For example, John Gray, Professor¶ of Politics at Oxford University, recently observed:¶ The neo-liberal experiment in New Zealand is the most ambitious¶ attempt at constructing the free market as a social institution to be¶ implemented anywhere this century. It is a clearer case ofthe costs and¶ limits of reinventing the free market than the Thatcherite experiment¶ in Britain. 47¶ While these comments may be somewhat exaggerated, even¶ more nuanced commentators agree the "New Zealand experiment"¶ was an early and extreme example of the now widespread¶ transition from social democracy to neo-liberalism in welfare state¶ societies."¶ In most discussions of the "New Zealand experiment," neo-liberalism¶ is understood as a coherent, top-down, state-initiated policy¶ agenda based on a unified political philosophy. Indeed there is¶ such a tight identification between neo-liberalism and the state¶ that in the most recent edited collection on the political economy¶ of New Zealand they are referenced together.s? There is also a¶ widespread assumption that this policy agenda has "programmatic¶ coherence'w despite the diversity of political perspectives and¶ ideological standpoints from which concepts such as devolution,¶ community and empowerment are disseminated. Even when the¶ resonance between hegemonic and oppositional claims is¶ acknowledged, the explanation tends to be in terms of "their" cooption¶ of "our" language. One consequence of this formulation is¶ that many of those who would contest this policy agenda unwittingly¶ reinforce the coherence ofneo-liberalism.¶ It is the "programmatic coherence" of neo-liberalism that this¶ paper seeks to challenge. My claim is that in constructing neo-liberalism¶ as a monolithic apparatus that is completely knowable¶ and in full control of the "New Right," such analyses inadvertently¶ reconstruct its hegemony. In this regard I am persuaded by¶ Wendy Brown's argument that many well-intentioned contemporary¶ political projects and theoretical postures inadvertently¶ redraw the very configurations and effects of power they seek to¶ vanquish.>! Both neo-Marxist and socialist-feminist literatures on¶ the "politics of restructuring" and the post-structuralist literatures¶ on governmentality open up possibilities to theorize the "New¶ Zealand experiment" in ways that emphasize its historically contingent¶ and internally contradictory aspects, rather than its coherence.¶ In this regard, it will be apparent that I take seriously the¶ post-structuralist admonition to recognize the consequences of¶ our theories, and to make visible "contested representations within¶ what are putatively singular or common cultures."52¶ What then might we see if we were to take such an approach?¶ Most immediately, the analysis needs to be grounded in a detailed¶ investigation of the case in order to make visible the messy actualities¶ of new forms of governance; the contradictions, complexities¶ and inconsistencies that inevitably characterize neo-liberal¶ political projects

, including the "New Zealand experiment."¶ Moreover, whereas a more orthodox account might analyse these¶ differences as simply permutations on a more general themestressing,¶ for example, the similarities between Rogernomics and¶ Thatcherism-an approach grounded in the literatures explored¶ herein would stress the specificity of these political projects.v¶ Such an approach understands that different formulations of neoliberalism¶ emerge out of a multiplicity of political forces always¶ in competition with one another, producing unintended outcomes¶ and unexpected alignments. Moreover, the emergence of new¶ political projects is never a complete rupture with what has gone¶ before, but rather is part of an ongoing process involving the recomposition¶ of political rationalities, programmes and identities.¶ In terms of substantive research projects, the differing strands of¶ thought that come together under the label of neo-liberalism in¶ New Zealand can be identified and explored. Reviving the distinction¶ between neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism, and then identifying¶ variants within each of these formulations, may be a critical¶ first step.>' In this regard, the work of Bruce Jesson et aZ. and Anne¶ Else is notable, and can be used to inform contemporary concerns.¶ s' Both were concerned to emphasize two different strands of¶ "new right ideology"-libertarianism and authoritarianism-and¶ argued the fourth Labour government was dominated by libertarians.¶ This argument could be extended. For example, whereas Hall¶ argued that Thatcherism managed to articulate neo-liberalism with¶ neo-conservatism, it could be argued that the achievement of the¶ fourth Labour government was that it was able to articulate a libertarian¶ version of neo-liberalism with social democratic aspirations.¶ 56This point also alerts us to the importance of exploring the¶ contradictions between social justice and economic agendas during¶ the 1980s. This is an often noted, but rarely investigated, aspect of¶ existing commentaries on the "New Zealand experiment."¶ In contrast, the policies and programmes of the National government¶ of the 1990s involved an articulation between a more¶ authoritarian version of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism, and¶ was thus a more recognizable "New Right" configuration. Even¶ during the 1990s, however, there were diverse and sometimes contradictory¶ formulations. There were, for example, clear tensions¶ between "market governance" in the economic realm premised on¶ individualistic and entrepreneurial economic subjects who could¶ be "governed from a distance," and the increased visibility of the¶ state in the area of social policy. These tensions were most notable¶ in the 1998 proposal to develop a "Code of Social and Family¶ Responsibility." This Code was premised on the assumption that¶ direct monitoring of New Zealand families could be used to foster¶ self-reliant and enterprising neo-libera1 subjects. Rather than conflating¶ these tensions under broad claims about the "New Right,"¶ the contradictions within and between these political rationales¶ can be made explicit and explored.t"¶ It follows that greater attention should be paid to the contestations¶ within and between hegemonic (neo-liberal?) groups.¶ Already there is work that alerts us to the existence of such tensions;¶ for example the debates within the Labour party,58 or the¶ well-publicized clashes between the Employers Federation and¶ the Manufacturers Federation. Closer attention to the specificities¶ of neo-liberalism would also encourage "de-centered" approaches¶ to the state, with an emphasis on the detail of the restructuring of¶ different government departments and state agencies. In this¶ regard, Geoff Fougere's 1997 research on the health sector in New¶ Zealand is indicative. 59His institutionalist analysis shows that the¶ new "hybrid" health system is less the result of design from above¶ than "skilful improvisation" from below. He identifies the "confusion"¶ of principles and forms of organization in this sector, and¶ argues that rather than this being a transitional moment (from one¶ pure form to another), the new health apparatus may well be more¶ permanent than is commonly assumed.¶ Inevitably such projects multiply the social locations from¶ which new formulations emerge. Social movements become visible¶ in these analyses, not simply as victims, but as active agents¶ in the process of political-economic change. At the same time, it¶ needs to be recognized that political "resistance" is figured by¶ and within, rather than being external to, the regimes of power it¶ contests.s'' Again, signposts exist for such work. Denese Henare¶ and Brenda Tahi, for example, emphasize that in New Zealand¶ public sector restructuring has been significantly shaped by¶ attempts to institutionalize bi-culturalism.st As Mason Durie¶ observes:¶ Positive Maori development, with its focus on tribal responsibilities¶ for health, education, welfare, economic progress, and greater autonomy,¶ fitted quite comfortably with the free market philosophy of a¶ minimal state, non-government provision of services, economic selfsufficiency¶ and privatization.62¶ This is not to suggest that the discourses of neo-liberalism and¶ tino rangatiratanga can be reduced to each other, nor is it to deny¶ neo-liberal hegemony. However it is to take seriously the idea¶ that new welfare state arrangements emerge out of political struggle,¶ rather than being simply imposed in a top-down manner. In¶ New Zealand demands from Maori for the right to deliver services¶ in culturally appropriate forms constitute a very significant¶ critique of the post-war welfare state. Moreover, as Elizabeth¶ Rata argues, in the last two decades there has been a dialectical¶ interaction between state actors and Maori as both have attempted¶ to reposition themselves in a wider global context. During this¶ process, neo-liberals and some Maori found themselves in unexpected¶ agreement on a key theme: namely, the dangers of continued¶ dependency on the state. 63 In this case, therefore, we see very¶ clearly that the claims of social movements are part of the discursive¶ construction and reconstruction associated with welfare¶ state restructuring.¶ Similarly, while the economic restructuring programme initiated¶ by the fourth Labour government is often seen as detrimental for¶ women, there were also important feminist victories during this¶ period. An active women's council and a feminist party president¶ meant that broader feminist struggles were reflected in both Labour¶ party organization and policy proposals. Once elected, the fourth¶ Labour cabinet was notable for the inclusion of several "stroppy¶ women."64The presence of these women provided the impetus for¶ important initiatives, including the establishment of a Ministry for¶ Women's Affairs. EEO programmes were also advanced, becoming¶ mandatory in the public sector with the passing of the State¶ Sector Act 1988. In her analysis of the EEO initiative, Alex¶ Woodley argues its success could be attributed to a general¶ appreciation of the merits of the case, together with widespread¶ political support from women in parliament, the bureaucracy, com-¶ munity groups and trade unions.e> Homosexual Law Reform and¶ the short-lived Employment Equity Act 66¶ were amongst the other¶ important initiatives. Thus, whereas neo-liberalism is often associated¶ with an anti-feminist backlash (see David,67 for example, on¶ the United Kingdom and the United States), the contrary was the¶ case in New Zealand during the 1980s.¶ Understanding neo-liberalism through these lenses also encourages¶ investigation of the reformulation of identities, not simply as¶ the outcome of rhetoric or political manipulation, but rather as an¶ integral part of the process of restructuring. It would centre the¶ recognition that political power does not just act on political subjects,¶ but constructs them in particular ways.68 This would help us¶ understand the processes by which the subjectivities of New¶ Zealanders have become more closely aligned with the individualistic¶ assumptions that underpin neo-liberalism, and how economic¶ identities have come to be posited as a new basis for political life,¶ usurping those associated with social citizenship. Elsewhere, for¶ example, I have shown that the restructuring of the telecommunications¶ industry was integrally associated with a move away from¶ governmental conceptions of the "public" and the concomitant¶ centring of the "consumer" as the hegemonic political-economic¶ identity. The analysis demonstrated that this change was a consequence¶ of the contestation between dominant and oppositional¶ claims, rather than being simply imposed from above.s?¶ This attention to identity can be extended to consider how new¶ gendered, racialized and classed subjectivities are also emerging¶ out of the articulations between hegemonic and oppositional¶ claims in the "discourse of restructuring."70 It is notable, for¶ example, that the new "consumer-citizen" is de-gendered.?! The¶ concept of the male breadwinner has also been eroded, manifest in¶ a more gender-neutral model of the citizen worker.Z- Government¶ agencies and documents now recognize diverse family forms,¶ rather than insisting on a culturally specific nuclear model of the¶ nuclear family, and more often use the gender-neutral term "parents,"¶ rather than the gender specific terms "mothers" and¶ "fathers." Indeed, one of the striking aspects of the proposed Code¶ of Social and Family Responsibility was that despite the emphasis¶ on the family as a self-supporting site of social well-being, it¶ explicitly referred to mothers only when discussing pregnancy and¶ child bearing, and exhorted fathers to assume more responsibility¶ for childcare and family life.¶ Of course, it is easy to be cynical about these changes.¶ Certainly, when second wave feminists demanded the rights to¶ economic independence and labour force participation for women¶ on the same terms as men, they did not anticipate increasing numbers¶ of men being employed in jobs and under terms and conditions¶ once associated only with women.ts Moreover, women who¶ opt for motherhood now find their labour devalued in a context¶ where paid work appears to be all,74 whereas those who choose¶ not to have children contend with the legacy of earlier formulations¶ and are seen as ''un-natural women." My point is, however,¶ that there is an articulation between feminist claims for gender¶ neutrality premised on the assumption that women have the right¶ to autonomous personhood, and neo-liberal claims for possessive¶ individualism. As O'Connor, Orloff and Shaver remind us, neoliberalism¶ emerged in a period when increasing numbers of¶ women entered into the labour market, and during which liberal¶ feminists have forcefully asserted women's personhood in law and¶ the market.v> The consequence is that neo-liberals are thus more¶ willing to recognize women as individuals in their own right than¶ their post-war political counterparts.¶ Conclusion Most immediately, I am making a claim for a more¶ detailed engagement with contemporary changes in governance,¶ rather than dismissing them as the prerogative of the "New Right."¶ Such investigations may reveal that neo-liberalism is a more tenuous¶ phenomenon than is commonly assumed. By focusing attention¶ on the historically specific and internally contradictory¶ aspects of neo-liberalism, and the shaping of specific neo-liberal¶ projects by articulations between both hegemonic and non-hegemonic¶ groups, it will become apparent that neo-liberalism, like the¶ welfare state, is "more an ethos or an ethical ideal, than a set of¶ completed or established institutions."76 The emergence of new¶ forms of political power does not simply involve the imposition of¶ a new understanding on top of the old. The transformation of a¶ polity involves the complex linking of various domains of practice,¶ is ongoingly contested, and the result is not a foregone conclusion.¶ Consequently, contemporary forms of rule are inevitably¶ composite, plural and multi-form.¶ Thus, while fully recognizing the distinctiveness of the contemporary¶ forms of political-economic life, it will become possible to¶ move past the either/or debates that currently structure political¶ life. If neo-liberalism cannot be reduced to a single set of philosophical¶ principles or a unified political ideology, nor is necessarily¶ linked to a particular political apparatus, this will encourage us¶ to think about different versions of neo-liberalism, and allow¶ exploration of the possibilities that might enhance social wellbeing.¶ As O'Malley, Weir and Shearing explain:¶ Not only does (the governmentality literature) provide a theoretical¶ elaboration which potentially opens everyday and institutional programmes¶ and practices for critical and tactical thinking, it also provides¶ a considerable array of empirical work in terms of which interventions¶ can be examined and thought out.??¶ Obviously these claims challenge many orthodoxies. Yet without¶ such an engagement, we restrict our potential to imagine¶ political alternatives. Only by theorizing neo-liberalism as a¶ multi-vocal and contradictory phenomenon can we make visible¶ the contestations and struggles that we are currently engaged in.¶ Moreover, the alternatives, premised on monolithic conceptions¶ of the "New Right," are both politically disempowering and intellectually unsatisfying. As academics, we need to pay careful attention to the reasons why the so-called "rhetoric" of programmers resonates, parodies and complicates our analyses, if only because in acknowledging the complexity of neo-liberalism we stand a better chance of identifying possibilities to advance social justice aims in a new context.

#### Demanding a “competitive policy option” *entrenches neoliberalism* and ensures *serial policy failure*

Gunder et al., Aukland University senior planning lecturer, 2009 (Michael, Planning in Ten Words or Less: A Lacanian Entanglement with Spatial Planning pgs 111-2, ldg)

The hegemonic network, or bloc, initially shapes the debates and draws on appropriate policies of desired success, such as the needs of bohemians, knowledge clusters, or talented knowledge workers, as to what constitutes their desired enjoyment (cobblestones, chrome and cappuccinos at sidewalk cafes) and what is therefore lacking in local competitiveness. In tum, this defines what is blighted and dysfunctional and in need of economic, spatial planning, or other, remedy. Such an argument is predicated on a logic, or more accurately a rhetoric, that a lack of a particular defined type of enjoyment, or competitiveness (for surely they are one and the same) is inherently unhealthy for the aggregate social body. Lack and its resolution are generally presented as technical, rather than political issues. Consequently, technocrats in partnership with their "˜dominant stakeholders` can ensure the impression of rationally seeking to produce happiness for the many whilst, of course, achieving their stakeholders' specific interests (Gunder and Hillier 2007a, 469). The current "˜post-democratic` milieu facilitates the above through avoidance of critical policy debate challenging favored orthodox positions and policy approaches. Consideration of policy deficiencies, or alternative solutions, are eradicated from political debate so that while "˜token institutions of liberal democracy' are retained conflicting positions and arguments are negated (Stavrakakis 2003, 59). Consequently, "˜the safe names in the field who feed the policy orthodoxy are repeatedly used or their work drawn upon. by different stakeholders. while more critical voices are silenced by their inability to shape policy debates' (Boland 2007, 1032). The economic development or spatial planning policy analyst thus continues to partition reality ideologically by deploying only the orthodox "˜successful' or "˜best practice' economic development or spatial planning responses. This further maintains the dominant, or hegemonic, status quo while providing "˜a cover and shield against critical thought by acting in the manner of a "buffer" isolating the political held Rom any research that is independent and radical in its conception as in its implications for public policy' (Wacquant 2004, 99). At the same time, adoption of the hegemonic orthodoxy tends to generate similar policy responses for every competing local area or city-region. largely resulting in a zero-sum game (Blair and Kumar 1997).

### 2nc a2 AFF o/w

#### No impact uniqueness – neolib makes extinction inevitable

Richard A. Smith 7, Research Associate at the Institute for Policy Research & Development, UK; PhD in History from UCLA, June 2007, “The Eco-suicidal Economics of Adam Smith,” Capitalism Nature Socialism, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 22-43

So there you have it: insatiable growth and consumption is destroying the planet and dooming humanity-but without ceaselessly growing production and insatiably rising consumption, we would be even worse off. Such is the lunatic suicidal logic of capitalist economics. Adam Smith's fatal error was his assumption that the "most effectual" means of promoting the public interest of society is to just ignore it and concentrate instead on the pursuit of economic self-interest. In the 18th century, this narcissistic economic philosophy had little impact on the natural world. Today it has a huge impact and is, moreover, totally at odds with the world's scientific bodies who are crying out for a PLAN to stop global warming and save nature. Capitalist Limits to Corporate Environmentalist!! Corporations aren't necessarily evil, but corporate managers are legally responsible to their owners, the shareholders, and not to society. This means that the critical decisions about production and resource consumption-decisions that affect our health and survival-are mainly the private prerogative of large corporations and are often only marginally under the control of governments. The blunt reality of this situation was well summed up by Joel Bakan in his recent book (and film), The Corporation: Corporations are created by law and imbued with purpose by law. Law dictates what their directors and managers can do, what they cannot do, and what they must do. And, at least in the United States and other industrialized countries, the corporation, as created by law, most closely resembles Milton Friedman's ideal model of the institution: it compels executives to prioritize the interests of their companies and shareholders above all others and forbids them from being socially responsible - at least genuinely so.38 So when corporate and societal interests conflict, even the "greenest" of corporate CEOs often have no choice but to make decisions contrary to the interests of society. British Petroleum's CEO, Lord John Browne, is good example. In the late 1990s, Browne had an environmental epiphany, broke ranks with oil industry denial, and became the first oil company executive to warn that fossil fuels are accelerating global warming. BP adopted the motto "Beyond Petroleum" in its advertisements, painted its service stations green and yellow, and bought a boutique solar power outfit. But under Browne, BP has spent far more on advertising its green credentials than it invests in actual green power production. Fully 99 percent of its investments still go into fossil fuel exploration and development, while solar power is less than 1 percent and seems to be declining. 9 In 1999, BP spent $45 million to buy the solar power outfit Solarex. By comparison, BP paid $26.8 billion to buy Amoco in order to enlarge its oil portfolio. BP's 2004 revenues topped $285 billion, while its solar power sales were just over $400 million. In February 2006, Browne told his board that the company had more than replenished its marketed output in 2005 with new proven reserves of oil and gas, and that "with more than 20 new projects due on stream in the next three years, and assuming the same level of oil price, the annual rate of increase should continue at some 4 percent through 2010."40 So, far from shifting to renewable sources of energy, BP is not only expanding its output of fossil fuels but increasing its overall reliance on fossil fuel sources of profit. BP now possesses proven reserves of 19 billion barrels produced in 23 countries, and the company currently explores for oil in 26 countries. Given the proven and stupendous profits of oil production versus the unproven profitability of alternative energy, how can Brown go "green" in any serious way and remain responsible to his owner-investors?41 Were he to do so, he would soon be out of a job.42 Ecosocialism or Collapse If we're going to stop the capitalist economic locomotive from driving us off the cliff, we are going to have to fundamentally rethink our entire economic life, reassert the visible hand of conscious scientific, rational economic planning, and implement democratic control over our economies and resources. We're going to have to construct an entirely different kind of economy, one that can live within its ecological means. Such an economy would have to be based around at least the following principles: An Ecosocialist Economy of Stasis First, in a world of fast-diminishing resources, a sustainable global economy can only be based on near-zero economic growth on average. That means that to survive, humanity will have to impose drastic fixed limits on development, resource consumption, the freedom to consume, and the freedom to pollute. Given existing global inequities and the fact that the crisis we face is overwhelmingly caused by overconsumption in the industrialized North, equity can only be achieved by imposing massive cutbacks in the advanced countries combined with a program of rational planned growth to develop the Third World, with the aim of stabilizing at zero growth on average. This will require drastically cutting back many lines of production, closing down others entirely, and creating socially and environmentally useful jobs for workers made redundant by this transition. This will also require physical rationing of many critical resources on a per capita basis for every person on the planet. Human survival will thus require a profound rethinking of our most fundamental ideas-bourgeois ideas-of economic freedom. For too long, many Americans, in particular, have come to identify their notion of "freedom," if not their very being and essence, with insatiable consumption-unlimited freedom of "choice" in what to buy. But 50 styles of blue jeans, 16 models of SUVs and endless choices in "consumer electronics" will all have dramatically less value when Bloomingdales is under water, Florida disappears beneath the waves, malarial mosquitos blanket Long Island beaches, and the U.S. is overrun with desperate environmental refugees from the South. Once we as a society finally admit the "inconvenient truth" that we have no choice but to drastically cut production and severely reduce consumer choice, it will also become apparent that we have to put in place a planned economy that will meet our needs and those of future generations as well as the other species with whom we share the planet. A Restructured Economy of Production for Social Need and for Use Second, we need to massively restructure the global economy. Enormous sectors in the global capitalist economy-plastics, packaging, much of the manufactured consumer electronics, petrochemical-based and other synthetic products, many pharmaceuticals, all genetically modified foods, and the vast and ever-growing production of arms-are either completely unnecessary or waste increasingly scarce resources and produce needless pollution.44 Our parents did without nearly all of this before WWII, and they were not living in caves. Many lines of production and most retail industries are built around unnecessary replacement and designed-in obsolescence. How much of the American economy from cars and appliances to clothes is purposefully designed to be "consumed, burned up, worn out, replaced, and discarded at an ever-increasing rate"46 so the cycle of waste production can begin all over again? How much of the planet's natural resources are consumed every year in completely unnecessary annual model changes, fashion updates, and "new and improved" products whose only purpose is simply to sell and sell again? If a global population of 6 to 9 billion people is going to survive this century, what choice do we have but to reorganize the global economy to conserve what shrinking natural resources we have left, reorient production for need rather than profit, design products to last as long as possible, enforce as close to total recycling as possible, and aim for as close to zero pollution as is possible? A Socialist Economic Democracy Third: an ecosocialist democracy. Endless growth or stasis? Resource exhaustion or conservation? Automobilization of the planet or enhanced public transport? Deforestation or protection of the wild forests? Agro poisons or organic farming? Hunt the fish to extinction or protect the fisheries? Raze the Amazon forest to grow MacBurgers or promote a more vegetarian diet? Manufacture products designed to be "used up, burned up, consumed as rapidly as possible" or design them to last, be repaired, recycled and also shared? Enforce private interests at the expense of the commons or subordinate private greed to the common good? In today's globalized world, decisions about such questions will determine the fate of humanity. Who can make these critical economic and moral decisions in society's interest and in the interest of preserving a habitable planet? In Adam Smith's view, which is still the operable maxim of modern capitalists and neoliberal economists, we should all just "Look out for Number 1," and the common good will take care of itself. If Smith were right, the common good would have taken care of itself long ago, and we wouldn't be facing catastrophe. After centuries of Smithian economics, the common good needs our immediate and concentrated attention. Corporations can't make such decisions in the best interests of society or the future, because their legal responsibility is to their private owners. The only way such decisions can be scientifically rational and socially responsible is when everyone who is affected participates in decision-making. And time is running out. We don't have 20 or 30 years to wait for Ford and GM to figure out how they can make a buck on electric cars. We don't have 60 or 70 years to wait while investors in coal-powered power plants milk the last profits out of those sunk investments before they consider an alternative. Humanity is at a crossroads. Either we find a way to move toward a global economic democracy in which decisions about production and consumption are directly and democratically decided by all those affected, or the alternative will be the continuing descent into a capitalist war of all-against-all over ever-diminishing resources that can only end in the collapse of what's left of civilization and the global ecology. To be sure, in an economic democracy, society would sometimes make mistakes in planning. We can't have perfect foresight, and democracies make mistakes. But at least these would be honest mistakes. The conclusion seems inescapable: Either we democratize the economy, construct the institutions of a practical working socialist democracy, or we face ecological and social collapse.

#### You have an *ethical obligation* to reject neoliberalism – it degrades all human life in an attempt to profit

Morgareidge, 98 – professor of philosophy at Lewis and Clark (Clayton, “Why capitalism is evil”, 1998, <http://www.lclark.edu/~clayton/commentaries/evil.html>)

 ¶ To show why this is the case, let me turn to capital's greatest critic, Karl Marx. Under capitalism, Marx writes, everything in nature and everything that human beings are and can do becomes an object: a resource for, or an obstacle, to the expansion of production, the development of technology, the growth of markets, and the circulation of money. For those who manage and live from capital, nothing has value of its own. Mountain streams, clean air, human lives -- all mean nothing in themselves, but are valuable only if they can be used to turn a profit.[1] If capital looks at (not into) the human face, it sees there only eyes through which brand names and advertising can enter and mouths that can demand and consume food, drink, and tobacco products. If human faces express needs, then either products can be manufactured to meet, or seem to meet, those needs, or else, if the needs are incompatible with the growth of capital, then the faces expressing them must be unrepresented or silenced. ¶ Obviously what capitalist enterprises do have consequences for the well being of human beings and the planet we live on. Capital profits from the production of food, shelter, and all the necessities of life. The production of all these things uses human lives in the shape of labor, as well as the resources of the earth. If we care about life, if we see our obligations in each others faces, then we have to want all the things capital does to be governed by that care, to be directed by the ethical concern for life. But feeding people is not the aim of the food industry, or shelter the purpose of the housing industry. In medicine, making profits is becoming a more important goal than caring for sick people. As capitalist enterprises these activities aim single-mindedly at the accumulation of capital, and such purposes as caring for the sick or feeding the hungry becomes a mere means to an end, an instrument of corporate growth. Therefore ethics, the overriding commitment to meeting human need, is left out of deliberations about what the heavyweight institutions of our society are going to do. Moral convictions are expressed in churches, in living rooms, in letters to the editor, sometimes even by politicians and widely read commentators, but almost always with an attitude of resignation to the inevitable. People no longer say, "You can't stop progress," but only because they have learned not to call economic growth progress. They still think they can't stop it. And they are right -- as long as the production of all our needs and the organization of our labor is carried out under private ownership. Only a minority ("idealists") can take seriously a way of thinking that counts for nothing in real world decision making. Only when the end of capitalism is on the table will ethics have a seat at the table.¶

#### Neolib makes life worthless for anyone who can’t measure up to the ideology of competitiveness---locks in master-servant social relations

Seth Ackerman 12, doctoral candidate in History at Cornell, 11/21/12, “The Twinkie Defense, or What Does “Uncompetitive” Mean?,” http://jacobinmag.com/2012/11/the-twinkie-defense-or-what-does-uncompetitive-mean/#sthash.aM63fqng.dpuf

So let’s turn back to hapless Hostess. In a piece for Salon, Jake Blumgart quoted a bakery worker who had been at the company for 14 years. “In 2005, before concessions I made $48,000, last year I made $34,000…. I would make $25,000 in five years if I took their offer. It will be hard to replace the job I had, but it will be easy to replace the job they were trying to give me.”

What we have here is a situation where a company offered a wage in the marketplace and couldn’t get any workers to accept it. Consequently, it went out of business. The word “competitive” gets thrown around a lot, often with the murkiest of meanings, but in this case there can be no doubt at all that a company, Hostess, was unable to pay a competitive wage. Ninety-two percent of its workers voted to walk out on their jobs rather than accept its wage, and they stayed out even after they were told it was the company’s final offer.

By all the canons of competitiveness, it was the company that was deluded. Hey, it’s a tough labor market out there. Hostess just couldn’t compete.

But the union got blamed instead, and that points to a fascinating aporia in neoliberalism. The competitiveness ideology keeps a double set of books. On the surface, it celebrates free individuals making voluntary agreements on a footing of formal equality. But look just a little deeper and it turns out to be a musty, medieval system of morality that venerates human hierarchy and inequality. If taken literally, an accusation of insufficient “competitiveness” would refer to a failure to buy or sell on the terms objectively demanded by the dispersed actors of the marketplace. But nine times out of ten, this literal meaning is just a facade for the real underlying meaning, which is all about policing the socially accepted rules concerning who is a worthy human being and who is not. Workers at an industrial bakery are losers. They need to take a pay cut — not so much to make the numbers add up (that’s a secondary consideration for all the commentators and columnists) but as a ritual affirmation of their debased social status. The refusal to take the cut was shocking and revolting — an act of lèse-majesté. It’s in that sense that the union was uncompetitive. The workers didn’t know their place.

Corey Robin has often cited the political scientist Karen Orren, whose book Belated Feudalism revealed the feudal underside of the nineteenth century “unregulated” capitalist labor market. Here’s Corey’s summary:

According to Orren, long after the Bill of Rights was ratified and slavery abolished – well into the 20th century, in fact – the American workplace remained a feudal institution. Not metaphorically, but legally. Workers were governed by statutes originating in the common law of medieval England, with precedents extending as far back as the year 500. Like their counterparts in feudal Britain, judges exclusively administered these statutes, treating workers as the literal property of their employers. Not until 1937, when the Supreme Court upheld the Wagner Act, giving workers the right to organize unions, did the judiciary relinquish political control over the workplace to Congress.

Prior to the ’30s, Orren shows, American judges regularly applied the “law of master and servant” to quell the worker’s independent will. According to one jurist, that law recognized only ”the superiority and power” of the master, and the ”duty, subjection, and, as it were, allegiance” of the worker….As soon as workers entered the workplace, they became the property of their employers. Judges enforced the 13th-century rule of ”quicquid acquietur servo acquietur domino” (whatever is acquired by the servant is acquired by the master), mandating that employees give to their employers whatever they may have earned off the job – as if the employee, and not his labor, belonged to the employer. If an outside party injured an employee so that he couldn’t perform his duties, the employer could sue that party for damages, “as if the injury had been to his chattel or machines or buildings.” But if the outside party injured the employer so that he could not provide employment, the employee could not likewise sue. Why? Because, claimed one jurist, the ”inferior hath no kind of property in the company, care, or assistance of the superior, as the superior is held to have in those of the inferior.”

”Belated Feudalism” set off multiple explosions when it appeared in 1991, inflicting serious damage on the received wisdom of Harvard political scientist Louis Hartz. In his 1955 classic ”The Liberal Tradition in America,” still taught on many college campuses, Hartz argued that the United States was born free: Americans never knew feudalism; their country – with its Horatio Alger ethos of individual mobility, private property, free labor, and the sacred rights of contract – was modern and liberal from the start. For decades, liberals embraced Hartz’s argument as an explanation for why there was no – and could never be any – radicalism in the United States. Leftists, for their part, also accepted his account, pointing to the labor movement’s failure to create socialism as evidence of liberalism’s hegemony.

But as Orren shows, American liberalism has never been the easy inheritance that Hartz and his complacent defenders assume. And the American labor movement may have achieved something far more difficult and profound than its leftist critics realize. Trade unions, Orren argues, made America liberal, laying slow but steady siege to an impregnable feudal fortress.

The hypocrisy of the competitiveness ideology is a revival of this old double-bottomed tradition: a society of equals on the outside, master-and-servant deep down. Let the neoliberals howl: this Friday at Wal-Marts around the country, workers will be storming an archipelago of little Bastilles.

#### Inequality and structural violence is the *root cause* of your impacts – it outweighs

Tamás Szentes 8, Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. “Globalisation and prospects of the world society” 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.\_\_\_prospects\_-\_jav..pdf

It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that --the “war against Nature”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.

## Case

### Transition Advantage

#### Economic sanctions de-linked Cuba from neoliberalism – that’s Harris – choosing to engage now allows the state to force neoliberalism on Cuba and Latin America

**Gonzalez, law prof, 3** (Carmen, Assistant Professor, Seattle University School of Law, Tulane Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 16, p. 685, 2003, “Seasons of Resistance: Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security in Cuba”, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=987944>, ZBurdette)

Notwithstanding these problems, the greatest challenge to the agricultural development strategy adopted by the Cuban government in the aftermath of the Special Period is likely to be external—the renewal of trade relations with the United States. From the colonial era through the beginning of the Special Period, economic development in Cuba has been constrained by Cuba’s relationship with a series of primary trading partners. Cuba’s export-oriented sugar monoculture and its reliance on imports to satisfy domestic food needs was imposed by the Spanish colonizers, reinforced by the United States, and maintained during the Soviet era.410 It was not until the collapse of the socialist trading bloc and the strengthening of the U.S. embargo that Cuba was able to embark upon a radically different development path.

Cuba was able to transform its agricultural development model as a consequence of the political and economic autonomy occasioned by its relative economic isolation, including its exclusion from major international financial and trade institutions.411 Paradoxically, while the U.S. embargo subjected Cuba to immense economic hardship, it also gave the Cuban government free rein to adopt agricultural policies that ran counter to the prevailing neoliberal model and that protected Cuban farmers against ruinous competition from highly subsidized agricultural producers in the United States and the European Union.412 Due to U.S. pressure, Cuba was excluded from regional and international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.413 Cuba also failed to reach full membership in any regional trade association and was barred from the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).414 However, as U.S. agribusiness clamors to ease trade restrictions with Cuba, the lifting of the embargo and the end of Cuba’s economic isolation may only be a matter of time.415

It is unclear how the Cuban government will respond to the immense political and economic pressure from the United States to enter into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that would curtail Cubansovereignty and erode protection for Cuban agriculture.416 If Cuba accedes to the dictates of agricultural trade liberalization, it appears likely that Cuba’s gains in agricultural diversification and food self-sufficiency will be undercut by cheap, subsidized food imports from the United States and other industrialized countries.417 Furthermore, Cuba’s experiment with organic and semi-organic agriculture may be jeopardized if the Cuban government is either unwilling or unable to restrict the sale of agrochemicals to Cuban farmers—as the Cuban government failed to restrict U.S. rice imports in the first half of the twentieth century.418

Cuba is once again at a crossroads—as it was in 1963, when the government abandoned economic diversification, renewed its emphasis on sugar production, and replaced its trade dependence on the United States with trade dependence on the socialist bloc. In the end, the future of Cuban agriculture will likely turn on a combination of external factors (such as world market prices for Cuban exports and Cuba’s future economic integration with the United States) and internal factors (such as the level of grassroots and governmental support for the alternative development model developed during the Special Period). While this Article has examined the major pieces of legislation that transformed agricultural production in Cuba, and the government’s implementation of these laws, it is important to remember that these reforms had their genesis in the economic crisis of the early 1990s and in the creative legal, and extra-legal, survival strategies developed by ordinary Cubans.419 The distribution of land to thousands of small producers and the promotion of urban agriculture were in response to the self-help measures undertaken by Cuban citizens during the Special Period. As the economic crisis intensified, Cuban citizens spontaneously seized and cultivated parcels of land in state farms, along the highways, and in vacant lots, and started growing food in patios, balconies, front yards, and community gardens. Similarly, the opening of the agricultural markets was in direct response to the booming black market and its deleterious effect on the state’s food distribution system. Finally, it was the small private farmer, the neglected stepchild of the Revolution, who kept alive the traditional agroecological techniques that formed the basis of Cuba’s experiment with organic agriculture. The survival of Cuba’s alternative agricultural model will therefore depend, at least in part, on whether this model is viewed by Cuban citizens and by the Cuban leadership as a necessary adaptation to severe economic crisis or as a path-breaking achievement worthy of pride and emulation.

The history of Cuban agriculture has been one of resistance and accommodation to larger economic and political forces that shaped the destiny of the island nation. Likewise, the transformation of Cuban agriculture has occurred through resistance and accommodation by Cuban workers and farmers to the hardships of the Special Period. The lifting of the U.S. economic embargo and the subjection of Cuba to the full force of economic globalization will present an enormous challenge to the retention of an agricultural development model borne of crisis and isolation. Whether Cuba will be able to resist the re-imposition of a capital-intensive, export-oriented, import-reliant agricultural model will depend on the ability of the Cuban leadership to appreciate the benefits of sustainable agriculture and to protect Cuba’s alternative agricultural model in the face of overwhelming political and economic pressure from the United States and from the global trading system.

#### No chance of terror attack---too tough to execute

John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart 12, Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute AND Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle, "The Terrorism Delusion," Summer, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1, politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//absisfin.pdf

In 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a lengthy report on protecting the homeland. Key to achieving such an objective should be a careful assessment of the character, capacities, and desires of potential terrorists targeting that homeland. Although the report contains a section dealing with what its authors call “the nature of the terrorist adversary,” the section devotes only two sentences to assessing that nature: “The number and high profile of international and domestic terrorist attacks and disrupted plots during the last two decades underscore the determination and persistence of terrorist organizations. Terrorists have proven to be relentless, patient, opportunistic, and flexible, learning from experience and modifying tactics and targets to exploit perceived vulnerabilities and avoid observed strengths.”8¶ This description may apply to some terrorists somewhere, including at least a few of those involved in the September 11 attacks. Yet, it scarcely describes the vast majority of those individuals picked up on terrorism charges in the United States since those attacks. The inability of the DHS to consider this fact even parenthetically in its fleeting discussion is not only amazing but perhaps delusional in its single-minded preoccupation with the extreme.¶ In sharp contrast, the authors of the case studies, with remarkably few exceptions, describe their subjects with such words as incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, inadequate, unorganized, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational, and foolish.9 And in nearly all of the cases where an operative from the police or from the Federal Bureau of Investigation was at work (almost half of the total), the most appropriate descriptor would be “gullible.”¶ In all, as Shikha Dalmia has put it, would-be terrorists need to be “radicalized enough to die for their cause; Westernized enough to move around without raising red flags; ingenious enough to exploit loopholes in the security apparatus; meticulous enough to attend to the myriad logistical details that could torpedo the operation; self-sufficient enough to make all the preparations without enlisting outsiders who might give them away; disciplined enough to maintain complete secrecy; and—above all—psychologically tough enough to keep functioning at a high level without cracking in the face of their own impending death.”10 The case studies examined in this article certainly do not abound with people with such characteristics. ¶ In the eleven years since the September 11 attacks, no terrorist has been able to detonate even a primitive bomb in the United States, and except for the four explosions in the London transportation system in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the only method by which Islamist terrorists have managed to kill anyone in the United States since September 11 has been with gunfire—inflicting a total of perhaps sixteen deaths over the period (cases 4, 26, 32).11 This limited capacity is impressive because, at one time, small-scale terrorists in the United States were quite successful in setting off bombs. Noting that the scale of the September 11 attacks has “tended to obliterate America’s memory of pre-9/11 terrorism,” Brian Jenkins reminds us (and we clearly do need reminding) that the 1970s witnessed sixty to seventy terrorist incidents, mostly bombings, on U.S. soil every year.12¶ The situation seems scarcely different in Europe and other Western locales. Michael Kenney, who has interviewed dozens of government officials and intelligence agents and analyzed court documents, has found that, in sharp contrast with the boilerplate characterizations favored by the DHS and with the imperatives listed by Dalmia, Islamist militants in those locations are operationally unsophisticated, short on know-how, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their capacity to learn.13 Another study documents the difficulties of network coordination that continually threaten the terrorists’ operational unity, trust, cohesion, and ability to act collectively.14¶ In addition, although some of the plotters in the cases targeting the United States harbored visions of toppling large buildings, destroying airports, setting off dirty bombs, or bringing down the Brooklyn Bridge (cases 2, 8, 12, 19, 23, 30, 42), all were nothing more than wild fantasies, far beyond the plotters’ capacities however much they may have been encouraged in some instances by FBI operatives. Indeed, in many of the cases, target selection is effectively a random process, lacking guile and careful planning. Often, it seems, targets have been chosen almost capriciously and simply for their convenience. For example, a would-be bomber targeted a mall in Rockford, Illinois, because it was nearby (case 21). Terrorist plotters in Los Angeles in 2005 drew up a list of targets that were all within a 20-mile radius of their shared apartment, some of which did not even exist (case 15). In Norway, a neo-Nazi terrorist on his way to bomb a synagogue took a tram going the wrong way and dynamited a mosque instead.15

**Squo solves---defense capabilities**

**Daniel 12** 2/16, \*Lisa Daniel: American Forces Press Service, Defense News, “U.S. Faces Broad Spectrum of Threats, Intel Leaders Say,” http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67231, AJ

Intelligence shows the next three years will be a critical transition time in counterterrorism, as groups like al-Qaida diminish in importance and terrorist groups become more decentralized, Clapper said. U.S. counterterrorism has caused al-Qaida to lose so many top lieutenants since 2008 “that a new group of leaders, even if they could be found, would have difficulty integrating into the organization and compensating for mounting losses,” the director said. Al-Qaida’s regional affiliates in Iraq, the Arabian peninsula and North Africa are expected to “surpass the remnants of core al-Qaida in Pakistan,” he said. With continued, robust counterterrorism efforts and cooperation from international partners, Clapper said, “there is a better-than-even chance that decentralization will lead to fragmentation of the movement within a few years,” although he added that terrorist groups will continue to be a dangerous transnational force. **Intense counterterrorism pressure has made it unlikely that a terrorist group would launch a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear mass attack** against the United States in the next year, Clapper said, but groups such as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula continue to show interest in such an attack. Most terrorist groups, however, remain locally focused, Clapper said, noting that al-Qaida in Iraq remains focused on overthrowing the Shiia-led government in Baghdad in favor of a Sunni-led government. In Africa, the al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and al-Shabaab organizations struggle with internal divisions and outside support, and have been diminished by government and military pressure in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia, he said. Still, intelligence shows no nation states have provided weapons of mass destruction assistance to terrorist groups, and no nonstate actors are targeting WMD sites in countries with unrest, the director said. But that could change as governments become more unstable, he added.

### Multilat Adantage

#### Using the state to integrate economies is the key to neoliberal control

**Phillips, Sheffield political economy professor, 2005**

(Nicola, “U.S. Power and the Politics of Economic Governance in the Americas”, Latin American Politics and Society, 47.4, December, Wiley)

The process of hemispheric integration represents a key dimension of the neoliberal project, both in the Americas and in the wider global political economy. It represents a device by which this global project is further embedded in the region and the region is further embedded in the globalizing world economy, reflecting “the triumph of economic lib- eralism, of faith in export-led growth and of belief in the centrality of the private sector to development processes” (Payne 1996, 106). Hemi- spheric regionalism thus represents a specific strategy on the part of its primary agents-various governments and business interests-to “lock in” a political economy and a mode of social organization that are ide- ologically and strategically hospitable to the rules of the neoliberal game. Of these agents, the U.S. government has been the principal driv- ing force, and the exercise of its hegemonic power since the early 1970s has been molded systematically to the purpose of disseminating the twin values of neoliberalism and democracy. The hemispheric project thus constitutes not only an attempt further to reinforce the parameters of a neoliberal (and democratic) political economy in the Americas, but also to consolidate the foundations of U.S. hegemony itself in the global and regional contexts.

#### That means that the state only pursues policies that benefit the neoliberal market

**Paterson et al., Ottawa political science professor, 2012**

(Matthew, “Neoliberal Climate Policy: From market fetishism to the developmental state”, Environmental Politics Volume 21, Issue 2, ebsco, ldg)

Our argument in this article is that the central problem with these analyses lies in the way that they conceive of neoliberalism either purely at the level of ideology, or in terms of at roll-out of financial interests, in other words, they tend to take too seriously the ideological claims made by market fundamentalists about how neoliberal states in practice operate, and thereby tend to over-represent the place of commodification and privatization logics in neoliberal policy. Instead, we argue that a more conceptually nuanced depiction of neoliberal climate policy would acknowledge that, while commodification and greater use of market instruments are indeed salient elements of the contemporary response, they are merely one aspect of it, and have not crowded out (or successfully trumped) other competing logics in the policy process. In particular, neoliberal ideology does not negate the state`s structural role in creating the conditions for stable growth and accumulation. Regarding climate change, this entails broad action to establish new modes of regulation for things like energy and environmental security and using the specific forms that climate policy takes as means to promote new forms of accumulation and sectoral growth. At best, neoliberal ideology provides a contextual backdrop for these policy objectives and can thereby alter the ways that policies manifest under market fundamentalist conditions, but it does not alter them in any basic manner.

#### causes extinction

**Santos, sociology prof, 3** (Boaventura de Sousa, Professor of Sociology at the School of Economics, University of Coimbra (Portugal) and Distinguished Scholar at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School. "Collective Suicide?" March 28, 2003 online http://www.ces.fe.uc.pt/opiniao/bss/072en.php)

According to Franz Hinkelammert, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was in Stalinism, with the Gulag and in Nazism, with the holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it. Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra‑conservative in that it aims to infinitely reproduce the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the State and international institutions in their favour. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to he incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage", to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years. Is it possible to fight this death drive? We must bear in mind that, historically, sacrificial destruction has always been linked to the economic pillage of natural resources and the labor force, to the imperial design of radically changing the terms of economic, social, political and cultural exchanges in the face of falling efficiency rates postulated by the maximalist logic of the totalitarian illusion in operation. It is as though hegemonic powers, both when they are on the rise and when they are in decline, repeatedly go through times of primitive accumulation, legitimizing the most shameful violence in the name of futures where, by definition, there is no room for what must be destroyed. In today's version, the period of primitive accumulation consists of combining neoliberal economic globalization with the globalization of war. The machine of democracy and liberty turns into a machine of horror and destruction.

#### Multilat doesn’t solve anything – assumes every single one of their warrants – star this card

Held et al, 13 – Master of University College and Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham, and Director of Polity Press and General Editor of Global Policy (David, “Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation,” ProQuest, 5/24/2013, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1355105016) // MS

Economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. The Doha round of trade negotiations is deadlocked, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it. Climate negotiators have met for two decades without finding a way to stem global emissions. The UN is paralyzed in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common. Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are not the result of any single underlying causal structure, but rather of several underlying dynamics that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems - indeed it is - but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries. A golden era of governed globalization In order to understand why gridlock has come about it is important to understand how it was that the post-Second World War era facilitated, in many respects, a successful form of 'governed globalization' that contributed to relative peace and prosperity across the world over several decades. This period was marked by peace between the great powers, although there were many proxy wars fought out in the global South. This relative stability created the conditions for what now can be regarded as an unprecedented period of prosperity that characterized the 1950s onward. Although it is by no means the sole cause, the UN is central to this story, helping to create conditions under which decolonization and successive waves of democratization could take root, profoundly altering world politics. While the economic record of the postwar years varies by country, many experienced significant economic growth and living standards rose rapidly across significant parts of the world. By the late 1980s a variety of East Asian countries were beginning to grow at an unprecedented speed, and by the late 1990s countries such as China, India and Brazil had gained significant economic momentum, a process that continues to this day. Meanwhile, the institutionalization of international cooperation proceeded at an equally impressive pace. In 1909, 37 intergovernmental organizations existed; in 2011, the number of institutions and their various off-shoots had grown to 7608 (Union of International Associations 2011). There was substantial growth in the number of international treaties in force, as well as the number of international regimes, formal and informal. At the same time, new kinds of. Postwar institutions created the conditions under which a multitude of actors could benefit from forming multinational companies, investing abroad, developing global production chains, and engaging with a plethora of other social and economic processes associated with globalization. These conditions, combined with the expansionary logic of capitalism and basic technological innovation, changed the nature of the world economy, radically increasing dependence on people and countries from every corner of the world. This interdependence, in turn, created demand for further institutionalization, which states seeking the benefits of cooperation provided, beginning the cycle anew. This is not to say that international institutions were the only cause of the dynamic form of globalization experienced over the last few decades. Changes in the nature of global capitalism, including breakthroughs in transportation and information technology, are obviously critical drivers of interdependence. However, all of these changes were allowed to thrive and develop because they took place in a relatively open, peaceful, liberal, institutionalized world order. By preventing World War Three and another Great Depression, the multilateral order arguably did just as much for interdependence as microprocessors or email (see Mueller 1990; O'Neal and Russett 1997). Beyond the special privileges of the great powers Self-reinforcing interdependence has now progressed to the point where it has altered our ability to engage in further global cooperation. That is, economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. Because of the remarkable success of global cooperation in the postwar order, human interconnectedness weighs much more heavily on politics than it did in 1945. The need for international cooperation has never been higher. Yet the "supply" side of the equation, institutionalized multilateral cooperation, has stalled. In areas such as nuclear proliferation, the explosion of small arms sales, terrorism, failed states, global economic imbalances, financial market instability, global poverty and inequality, biodiversity losses, water deficits and climate change, multilateral and transnational cooperation is now increasingly ineffective or threadbare. Gridlock is not unique to one issue domain, but appears to be becoming a general feature of global governance: cooperation seems to be increasingly difficult and deficient at precisely the time when it is needed most. It is possible to identify four reasons for this blockage, four pathways to gridlock: rising multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional fragmentation.

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### 2nc environment turn

#### Alt doesn’t eliminate helping people – just creates space for resistance

**De Angelis, East London political economy professor, 2004**

(Massimo, “Separating the Doing and the Deed: Capital and the Continuous Character of Enclosures”, Historical Materialism; 2004, Vol. 12 Issue 2, p57-87, ebsco, ldg)

However, we must be fully aware of the implications of this discourse on commons. As we have seen, since commons emerge out of a relational social ﬁeld, they are deﬁned in opposition to enclosures. In other words, just as capital’s drive for accumulation must identify a common as limit for its expansion and thus outline strategies of new enclosures, 67 so the building of alternatives to capital must identify a strategic space in which current enclosures are limiting the development of new commons. To be able to identify, so to speak, ‘them’ as the limit of ‘our’ project would be a great strength, a strength that is based on processes of political recomposition and constitution of projects that pose the concrete question of alternatives here and now, and not in a distant future. In other words, life despite capitalism and not life after capitalism. How can we politically invert capital’s strategies and identify enclosures as limits for non-market social interactions and as a strategic space for new commons? This is the true strategic challenge faced by the many articulations of today’s global justice and solidarity movement. As I have argued elsewhere, to be viable and desirable, a process for the deﬁnition and constitution of alternatives requires nothing less than participatory, inclusive and democratic forms of organisation that found their political practice on formulating and addressing questions such as ‘What do we want?’, ‘How do we go about getting it?’ and ‘Who is “we”?’. 68 Raising and addressing these naïve questions as part of our political practice implies that we participate in the production of a discursive inversion of the ‘ordinary run of things’, and the opening up of the many spaces for alternatives and the problematisation of their articulation.

#### Still have economics – means still have relationships with other countries

**Klein, London School of Economics Milibrand Fellow, 2007**

(Naomi, “The Shock Doctrine: the Rise of Disaster Capitalism,” pgs. 24-5, ldg)

I am not arguing that all forms of market systems are inherently violent. It is eminently possible to have a market-based economy that requires no such brutality and demands no such ideological purity. A free market in consumer products can coexist with free public health care, with public schools, with a large segment of the economy—like a national oil company—held in state hands. It's equally possible to require corporations to pay decent wages, to respect the right of work¬ers to form unions, and for governments to tax and redistribute wealth so that the sharp inequalities that mark the corporatist state are re¬duced. Markets need not be fundamentalist. Keynes proposed exactly that kind of mixed, regulated economy af¬ter the Great Depression, a revolution in public policy that created the New Deal and transformations like it around the world. It was exactly that system of compromises, checks and balances that Friedman's counterrevolution was launched to methodically dismantle in country after country. Seen in that light, the Chicago School strain of capital¬ism does indeed have something in common with other dangerous ideologies: the signature desire for unattainable purity, for a clean slate on which to build a reengineered model society. This desire for godlike powers of total creation is precisely why free-market ideologues are so drawn to crises and disasters. Nonapoc-alyptic reality is simply not hospitable to their ambitions. For thirty-five years, what has animated Friedman's counterrevolution is an attraction to a kind of freedom and possibility available only in times of cataclysmic change—when people, with their stubborn habits and insistent demands, are blasted out of the way—moments when democracy seems a practical impossibility.

#### Root cause of environmental issues is neoliberal drive for profit-try or die for reorganizing social relations

**Abramsky, former Institute of Advanced Studies in Science, Technology and Society fellow, 2010**

(Kolya, Sparking a Worldwide Energy Revolution: Social Struggles in the Transition to a Post-Petrol World, pg 7-9)

The stark reality is that the only two recent periods that have seen a major reduction in global CO2emissions both occurred in periods of very sudden, rapid, socially disruptive, and painful periods of forced economic degrowth—namely the breakdown of the Soviet bloc and the current financial-economic crisis. Strikingly, in May 2009, the International Energy Agency reported that, for the first time since 1945, global demand for electricity was expected to fall. Experience has shown that a lot of time and political energy have been virtually wasted on developing a highly-ineffective regulatory framework to tackle climate change. Years of COPs and MOPs—the international basis for regulatory efforts— have simply proven to be hot air. And, not surprisingly, hot air has resulted in global warming. Only unintended degrowth has had the effect that years of intentional regulations sought to achieve. Yet, the dominant approaches to climate change continue to focus on promoting regulatory reforms, rather than on more fundamental changes in social relations. This is true for governments, multilateral institutions, and also large sectors of so-called "civil society," especially the major national and international trade unions and their federations, and NGOs. And despite the patent inadequacy of this approach, regulatory efforts will certainly continue to be pursued. Furthermore, they may well contribute to shoring up legitimacy, at least in the short term, and in certain predominantly-northern countries where the effects of climate changes are less immediately visible and impact on people's lives less directly. Nonetheless, it is becoming increasingly clear that solutions will not be found at this level. The problem has to do with production, not regulation. The current worldwide system of production is based on endless growth and expansion, which is simply incompatible with a long term reduction in emissions and energy consumption. Despite the fact that localized and punctual moments of reduction may well still occur, the overall energy consumption and emissions of the system as a whole can only increase. All the energy-efficient technologies in the world, though undoubtedly crucial to any long term solution, cannot, on their own, square the circle by reducing the total emissions of a system whose survival is based on continual expansion. This is not to say that developing appropriate regulation is not important—it is completely essential. However, the regulatory process is very unlikely to be the driving force behind the changes, but rather a necessary facilitation process that enables wider changes. Furthermore, regulation that is strong enough to be effective is only likely to come about once wider changes in production are already underway. Energy generation and distribution plays a key role in shaping human relations. Every form of energy implies a particular organization of work and division of labor (both in general, and within the energy sector, in particular). The most significant social, economic, cultural, political, and technological transformations in history were associated with shifts in energy generation: from hunting and gathering to agriculture, from human and animal power for transport and production to wind and the steam engine, from coal to oil and nuclear fission as drivers of industry and war. All these transformations have led to increased concentration of power and wealth. And a very real possibility exists that the coming transformation in the world's energy system will result in similar shifts in power relations. But we live in interesting times. The ecological and social carrying-capacity of our planet and existing social relations are overstretched, snapping in different places. This will trigger a major change in the next few decades, but nobody knows in which direction. Consequently, the most important single factor determining the outcome of this change will be the intensity, sophistication, and creativity of grassroots social mobilization.

#### Neolib necessitates systems that are catastrophic for the environment.

**Mander, International Forum on Globalizaton, and Retallack, The Ecologist 2002**

(Jerry and Simon “Intrinsic Environmental Consequences of Trade-Related Transport,”. Alternatives to Economic Globalization: A Better World is Possible, The International Forum on Globalization, pg 26-7, ldg)

The central feature of an export-oriented production model is that it dramatically increases transport and shipping activity. In the half-century since Bretton Woods, there has been about a twenty-five-fold increase in global transport activity. As global transport increases, it in turn requires massive increases in global infrastructure development. This is good for large corporations like Bech-tel, which get to do the construction work: new airports, seaports, oil fields, pipelines for the oil, rail lines, highspeed highways. Many of these are built in areas with relatively intact wilderness, biodiversity, and coral reefs, or they are built in rural areas. The impact is especially strong now in South and Central America, where there have been tremendous investments in infrastructure development in wilderness regions, often against great resistance from native communities like the U'wa in Colombia, the Kuna in Panama, and many different groups in Ecuador. The problems also occur in the developed world. In the United Kingdom a few years ago, there were protests by two hundred thousand people against huge new highways jammed through rural landscapes so that trucks could better serve the global trading system. Both the indigenous protestors and the rural English were protesting the same thing—the ecological destruction of their region to serve globalization. Increased global trade increases fossil fuel use as well, contributing to global warming. Ocean shipping carries nearly 80 percent of the world's international trade in goods. The fuel commonly used by ships is a mixture of diesel and low-quality oil known as "Bunker C," which is particularly polluting because of high levels of carbon and sulfur. If not consumed by ships, it would otherwise be considered a waste product. The shipping industry is anticipating major growth over the next few years; the port of Los Angeles alone projects a 50 percent increase over the next decade. Increased air transport is even more damaging than shipping. Each ton of freight moved by plane uses forty-nine times as much energy per kilometer as when it's moved by ship. A physicist at Boeing once described the pollution from the takeoff of a single 747 like "setting the local gas station on fire and flying it over your neighborhood." A two-minute takeoff by a 747 is equal to 2.4 million lawnmowers running for twenty minutes. Ocean pollution from shipping has reached crisis levels, and there have been direct effects of these huge ships on wildlife and fisheries. Even more serious, possibly, is the epidemic increase of bioinvasions, a significant cause of species extinction. With the growth of global transport, billions of creatures are on the move. Invasive species, brought by global trade, often out compete native species and bring pollution or health crises. In the United States, the emergence of the West Nile virus where it never existed before is due to increased transport activity. So is the spread of malaria and dengue fever. Ocean shipping also requires increased refrigeration—contributing to ozone depletion and climate change— and an increase in packaging and the wood pallets used for cargo loading; these are little-noted but significant factors in increased pressure on global forests. Global conversion of agriculture from diverse, small-scale local farms to giant, chemical-intensive industrial production for export markets has also brought terrible environmental destruction to lands and waters across the planet. (See also chapter 6.) The central point is this: if you are going to design a system built on the premise that dramatically increased global trade and transport is good, you are guaranteed to bring on these kinds of environmental problems. They are intrinsic to the model.

#### Only ALT makes it sustainable

**Zehner, visting scholar at University California Berkley, 2012**

(Ozzie Green Illusions, pg 175, ldg)

There's another problem. Even though energy consumers might not spend their efficiency savings to buy more energy, they may choose to spend these savings on other products or endeavors that still lead to energy consumption. In this case, energy-efficiency measures can unintentionally inspire other types of consumption, leaving overall energy footprints unchanged or even larger. This occurs at the macroeconomic level as well. In short, energy-efficiency savings frequently lead to larger profits, which spur more growth and thus higher energy consumption. For instance, another Rocky Mountain Institute study shows that reducing drafts, increasing natural light, and otherwise making workplaces more efficient, can increase worker productivity by as much as 16 percent.6 This higher productivity allows firms to grow, and the resulting labor cost savings can be spent on new machinery, buildings, or expansion. These rebound effects often dwarf the original energy-efficiency effects, leading to far greater overall energy consumption.7 In fact, the authors of a central report on the rebound effect conclude, "While the promotion of energy efficiency has an important role to play in achieving a sustainable economy, it is unlikely to be sufficient while rich countries continue to pursue high levels of economic growth."8 Thus, efficiency efforts will only prove effective as long as we institute contemporaneous reforms to move from a consumption-based economy to one grounded in sufficiency.

### 2nc war turn

#### Uniqueness is on our side---neoliberalism’s collapsing in the rest of the world---the question is whether the U.S. can coopt the global response to the crisis and extend market hegemony

Stephen Gill 12, Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science, York University, Toronto, and a former Distinguished Scholar in International Political Economy of the International Studies Association, 2012, Global Crises and the Crisis of Global Leadership, p. 2-4

Indeed, in several parts of the world, this neoliberal governing formula of authoritarianism and/or controlled electoral democracy/depoliticization is coming under increasing, popular, grassroots pressure. It is not just in Latin America that this is happening, where, in Venezuela and Bolivia, ‘twenty-first-century’ socialism has produced a substantial shift towards a new political order, consolidating progressive, more democratic constitutional forms as well as new regional economic and security alliances outside US control. In early 2011 a wave of Arab revolt, originating in Tunisia, spread throughout the Middle East. It encompassed not only the epicentre of Arab civilization, in Egypt, but also moved quickly to Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain. It was met initially with repression in some contexts, particularly brutal in Libya, provoking civil war and panic in the oil markets. In Tunisia and Egypt, peaceful protests – with protesters, apparently, behaving en masse as a form of revolutionary collective leadership – quickly forced the resignation of their long-standing military dictators. Demands were made for a new political order, with more democracy, redistribution and meaningful rights. The protests were motivated by a variety of grievances but originated in outrage concerning the way that authoritarian and dictatorial leaders had, particularly since the early 1990s, orchestrated policies directed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of neoliberal restructuring, including privatization, to plunder the state and the economy for themselves and for their business allies – while the majority suffered poverty, mass unemployment, and soaring food prices as well as repression and a denial of basic rights and dignity. This state of affairs was widely perceived as being orchestrated by the strategic interests of the United States and Israel with Arab leaders as its subordinates, despite widespread popular opposition to Israeli policies, particularly in Palestine. The regional uprisings drew on a broad swathe of spontaneous and organized secular forces in ways that put to rest the Orientalist myth that inheres in the ‘clash of civilizations’ hypothesis – specifically, that Muslim masses can be mobilized only through religion (see Chapter 8, by Mustapha Pasha). The uprisings also refute ‘the claim of American-sponsored dictators that they are the great bulwark against a rising tide of “Islamo-fascism” (a word of American coinage) that is sweeping the Arab lands. What are in fact sweeping across the Arab world today are the good old values of the French Revolution’ (Ahmad 2011).1 What these revolutionary changes share is their secular, democratic form and a repudiation of years of imperialism and neoliberal restructuring. In the Arab world they herald, particularly given the novel ways in which they combine spontaneous and organized forces in a mass collective leadership, ‘the autumn of the patriarchs’ (Ahmad 2011). These forms seem to be consistent with an emergent ‘postmodern prince’ (see Chapter 13). By contrast, neoliberal leadership operates from the ‘top down’ to underpin ‘market civilization’ and its governing discourse of ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ (Gill 1995a). Such leadership – which operates systematically to favour affluent strata of the population – seeks to stabilize dominant power structures and strategies of rule, albeit with some marginal modifications under crisis conditions in ways that do not fundamentally challenge the dominant modes of accumulation and power. This formula is what we can expect to guide the powerful Egyptian army in the aftermath of President Mubarak’s resignation, taking its political guidance from the United States and Israel. Whether this moment signals not only the probable end of patriarchal leadership but, more acutely, the end of disciplinary neoliberalism in the Arab world is a more open question. Neoliberalism can go with authoritarian, technocratic or, indeed, limited electoral forms of leadership and indirect democracy. Strategic cooperation between Israel, Egypt and the United States guarantees Israeli domination of the region; Egypt offers the Pentagon a crucial military platform and privileged access to the Suez Canal, and so the United States will seek to maintain its strategic assets in Egypt. The United States may ‘allow a controlled democratizing process . . . and hope that the elections held under this umbrella will be won mainly by the liberal, IMF-oriented elite’ – the very outcome, Aijaz Ahmad (2011) notes, that many of the protesters have hoped for. Progressive forces seeking an authentic revolution may therefore come to be co-opted and constrained in a ‘passive revolution’, to use Antonio Gramsci’s phrase (Hoare and Nowell-Smith 1971). This global situation helps form some of the backdrop to the considerations of this volume. Indeed, one of the key features of disciplinary neoliberalism since its emergence in the 1970s is how, until now, its crises of accumulation (e.g. debt and financial crises) have also provided opportunities for dominant forces to extend and deepen neoliberalism as a geopolitical project, as I noted in the early 1990s (Gill 1990; see also Panitch, Albo and Chibber 2011). In the present conjuncture, dominant forces in the global North have taken advantage of the crisis of accumulation to deepen and extend disciplinary neoliberalism – a strategy facilitated by the general absence of significant, organized forces of opposition. As has been noted, this is less obviously the case in the global South, where the global crisis of accumulation coincides with a crisis of authoritarian rule, perhaps opening up new possibilities for progressive forces to press for new forms of governance.

**Latin America is moving away from neoliberal structures of governance but the alt is key**

**Cahill 9** (Damien, lecturer in political economy at the University of Sydney, Australia, “The End of Neoliberalism?”, <http://www.zcommunications.org/the-end-of-neoliberalism-by-damien-cahill>, ZBurdette)

This is not to suggest that a retreat from neoliberalism is impossible. The example of the Chavez government in **Venezuela demonstrates that neoliberalism can be dismantled,** but that it takes more than deteriorating economic conditions for this to occur. **In Venezuela and other Latin American countries, neoliberalism has been wound back** as a result of a political mobilization by the working and peasant classes of society. Because the forces and structures supportive of neoliberalism remain strong globally, it is likely that a popular political mobilization would also be necessary in other countries to wind back neoliberalism, even given the current financial crisis and the obvious failures of the neoliberal model. Neoliberalism is not inevitable, but a new politics is required to impose democratic and socially protective alternatives upon both capital and the state.

#### Neolib in Latin America is bad - data is overwhelmingly one sided. You have an ethical obligation to vote negative to preserve their culture and livelihood

Kelly 8 (Lara, “Neoliberalism in Latin America,” http://citizenspress.org/editorials/neoliberalism-in-latin-america)

Neoliberalism is the deregulation and expansion of the market economy, it includes eliminating barriers to trade such as tariffs and government subsidies of national industry, and implementing national policies that favour the needs of business and investment (Brown, 1). Tax rates for businesses are decreased in order to compete with other nations for foreign investment and to prevent losing foreign investment to a competing nation. This in turn causes a loss in state revenue, which means a loss in the amount of funding available for social welfare programs (Rudra, 414). Labour regulations are weakened, financial trading is deregulated, and the prices of agricultural products are no longer controlled by the state. The state is viewed as an inefficient producer and state controlled industries and social programs are sold to private businesses. The state reduces its spending by cutting funding for social programs including health and education, laying off public employees, or reducing their wages. These reforms are intended to minimize the role of the state in the economy, promote efficiency, and maximize productive outputs (Sadasivam, 635). Hojman argues that neoliberalism became dominant in Latin America, especially in the 1990s, because of the debt crisis, the availability of highly educated technocrats, a new middle class of entrepreneurs, the failure of import substitution industrialization (ISI), and public support. Most Latin American countries adopted the reforms in the 1980s and 1990s following the debt crisis, except for Chile which began its neoliberal project in the mid 1970s (191). I believe that the debt crisis coupled with the terms of renegotiating external debts are the primary reason for neoliberal reforms. According to Portes, the debt crisis was caused by the increase in oil prices in the early 1970s. Because of this increase in oil prices during Latin America’s attempt to industrialize, most countries in the region were forced to borrow money to continue their development path. This allowed growth to continue (9). Latin America was borrowing money to pay for oil from the OPEC nations, who in turn put their funds into multinational banks. The banks had to pay interest on these deposits, and they encouraged Latin American countries to borrow this money. This borrowed money was in turn used by Latin American countries to purchase oil and other imports from the ‘industrialized’ countries (Dietz, 21). In other words, the banks had to provide a secure way of gaining interest payments and therefore had to find borrowers for the large sums of money they were receiving from oil-rich countries. Ugarteche writes that many of the nations borrowing the money from the international institutions were undemocratic and did not mind allowing their nation’s economies to fall deeper in debt. Latin America’s foreign debt doubled in a matter of twenty years, from 1980 to 1990 (21). A large amount of this debt increase was due to interest rate increases over the period. The risks of interest increases fell solely on the borrower nations (23). As the interest rates climbed, exports from Latin America fell in price which caused many nations to threaten to default on their loans (21). Defaulting on foreign loans is not good for the lenders or the borrowers. Therefore most banks and nations agreed renegotiation was better than declaring bankruptcy. Before a nation was permitted to enter renegotiation talks, however, the international lending institutions, namely the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), required the imposition of structural adjustment policies on the indebted nations. These requirements followed neoliberal ideology, and included the changes to government economic and social policies discussed above (Ugarteche, 23). These policies were forced on countries to ensure repayment to the institutions. The banks disregarded the effects these reforms would have on citizens, since caring about people’s lives would not be helpful to their goal of collecting money with interest. The consequences of neoliberalist policies are far reaching for any nation, but particularly hurtful for the majority of Latin American residents. Income inequality has increased in most nations that have implemented the reforms (Bray, 68). Job losses and subsequent higher unemployment rates resulted due to the sale of state run enterprises and the scaling back of the public service (Kurtz, 269). Because of the removal of subsidies on necessary items such as fuel, food, and social services their prices have increased (Crisp & Kelly, 542). When Fujimori, the former president of Peru came to power in 1990, he immediately undertook neoliberal reforms. Immediately following there was an increase in the price of gasoline by 3000%, telephone and water prices increased by 1300%, and electricity prices increased by 5300% (Hays-Mitchell, 72). Another aspect of neoliberal restructuring policies is the encouragement and creation of export processing zones (EPZs). Export processing zones are parcels of territory where special laws exist regarding production. These zones are meant to attract foreign investments. The incentives offered to corporations include the ability to import without tax, minimal corporate income tax, freedom from labour unions, lessened regulations on the environment and labour, and state subsidized infrastructure (Teeple, 89). Transnational corporations have the ability to invest in whichever country they please, and EPZs offer an extreme advantage in that the production costs to corporations are minimal in these zones. Wages are low, infrastructure costs are born by the state, and employee protections are nil (Teeple 90-91). Hojman argues that in Mexico EPZs helped to create a new middle class of transnational executives, public servants, politicians, professionals, tradespeople and media personnel (202). He does not specify if these people are those who have improved their standard of living due to employment opportunities within EPZs. I assume he is referring to people attracted to the export-processing zones in order to profit from the increased production activities. It is unclear why he makes this argument, because chances are, these upper-class people have always been upper-class, and the fact that they have moved to an EPZ does not mean anything for the regular worker in these zones. Contrary to Hojman, Sadasivam has shown that EPZs profit from women’s cheap labour, and offer jobs which are repetitive in nature and dead-end. These women are targeted for these jobs because of their ‘vulnerability, docility and dispensability’ and the jobs do not include any security or safety requirements from the employer. She uses the example of EPZs in the Dominican Republic where the women must endure “strict discipline, sexual harassment, low pay, occupational health hazards, excessive and forced overtime, and arbitrary suspension and dismissal for protesting or organizing” (642-643). The rationale of neoliberalism causes states to be judged solely on their ability to secure economic growth. This ensures the legitimacy of the government (Brown, 4). Therefore, the government gives up control to the market, and if economic growth ensues, the state itself is legitimized. Neoliberal ideology does not consider the well being of people and linking legitimacy to economic growth indicators alone greatly reduces the perceived responsibility of the government (and the political process itself), to care for and protect its citizens. Brown claims that the adoption of neoliberal policies does not mean that the state has control over the market, but rather the state cedes this control to the market which directs the actions of government and society (4). Nations compete with one another for large corporate investments. They offer incentives such as lower taxes and free infrastructure. This money is taken from the budget of the country and placed into the hands of corporate investors instead of going to programs which would improve social welfare. This indicates a degree of control over budgetary process which is taken from the hands of a democratic populous and placed into the hands of transnational corporations (Weyland, 144). The people in Latin America view large corporations as equally powerful as their own governments which they elected. When the elected officials create policy which is not beneficial to the majority of the people, democracy is lessened (Weyland, 145). Or non-existent. A guise which legitimates dominant international power structures. Democracy cannot live up to its definition when people have lost control of the distribution of their resources to international financial institutions and large corporations. In effect, the democratic state hands power to undemocratic actors. The IMF, which controls the public policy of many Latin American countries is a good example. Cypher notes that international lending institutions such as the IMF are made of representatives from various states. They are not all equal however, as nations who contribute more funding to the banks receive more votes, and in the case of the US, the option to veto (71). Through an undemocratic voting process in international financial institutions such as the IMF, the US can ensure its corporate interests are heeded in countries where US companies are extracting profits. According to Kurtz, business interests are at the forefront of state policy under neoliberalism. Because the decisions and actions of business affect the growth prospects of nations, governments must consider their interests when making policy decisions, which leaves other groups with a weaker voice (268). Corporate interest groups are the only internal groups with access to state decision-making where neoliberalism prevails. External groups such as multinational lending institutions and transnational corporations also enjoy access to state policy formation (Grugel, 4). Grugel uses the example of large agribusinesses which now produce almost 25% of agricultural outputs in Central America (4). In order for transnational capital to manipulate internal state conditions for its own benefit, it needs exclusive access to the decision-making process of governments. Oneal says that historically, democratic regimes in Latin America have received less investment from the US than authoritarian regimes, and those investments in countries with an authoritarian government have been more profitable (582). Now that most Latin American countries are formal democracies, one could argue that these democracies are not in fact real but are in place solely to legitimize the authoritarianism of the international capitalist system. This new form of concealed authoritarianism successfully prevents democratic opposition by transferring real decision-making out of the hands of elected governments and covertly controls their actions. Neoliberal reforms have happened and are happening at the same time countries in Latin America are adopting democracy. Neoliberal reforms are directly linked with increased inequality, poverty, and lack of access to social support via programs sponsored by the state. In the period of ISI, interest groups would have most likely formed to counter the choices of the state if policies resulted in such outcomes (Kurtz, 264). Under ISI, the state could regulate and somewhat control the marketplace. In this way, citizens could hold the state responsible for their quality of life. This also meant that the state had an incentive to provide for its citizens (Kurtz, 269). Statism can promote oppositional expression (Kurtz, 270). When the state controls distributional outcomes, people and interest groups can articulate their dissatisfactions to a unified responsible body, unlike mobile capital. Munck points out that privatizing and deregulating the market left the state with less control over the lives of its people (92). Therefore, the state has been removed from the focus of protest groups because it is no longer a controlling factor in their lives. When there are more neoliberal economic reforms implemented within a state it appears that there are less accounts of political mobilization. Political activities against a government tend to happen more frequently under authoritarian regimes where it is more difficult to enact protest activities, rather than happening more frequently in a democratic setting where it is easier to demonstrate opposition. Under authoritarianism the people have an obvious target to express their dissatisfaction, whereas under a more liberalized economic regime, individuals have conflicting interests and complaints against various targets (Kurtz, 294). It is not democracy which prevents opposition, but liberalization. Many Latin American states were democratic and statist and their citizenry were more mobilized and politically active. Although neoliberalism has weakened democracy in Latin America, it also seems to have secured it in most countries, at least in terms of procedure. One of the reasons why democracy could have survived the reform process is because the reforms were enacted during a time of crisis, and the population was willing to take drastic measures in hopes of higher economic stability (Weyland, 136). A secure system of democratic formal procedure does not mean democracy in fact exists, whether or not the reforms happened during a crises situation. Liberal democracy is undermined by neoliberalism in that social policy must prove profitable, competition must not be hindered, and individuals must be seen as rational actors. The independence from the market of many institutions within liberal democracy such as ‘law, elections, the police, and the public sphere,’ is necessary for the preservation of a healthy tension between democracy and capitalism. Expanding the market into these previously independent realms greatly impedes democracy from performing its primary role of checks and balances (Brown, 6). Neoliberal adjustment policies which a state must undertake to renegotiate loans does not only mean that a state must reconfigure its marketplace, control wages and lower funding to social services. The state effectively loses control over its own policy making decisions to the multilateral lending institutions (Cypher, 70). Reforms transfer policy decisions out of the hands of the government and into the hands of the international economic system, therefore the social sphere of economic policy within a country becomes apolitical, and political decisions that are made do not have a direct impact on the citizenry (Kurtz, 273). Neoliberal reforms remove issues from the sphere of political action and therefore cause the decline in interest groups (Kurtz, 279). When citizens make electoral choices, they really do not have the opportunity to effect real change, since economic and social policymaking has been relegated from their government and into the hands of international capital and lending institutions. This can be seen in Latin America where social and political organizations have declined as have the amount of people showing up to vote (Weyland, 144). The individualization effect of neoliberalism promotes competition and prevents group cohesion. There is no focus point for protesting if the real power structures exist outside of the nation state. This decline in political organizations has also meant that politicians are less accountable. These organizations help people make decisions by promoting awareness of issues and forcing political accountability. They also help to advise politicians what the will of the people actually is (Kurtz, 267). Since the privatization of pensions in Chile, which happened in the early 1980s, strike activity has dramatically decreased. This indicates a lower level of political organizing. Before the pension plan was privatized, it often provoked political participation. With privatization of the program, individuals make their own decisions between various private funds (Kurtz, 276). Under more democratic regimes in Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru protesting against the state became easier and more acceptable, however, under the new regime of neoliberalism in each of these nations, political protests were reduced to less than 20% of what they were under previous authoritarian regimes (Kurtz, 289). Another example is unions. In Latin America there are many people who are without work and the focus for unions has been changed to obtaining and keeping employment rather than fighting for social benefits (Rudra, 420). Workers are forced to preoccupy themselves with secure employment rather than improving the conditions of employment. The political activism of the peasantry is also negatively impacted by neoliberal reforms. Kurtz argues that the reform of previously communal lands into individual land titles creates division within the community and breaks down the stability of their historical, social, and cultural way of life. Disputes often erupt because some villagers may decide to sell their land which causes fragmentation, land usage also causes conflicts between villagers. This in turn hampers the political actions of the peasantry, as they would traditionally act collectively but now must concern themselves primarily with their own perceived self-interest (273). In Mexico, lands which were held collectively in a legal sense since the 1930s, went under neoliberal land reform in 1992 after a change in the constitution. The land had to be divided among individuals, and this caused conflicts between the residents. All the control over dividing up the land and monitoring disputes was held by the political elites. This made the peasants more vulnerable and discouraged them from collectively organizing or speaking out against market reforms. The only state within Mexico where peasants openly resisted market reforms was in Chiapas, where land liberalization was least widespread (Kurtz, 278). Like Mexico, in Chile there existed many land cooperatives where land was legally held collectively since the early 1970s when it was legally protected by a democratically elected government. From 1975 to 1979 land counter-reform was implemented by the military dictatorship while it was extensively liberalizing the state and the market. The government privatized most of the land co-ops and half the residents were left landless and some even homeless. The land was sold to private families and agribusiness. Because of these reforms, many peasants were prevented from acting collectively to protect their communal lands and ways of life (Kurtz, 277). The cost of this type of *liberalization and individualization is incalculable*. One cannot put a figure on the *permanent loss of unique cultural livelihoods* or on the loss of the independence of traditional cultures from market or consumer culture. Trainer illustrates this point by noting that in Haiti where many people do not have enough to eat, land is “efficiently” used in a productive manner to grow flowers for export (9). While many people may not have access to land in order to adequately sustain themselves, large export businesses reap profits and contribute to the country’s overall GDP, while simultaneously impoverishing its citizenry. Inherent property rights are to blame for this ironic situation, I think he could have taken his point further by examining the issue of property rights, especially how they are promoted and protected for corporations in a liberal market-oriented state, and how this kind of injustice is not viewed as unethical giving their inherent value within neoliberal ideology. Liberal democracy is being hijacked by neoliberalism in Latin America. This new neoliberal order is a form of authoritarianism to which it is increasingly difficult to mount opposition. The interference of international lending institutions in a sovereign nation’s budgetary policy-making nullifies an essential process inherent in healthy liberal democracies. Innocent workers, peasants, women, men, and children all pay for the actions of international lending institutions who often loaned money to undemocratic regimes. The re-configuration of Latin American society in order to repay already rich nations is a global injustice. Human rights to sustenance, culture, political process, labour standards, and self-determination must come before the property rights of greedy corporations.

#### Globalization causes war-exacerbates all the proximate causes.

**Staples, International Network on Disarmament and Globalization chair, 2000**

(Steven, “The relationship between globalization and militarism”, Social Justice, 27.4, proquest)

Economic inequality is growing; more conflict and civil wars are emerging. It is important to see a connection between these two situations. Proponents of global economic integration argue that globalization promotes peace and economic development of the Third World. They assert that "all boats rise with the tide" when investors and corporations make higher profits. However, there is precious little evidence that this is true and substantial evidence of the opposite. The United Nation's Human Development Report (U.N. Development Programme, 1999: 3) noted that globalization is creating new threats to human security. Economic inequality between Northern and Southern nations has worsened, not improved. There are more wars being fought today -- mostly in the Third World -- than there were during the Cold War. Most are not wars between countries, but are civil wars where the majority of deaths are civilians, not soldiers. The mainstream media frequently oversimplify the causes of these wars, with claims they are rooted in religious or ethnic differences. A closer inspection reveals that the underlying source of such conflicts is economic in nature. Financial instability, economic inequality, competition for resources, and environmental degradation -- all root causes of war -- are exacerbated by globalization. The Asian financial meltdown of 1997 to 1999 involved a terrible human cost. The economies of Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia crumbled in the crisis. These countries, previously held up by neoliberal economists as the darlings of globalization, were reduced to riots and financial ruin. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) stepped in to rescue foreign investors and impose austerity programs that opened the way for an invasion by foreign corporations that bought up assets devalued by capital flight and threw millions of people out of work. Political upheaval and conflict ensued, costing thousands of lives. Meanwhile, other countries watched as their neighbors suffered the consequences of greater global integration. In India, citizens faced corporate recolonization, which spawned a nationalistic political movement. Part of the political program was the development of nuclear weapons -- seen by many as the internationally accepted currency of power. Nuclear tests have put an already conflict-ridden region on the brink of nuclear war. 2. Globalization Fuels the Means to Wage War The world economic system promotes military economies over civilian economies, pushing national economic policies toward military spending. The World Trade Organization (WTO), one of the main instruments of globalization, is largely based on the premise that the only legitimate role for a government is to provide for a military to protect the interests of the country and a police force to ensure order within. The WTO attacks governments' social and environmental policies that reduce corporate profits, and it has succeeded in having national laws that protect the environment struck down. Yet the WTO gives exemplary protection to government actions that develop, arm, and deploy armed forces and supply a military establishment. Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) allows governments free reign for actions taken in the interest of national security. For example, in 1999 a WTO trade panel ruled against a Canadian government program that provided subsidies to aerospace and defense corporations for the production of civilian aircraft. Within weeks, the Canadian military announced a new $30 million subsidy program for the same Canadian corporations, but this time the money was for production of new weapons (Canadian Press, 1999). In this case, the government was forced down the path of a military economy. Contrast this WTO ruling with the billions of dollars the Pentagon gives to American weapons corporations for developing and producing military aircraft. The $309-billion U.S. military budget dwarfs the budgets of all its potential enemies combined, and with the collapse of the Soviet Union the U.S. faces no imminent military challengers. This large budget is, for all practical purposes, a corporate subsidy. Because the corporations involved happen to be building weapons, the subsidy is protected under GATT's Article XXI. The use of military spending to develop a country's industrial and economic base has not been lost on Third World countries. Though struggling to lift itself from apartheid-era poverty and accompanying social problems, South Africa is spending billions of dollars on aircraft, warships, and even submarines in an effort to develop its economy. South Africa stipulated that the arms it buys must be partially manufactured in South Africa. Finance Minister Trevor Manuel explained that the increase in military spending would allow "the National Defence Force to upgrade equipment, while providing a substantial boost to South African industry, foreign investment, and exports" (Engelbrecht, 1999). South Africa's performance requirements would be wide open to WTO challenges if they were for building schools, hospitals, transportation infrastructure, or virtually anything except weapons. South Africa is about to make the same mistake Northern industrialized countries made: it is creating new military projects that will become dependent on perpetual government funding, drawing money away from essential social programs. When the current weapons orders have been filled and government funding dries up, weapons corporations will have to find new customers to maintain current job levels, driving the arms trade and potentially causing a whole new arms race in the region. The Military-Corporate Complex Since the end of the Cold War, President Eisenhower's 1960s-era military-industrial complex has been fundamentally challenged by globalization. Globalization has weakened the powers of the nation-state, while freeing corporations to move profits and operations across national boundaries. Defense/military contractors, once considered part of the national industrial base and regulated and nurtured as such, are becoming detached from the nation-state and are able to pursue their interests independently. Globalization and the transnationalization of defense/military corporations have replaced the military-industrial complex of the Cold War economy with a military-corporate complex of the new global economy. This is based upon the dominance of corporate interests over those of the state. The weakened state is no longer able to reign in weapons corporations and is trapped increasingly by corporate interests: greater military spending, state subsidies, and a liberalization of the arms trade. Increased military production and the proliferation of weaponry take place without considering the costs of militarization to international diplomacy and peace. In many industrialized nations, government military spending has increased since the end of the Cold War. Lockheed Martin, Boeing, BAe Systems (formerly British Aerospace), Raytheon, Thomson-CSF, and DaimlerChrysler Aerospace are all part of the military-corporate complex. Formerly national in orientation, these corporations have become transnational, with enormous revenues and tremendous economic and political power. Boeing alone has global sales of over $50 billion and has swallowed up several competitors to become the world's largest maker of military aircraft, including advanced fighters, bombers, helicopters, and missiles. Boeing is the largest U.S. exporter, with customers in 145 countries, employees in more than 60 countries, and operations in 27 U.S. states. Worldwide, over 200,000 people receive paychecks from Boeing. Weapons corporations on both sides of the Atlantic have been merging at an unprecedented rate in recent years. In the U.S., Boeing has merged with McDonnell Douglas, Hughes Helicopters, and Rockwell International; Lockheed with Martin Marietta and General Dynamics; Northrop with Grumman and Westinghouse; and Raytheon with Hughes Aerospace & Defense and Texas Instruments Defense. In Europe, British Aerospace has taken over GEC Marconi, and France's Aerospatiale Matra has merged with Germany's DaimlerChrysler Aerospace and Spain's CASA. Weapons corporations are merging to compete more forcefully for a dominant share of the lucrative but highly competitive global arms market. In 1998, arms imports amounted to $22 billion, with Third World countries accounting for over half of this market. Until the late 1990s, transatlantic mergers of defense/military contractors had been prohibited by governments due to national security concerns. In 1999, however, the Pentagon admitted that U.S. and European mergers were inevitable and accorded national treatment to BAe Systems, allowing it to be awarded military contracts as if it were an American corporation. These mergers produce ever-larger and more powerful weapons-producing corporations. These newly merged corporations are able to greatly influence, even dictate, government defense and military policy. Government regulations have been weakened or removed altogether. For example, export controls designed to prevent weapons from being sold to countries at war or to countries that violate human rights are narrowly interpreted so that they do not interfere with corporate profits. Foreign embassies and trade missions abroad are used to aid arms sales. 3. The Threat of Military Force Is Used to Protect Corporate Interests According to New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, "the hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist. McDonald's cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the builder of the F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps" (Friedman, 1999). Friedman illuminates the strategic relationship that exists between corporations and militaries. As globalization extends the reach of corporate interests around the world, a matching military capacity must be deployed to protect those interests. This is the underlying reason the U.S. military maintains the capacity to wage two major wars in different regions of the world simultaneously. There is nothing new about Friedman's "hidden fist." Military supremacy has always been a prerequisite for economic integration into a sphere of influence or an empire. One can see this in the settling of the New World, when the network of military forts and outposts suppressed First Nations peoples and opened North America for settlers, prospectors, and industry barons. Outer space is the next frontier to be made safe for corporations, according to U.S. military strategists. In Vision for 2020, the U.S. Space Command revealed that the "U.S. Space Command [is] dominating the space dimensions of military operations to protect U.S. interests and investment" (United States Space Command, 1997). Conclusion Globalization is driving a global war economy and creating the conditions for tremendous loss of human life. Many writers and researchers have documented the decline in human rights, social justice, environmental standards, and democracy caused by globalization. The inevitable outcome of globalization will be more wars -- especially in the Third World where globalization has its harshest effects. Meanwhile, the elites of the industrialized world are confident that the global economy will continue to provide them with wealth created from the resources and labor of the Third World. Their technologically advanced militaries will protect them and their investments, insulating them from the violent effects of globalization.

### 2nc perm do both

#### No residual link – the plan itself is neoliberal

**Gonzalez, law prof, 3** (Carmen, Assistant Professor, Seattle University School of Law, Tulane Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 16, p. 685, 2003, “Seasons of Resistance: Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security in Cuba”, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=987944>, ZBurdette)

Notwithstanding these problems, the greatest challenge to the agricultural development strategy adopted by the Cuban government in the aftermath of the Special Period is likely to be external—the renewal of trade relations with the United States. From the colonial era through the beginning of the Special Period, economic development in Cuba has been constrained by Cuba’s relationship with a series of primary trading partners. Cuba’s export-oriented sugar monoculture and its reliance on imports to satisfy domestic food needs was imposed by the Spanish colonizers, reinforced by the United States, and maintained during the Soviet era.410 It was not until the collapse of the socialist trading bloc and the strengthening of the U.S. embargo that Cuba was able to embark upon a radically different development path.

Cuba was able to transform its agricultural development model as a consequence of the political and economic autonomy occasioned by its relative economic isolation, including its exclusion from major international financial and trade institutions.411 Paradoxically, while the U.S. embargo subjected Cuba to immense economic hardship, it also gave the Cuban government free rein to adopt agricultural policies that ran counter to the prevailing neoliberal model and that protected Cuban farmers against ruinous competition from highly subsidized agricultural producers in the United States and the European Union.412 Due to U.S. pressure, Cuba was excluded from regional and international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.413 Cuba also failed to reach full membership in any regional trade association and was barred from the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).414 However, as U.S. agribusiness clamors to ease trade restrictions with Cuba, the lifting of the embargo and the end of Cuba’s economic isolation may only be a matter of time.415

It is unclear how the Cuban government will respond to the immense political and economic pressure from the United States to enter into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that would curtail Cubansovereignty and erode protection for Cuban agriculture.416 If Cuba accedes to the dictates of agricultural trade liberalization, it appears likely that Cuba’s gains in agricultural diversification and food self-sufficiency will be undercut by cheap, subsidized food imports from the United States and other industrialized countries.417 Furthermore, Cuba’s experiment with organic and semi-organic agriculture may be jeopardized if the Cuban government is either unwilling or unable to restrict the sale of agrochemicals to Cuban farmers—as the Cuban government failed to restrict U.S. rice imports in the first half of the twentieth century.418

Cuba is once again at a crossroads—as it was in 1963, when the government abandoned economic diversification, renewed its emphasis on sugar production, and replaced its trade dependence on the United States with trade dependence on the socialist bloc. In the end, the future of Cuban agriculture will likely turn on a combination of external factors (such as world market prices for Cuban exports and Cuba’s future economic integration with the United States) and internal factors (such as the level of grassroots and governmental support for the alternative development model developed during the Special Period). While this Article has examined the major pieces of legislation that transformed agricultural production in Cuba, and the government’s implementation of these laws, it is important to remember that these reforms had their genesis in the economic crisis of the early 1990s and in the creative legal, and extra-legal, survival strategies developed by ordinary Cubans.419 The distribution of land to thousands of small producers and the promotion of urban agriculture were in response to the self-help measures undertaken by Cuban citizens during the Special Period. As the economic crisis intensified, Cuban citizens spontaneously seized and cultivated parcels of land in state farms, along the highways, and in vacant lots, and started growing food in patios, balconies, front yards, and community gardens. Similarly, the opening of the agricultural markets was in direct response to the booming black market and its deleterious effect on the state’s food distribution system. Finally, it was the small private farmer, the neglected stepchild of the Revolution, who kept alive the traditional agroecological techniques that formed the basis of Cuba’s experiment with organic agriculture. The survival of Cuba’s alternative agricultural model will therefore depend, at least in part, on whether this model is viewed by Cuban citizens and by the Cuban leadership as a necessary adaptation to severe economic crisis or as a path-breaking achievement worthy of pride and emulation.

The history of Cuban agriculture has been one of resistance and accommodation to larger economic and political forces that shaped the destiny of the island nation. Likewise, the transformation of Cuban agriculture has occurred through resistance and accommodation by Cuban workers and farmers to the hardships of the Special Period. The lifting of the U.S. economic embargo and the subjection of Cuba to the full force of economic globalization will present an enormous challenge to the retention of an agricultural development model borne of crisis and isolation. Whether Cuba will be able to resist the re-imposition of a capital-intensive, export-oriented, import-reliant agricultural model will depend on the ability of the Cuban leadership to appreciate the benefits of sustainable agriculture and to protect Cuba’s alternative agricultural model in the face of overwhelming political and economic pressure from the United States and from the global trading system.

#### Perm just re-brands dissent into a new enclosure-creates cooption.

Neubauer 12 (Robert J, is a Phd Student at the School of Communications at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver “Dialogue, Monologue, or Something in Between? Neoliberal Think Tanks in the Americas,” http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/viewfile/1481/789)

As Mato (1997, 2003, 2005, 2008) notes, transnational networks are rarely entirely unified, as elites emerge from different nations with their own institutions, histories, cultures, and political priorities. It is thereby telling that one Dialogue publication from 2009 states that “our membership is politically diverse,” including both “Republicans and Democrats from the United States,” as well as supporters of various “parties and political perspectives from elsewhere in the Americas” (IAD, 2009). This diverse ideological and regional representation may account for the fact that many of the IAD’s Latin directors do not consider themselves neoliberals, with some serving in nominally social democratic governments. As President of Chile, Lagos oversaw the establishment of national unemployment insurance and expansions in public education (ICG, n.d.), while Foxley has argued that states “must develop some kind of social protection for those who are left out of the process of globalization” (Public Broadcasting Service [PBS], 2001). Given this divergence from neoliberal orthodoxy, it is plausible that the Dialogue aims to smooth out tensions and establish a rolling consensus around a reform agenda. This may be made easier in that virtually all Dialogue directors emerge from the economic and political institutions of the transnational neoliberal bloc and state apparatus. Tellingly, there neither seems to be labor representatives nor any members of the New Left among the IAD’s Latin directorate. Therefore, it should be unsurprising that even the Dialogue’s “social democrats” seem to have embraced the overall project of regional neoliberalization. For instance, Foxley has come to “appreciate the strength and the power of the market,” even grudgingly commending Pinochet’s economic program for “deregulating the markets” and “opening up the economy” (PBS, 2001). Regardless of occasional social democratic rhetoric, directors have been intimately involved with processes of neoliberal restructuring and transnational state consolidation. Many have worked in top-level posts with neoliberal IFIs: Director David de Ferranti served as a World Bank Vice-President (Results for Development Institute, n.d.); Foxley was a Governor of the World Bank and the IADB (CGD, n.d.); and Iglesias served as President of the IADB (n.d.) for 17 years. Other directors have been involved with neoliberal privatizations. As President of Brazil, Cardoso oversaw the most sweeping privatization program in the country’s history (Epstein, 1998; View from RBC, 2012). He was instrumental in the 1997 privatization of CVRD, now the world’s second largest mining corporation (and a key holding of Dialogue funder AIG). Cardoso also oversaw the 1998 break-up of Telebras, Latin America's biggest telecommunications firm. Board members have also facilitated transnational state formation through the negotiation and implementation of regional free trade agreements. As president of Chile, Lagos signed “expansive trade agreements with the United States, the European Union and South Korea” (Armington, Lettieri, & Slim, 2005); Iglesias chaired the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations that gave birth to the WTO (IADB, 2010); and Hills served as chief U.S. trade negotiator during the negotiations for NAFTA and the Uruguay Round, at one time declaring that the United States would open up foreign markets “with a crowbar, if necessary” (Uchitelle, 1990).

#### Try or die for the alternative alone.

**De Angelis, East London political economy professor, 2009**

(Massimo, “The tragedy of the capitalist commons”, December, <http://turbulence.org.uk/turbulence-5/capitalist-commons/>, DOA: 7-2-12, ldg)

This platform of management of the global commons is based on one key assumption: that capitalist disciplinary markets are a force for good, if only states are able to guide them onto a path of environmentally sustainable and socially inclusive growth. What this view forgets is that there is little evidence that global economic growth could be achieved with lower greenhouse gas emissions, in spite of increasingly energy-efficient new technologies, which in turn implies that alternatives might just be necessary to stop climate change. This raises the question of how we disentangle ourselves from the kind of conception of commons offered by Stiglitz, which allow solutions based on capitalist growth. COMMON INTERESTS? Commons also refer to common interests. To stay with the example of climate change, if there is any chance of significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions – without this implying some form of green authoritarianism – it is because there is a common interest in doing so. But common interests do not exist per se, they have to be constructed, a process that has historically proven to be riddled with difficulties – witness the feminist movement’s attempts to construct a ‘global sisterhood’; or the workers’ movement’s project of a ‘global proletariat’. This is partly the case because capitalism stratifies ‘women’, ‘workers’ or any other collective subject in and through hierarchies of wages and power. And therein lies the rub, because it is on the terrain of the construction of common global interests (not just around ecological issues, but also intellectual commons, energy commons, etc.) that the class struggle of the 21st century will be played out. This is where the centre of gravity of a new politics will lie. There are thus two possibilities. Either: social movements will face up to the challenge and re-found the commons on values of social justice in spite of, and beyond, these capitalist hierarchies. Or: capital will seize the historical moment to use them to initiate a new round of accumulation (i.e. growth). The previous discussion of Stiglitz’s arguments highlights the dangers here. Because Stiglitz moves swiftly from the presumed tragedy of the global commons to the need to preserve and sustain them for the purpose of economic growth. Similar arguments can be found in UN and World Bank reports on ‘sustainable development’, that oxymoron invented to couple environmental and ‘social’ sustainability to economic growth. Sustainable development is simply the sustainability of capital. This approach asserts capitalist growth as the sine qua non common interest of humanity. I call commons that are tied to capitalist growth distorted commons, where capital has successfully subordinated non-monetary values to its primary goal of accumulation. The reason why common interests cannot simply be postulated is that we do not reproduce our livelihoods by way of postulations – we cannot eat them, in short. By and large, we reproduce our livelihoods by entering into relations with others, and by following the rules of these relations. To the extent that the rules that we follow in reproducing ourselves are the rules of capitalist production – i.e. to the extent that our reproduction depends on money – we should question the operational value of any postulation of a common interest, because capitalist social relations imply precisely the existence of injustices, and conflicts of interest. These exist, on the one hand, between those who produce value, and those who expropriate it; and, on the other, between different layers of the planetary hierarchy. And, it is not only pro-growth discourses that advocate the distorted commons that perpetuate these conflicts at the same time as they try to negate them. The same is true of environmental discourses that do not challenge the existing social relations of production through which we reproduce our livelihoods. Given that these assertions are somewhat abstract, let us try to substantiate them by testing a central environmental postulate on subjects who depend on capitalist markets for the reproduction of their livelihoods.

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#### Try or die-only way to create a system not centered on profit.

**Sachs et al., Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy, 2012**

(Wolfgang, “Critique of the Green Economy Toward Social and Environmental Equity”, <http://boell.org/downloads/Critique_of_the_Green_Economy.pdf>, DOA: 6-27-12, ldg)

In all the old industrial countries the times of high economic growth are past. Experts now argue over whether we should expect a slight rise in economic output year on year or zero growth punctuated by upswings and downswings. Yet that takes no account of the green transformation of society and the economy. A strategy of eco-efficiency (“better”), environmental sustainability (“different”) and self-restraint (“less”) has fewer prospects of growth. In a post-growth society the renewable sectors of the economy will need to grow while the fossil ones shrink, but on balance it must be assumed that in the long term growth rates will be negative. How will a non-growing economy work, if everyone has a lower income than before? To this key question, which will define the next few decades, there are broadly speaking two answers – a reactionary one and a progressive one. The reactionary answer involves enduring a period of loss of growth accompanied by increasing inequality, social exclusion and impoverishment. The progressive one sees us investing in a new model of wealth that ensures that everyone has enough, because it is based on a different equilibrium between the economy and society. The progressive answer does not just fall from the sky; we must prepare for it over the forthcoming years and decades. Strengthening society as against the economy needs new types of infrastructure for different ways of thinking. The commons are a fundamental feature of our present reality. People can only survive and thrive if they have access to nature, to family and friends, and to language and culture. While this may seem obvious, it is hard to find a public and political language in which to talk about the commons. If we speak of the economy, the concepts of the market and the state dominate everything else. If we speak of politics, what comes to mind is the polarization of right and left. Hardly anyone mentions the commons – as though nothing of significance exists outside the market and the state. These two concepts are like two communicating tubes: a lot of market on one side and not much state on the other; not much market on one side and a lot of state on the other. Yet historians and anthropologists have long been at pains to point out that exchanging goods via the market or via the state are only two ways in which goods can be distributed – there is a third way: exchange in the community. The first way is governed by the principle of competition and the second by the principle of planning, while in the third the emphasis is on mutuality. In any society the three distributive principles usually mingle, but over the last two centuries something new has happened: the principle of mutuality has steadily lost ground. Since Adam Smith the relationship between the market and the state, between competition and planning, has become the main dispute, while the principle of mutuality has become the big loser. Social groups such as families, relatives, neighborhoods, networks of friends, cooperatives and similar economic forms have been sucked into a vortex of decline from which by turns the market and the state have emerged victorious. In a post-growth society this development must be reversed. Or rather: it must move forwards. The commons are another source of wealth in addition to the market and the state. They form the basis of social communities, especially at four levels: Firstly, at the natural level all humans depend on water, forests, soil, fishing grounds, species diversity, countryside, air and the atmosphere and on the life processes embedded in them. As biological beings they have a right to natural assets, regardless of and with precedence over any private ownership of natural stocks. Secondly, at the social level places such as squares, parks, courtyards and public gardens, as well as post-work leisure, holidays and free time, are essential if social networks are to develop. Thirdly, as far as the cultural level is concerned, it is obvious that language, memory, customs and knowledge are basic to the creation of any material or non-material product. As cultural beings, the spirits and fates of every person ultimately rely on the achievements of others. And finally, fourthly, at the digital level: production and exchange on the Internet work best if access to stored data is not impeded. For free navigation in the virtual world it is important that neither software codes nor the wealth of uploaded documents, sounds and pictures are locked away by excessive property claims. Restoring the strength of the commons requires a different perspective on the economy. What actually is property? And what legitimates the ownership of property? What sounds like a philosophical discussion has practical consequences. If the concept of property does not discriminate clearly between possession and use there is little hope either for the shepherd who lets his sheep graze here one day and there the next, or for the Internet surfer who downloads articles and pictures. And what actually is competition? If competition is understood as “costriving” (and the German word for competition, “Konkurrenz,” has the same Latin root as the English “concur”) rather than as “survival of the fittest,” then small traders and software specialists can breathe again. And what does creating value actually mean? If it means only monetary value created by selling goods and services, then work in the home, neighborhood services, community organizations and peer groups are left out in the cold. And – the most fundamental question of all – what actually is money? If we make no distinction between money as a means of exchange and credit and money as a means of enrichment and speculation, the whole economy is listing dangerously – in nautical terms it is a disaster waiting to happen. Looking at the economy from a different angle reveals important aspects that could be relevant to a no-growth economy. Alongside the formal economy there is a relational economy that is concerned not with material things but with relationships between people. The ambit of the relational economy is wide and can range from traditional associations such as sports clubs and church communities, together with businesses of the classical type such as shops and repair services, to post-modern manifestations such as car-sharing schemes and community solar energy projects. Different forms of commitment can arise: friendships, self-help groups and neighborhood services as well as welfare organizations, local businesses and Internet services. Forms of the relational economy can be found in different sectors: relating to food, the care of the sick and elderly, service provision and everyday needs, and in sports and entertainment. At the core is an economy that is built on social relationships, a “care economy.” It cares for children, young people, the sick and the elderly. It brings together parents, educators and carers of all types. Of course it also demonstrates the difficulties that a relational economy has to contend with: care work, family relationships, local communities and private organizations will need to be financially and structurally reorganized. This reorganization must also extend to relationships between the genders if the inherited gender-based division of labor that is predicated on gender hierarchy is not to become even more firmly entrenched. The “care economy,” and with it the whole concept of the relational economy, will be derailed if men and women do not participate equally. Caring must undergo a political and social revaluation. In the process, paid and unpaid work must be redistributed – not just between the genders, but primarily so. Moreover, the relational economy appeals to different motives and norms than the market and the state. Competition and achievement, routine and loyalty certainly occur and can be a component of the social commons, but they can never replace voluntary action and selforganization, cooperation and enterprise. Whether in the development of Wikipedia or of urban community gardens or in the running of old people’s clubs and nursery schools – the virtue of cooperation is writ large. Cooperation, with all the attendant difficulties, is held in higher regard than competition, shared curiosity is valued more than hoarding egotism. Things are more successful if they are done with passion, commitment and a sense of responsibility – this is an old lesson that classical business administration has been slow to learn. How can an economy function without growing? This is a big question that cannot be answered without considering the hidden dimensions of wealth – and in particular of the care economy. One of these dimensions is the social commons. Although private wealth is the most frequently highlighted aspect of wealth, all the variants of community wealth are just as important. Moreover, they harbor the opportunity of creating forms of a “distributed economy” based on the model of distributed energy production – in other words, forms of local production that are linked, globally if necessary, via the Internet. Above all, though, it has become possible to imagine a form of wealth with less money. Because in the social commons services are not provided for monetary reasons, but out of a sense of community spirit, interest or solidarity, needs can be met with a lesser investment of money. For example, just as Wikipedia would be unaffordable if all the authors and editors had to be paid a fee, older people in a housing project provide caring services for each other that could never be paid for from public care budgets. The reinvention of the commons is therefore vital to the creation of an economic order for the 21st century that has been freed from the dictate of growth.

#### Stops the spread of enclosures and creates autonomy against corporate globalization.

**De Angelis, East London political economy professor, 2004**

(Massimo, “Separating the Doing and the Deed: Capital and the Continuous Character of Enclosures”, Historical Materialism; 2004, Vol. 12 Issue 2, p57-87, ebsco, ldg)

In the context of contemporary dynamics, the many types of ‘new enclosures’ 46 are deﬁned through both of these two processes of identiﬁcation. Enclosures are identiﬁed both by processes of commodiﬁcation and by processes of decommodiﬁcation; by strategies that go under the name, for example, of ‘privatisation’; or by class strategies that roll enclosures back through practices that produce commons and reinvent communities. In the ﬁrst case, they include attacks on conditions of life by a World Bank-funded dam in India threatening hundred of thousands of farming communities; cuts in social spending to pay for servicing international debt in a country of the global South; cuts in social expenditures in the UK threatening hundreds of thousands of families. In the second case, as in St George’s Hill during the English Civil War, 47 or currently in Brazil in the waves of land occupations, 48 or in the de facto mass illegal bypassing of intellectual property rights in music and software production and the establishment of ‘creative commons’, it is possible to identify enclosures as an external limit, posed by capital, to the production of commons. It is this barrier that political and social movements need to overcome through the production of commons, and often this production is the result of practices of civil disobedience and direct action, rather than of traditional party politics. Also, it is clear that these productions of commons, in the context in which capital aims at pervading the entire social ﬁeld, are at the same time struggles against enclosures. The awareness and de facto identiﬁcation of enclosures thus arises either because the production of commons problematises existing established property rights (as past enclosures), or because the struggles to defend commons established in the past problematise the threat of new enclosures attempted by states. In other words, the extent to which we are aware of enclosures is the extent to which we are confronted by them. In all other social interactions still rooted in commons of different types (take, for example, language), in commons that are not immediately threatened by enclosures, we live our lives undisturbed. Here, we are only preoccupied by the question of how we relate to each other within these commons (say, how do we speak to each other), and not whether the ‘what’ that constitutes the material basis of this ‘how’ is a common or not. We take that for granted. As we have seen, there is a vast critical literature on processes of privatisation, marketisation, cuts in entitlements both North and South, effects of structural adjustment policies, biopiracy, intellectual property rights, resource privatisation, and so on. However, not much effort has been devoted to pulling together these and other types of enclosures into a coherent whole, rooted in a critique of capital. The broad picture which I present derives from an understanding of the role of enclosure from a capitalist-systemic point of view, that is from the role which enclosures play in the accumulation of surplus-value by capital (the M-C-M’ process). From this perspective, all these different types of enclosures, and the consequent enclosure strategies, share a common character: the forcible separation of people from whatever access to social wealth they have which is not mediated by competitive markets and money as capital. Where such access exists, it empowers people in that it gives them a degree of autonomy and independence from the corporate sharks of the world economy and from competitive market relations. New enclosures thus are directed towards the fragmentation and destruction of ‘commons’, that is, social spheres of life whose main characteristic is to provide various degrees of protection from the market.